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Chapter 1
Introduction
The still ongoing financial crisis is the common thread connecting the chap-
ters of this thesis on securitization and dividend payout by banks. Triggered
by defaults on subprime mortgages in the United States, the crisis was first
labeled “The Subprime Crisis”. The risky mortgages had been securitized
and sold to investors all over the world, among others to banks. Losses on
mortgage-backed securities wiped out the banks’ capital cushions1 and trig-
gered “The (Systemic) Banking Crisis”. As a consequence, the developed
nations’ GDP dropped by 3.2% in 2009 and world trade by 12.3%;2 “The
Great Recession” emerged. Governments and central banks intervened and
were at first successful in stabilizing the financial system and reviving ag-
gregate demand. However, currently concerns about the sustainability of
mounting government debt levels have arisen and have led to the outbreak
of the sovereign “Debt Crisis” in the euro area.3
1See International Monetary Fund (2010)a, the April 2010 Global Financial Stability
Report, Figure 1.11 and Table 1.2 for an estimate of global bank writedowns by region.
2See International Monetary Fund (2010)b, the World Economic Outlook Update from
26/01/2010, Table 1.1.
3The IMF distinguishes four phases of the crisis: a systemic buildup from July 2007
to September 2008 which corresponds to the “Subprime Crisis”, a systemic outbreak form
October 2008 to March 2009 - the “Banking Crisis”, a systemic response until October 2009
capturing the government intervention to calm markets and dampen the adverse effects on
the real economy during the “Great Recession”, and a still on-going sovereign risk phase.
See Global Financial Stability Report April 2010, Box 1, page 7. For a detailed timeline
of events from the US perspective, see the Financial Crisis Timeline available on-line on
the web page of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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The focus of this thesis is on aspects of the behavior of banks both in
the run-up phase and during the financial crisis outbreak. The individual
chapters are arranged in a chronological order, reflecting the evolution of
issues concerning the banking system and resulting research ideas thereof.4
I started working on it in the early summer of 2007, at the stage of the
“Subprime Crisis”. Thus, the focus of the next two chapters is on under-
standing the trigger event: losses on asset-backed securities. The questions
addressed are why do banks engage in securitization, how does securitization
affect banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers, and how does it influence the
amount of bank credit?
Not long ago, securitization was considered by and large a beneficial fi-
nancial technique, that allows a better diversification of risk, and therefore
increases welfare. Currently asset-backed securities are being called by some
“toxic waste assets”. In a recent on-line debate on the topic of financial in-
novation and growth, organized by the Economist magazine, Joseph Stiglitz
claimed that “..[these] financial products increased the problems of informa-
tion asymmetry, exacerbating problems of moral hazard. Indeed much of
the growth of some of these products can be attributed to these information
problems, and perhaps to the deliberate exploitation of the uninformed.”5
Focusing on the information asymmetry inherent in securitization, the
second chapter of this thesis presents a simple model of securitizing banks
and investors in asset-backed securities. For the analysis I augment the
principal-agent framework used by Innes (1990) and use the optimal con-
tract proposed by him and Pennacchi (1988). I investigate how securitization
affects the quantity and quality of bank credit as well as its welfare effects
considering first a single friction: asymmetric information between originator-
underwriters and investors. Securitization is assumed to help banks to reduce
their funding costs by allowing them to circumvent capital regulation. How-
4The evolution of the crisis, as unique it may be in the detail, followed a general pattern
similar to historical financial crises, see Reinhard and Rogoff (2008). For a description of
historical patterns and crises, see further Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), among others.
5See Stiglitz (2010) in the Economist debates, ”This house believes that financial
innovation boosts economic growth”, February 23 2010. See also Ashcraft and Schuermann
(2008).
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ever, it also impairs banks’ incentives for diligent monitoring.
In its baseline version the model yields three predictions: first, securitized
loans are less well monitored than retained loans originated by the same bank,
and, second, under certain parameter values it is possible that a higher than
the first best fraction of loans is securitized. Therefore, the average quality
of loans is too low both because securitized loans are inefficiently monitored
and there may be too many of them. Third, total bank credit increases.
Overall welfare in the baseline framework is improved as the cost reduc-
tion due to securitization outweighs the adverse effects of inefficient moni-
toring. However, securitization may lead to substantial welfare losses and
mis-allocate funds away from more profitable investment projects to poorly
underwritten and thus badly performing securitized assets, if additional fric-
tions impair the willingness or ability of investors to adequately price asset-
backed securities. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) provide an overview of
the numerous interlinked frictions present in the securitization process and
conclude that a combination of five of them, has lead to the sub-prime crisis.
In the subsequent chapter, Ivan Andreev and I use a panel dataset of
506 large commercial banks in the United States to empirically investigate
how securitization affects the quality of originated loans and whether banks
engage in it to circumvent capital adequacy regulation. We are able to em-
pirically confirm the driving assumption and one of the predictions of the
theoretical model from the second chapter of this thesis.
Contrary to most previous studies we find evidence of a regulatory ar-
bitrage motive. The data further suggest that securitization impairs the
incentives for screening and monitoring by originating institutions. The
commonly used techniques for overcoming such incentive problems - seller-
provided credit enhancements - do not seem to help remedy moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. Instead sufficient levels of capital at credit insti-
tutions lead to the origination and securitization of better quality assets. Our
research indicates that capital adequacy regulation is a double-edged sword:
whereas loopholes in the regulatory framework can seduce banks to securi-
tize assets just for the sake of not having to hold regulatory capital, sufficient
levels of capital do give banks the right incentives for prudent behavior.
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In the course of the crisis governments and central banks intervened to
prevent a meltdown of the financial system. Given the large amount of tax
payers’ money at stake, both directly because it was injected in ailing banks
and indirectly because of government-guaranteed bank liabilities, concerns
arose that the capital buffers of banks may be further diminishing due to
excessive management remuneration or high dividends. Contrary to com-
pensation packages, dividends are not a contractual obligation of the banks
and, therefore, can be canceled by the management. Thus, the last chapter
of the thesis focuses on the questions: Did capital leak out of the banking
system in the form of dividends at the time of turmoil? Why did it leak and
did banks on the brink of bankruptcy continue to remunerate shareholders?
The chapter is based on a joint work with Katri Mikkonen. Using the
updated dataset of 506 large commercial banks for the United States from
chapter 3 and data on banks operating in the 27 member states of the Eu-
ropean Union, we investigate whether the surge in dividend-to-profit ratios
in 2007 and 2008 could be attributed to banks with low capital buffers or
subject to high credit risk, implying imprudent behavior and avoidance of
capital accumulation in times of crisis, as suggested by Acharya et al (2009).
For US banks participating in the government support program, we observe
a significant shift of dividend policies towards higher sensitivity to credit risk
and lesser smoothing of the dividend level over time. US banks that have not
received support have, in contrast, not significantly adjusted their dividend
policies: for these banks, dividends seem to have declined only gradually
following the sharp profitability shock, which, in the short run, has further
weakened the banks’ capital buffers. Similarly to the results on the US banks
receiving state support, European banks seem to have increased the influ-
ence of credit risk considerations on dividend decisions. However, we also
find some evidence for stronger dividend smoothing during the crisis period
compared to the period up to 2008. In sum, most of the observed surge in
payout-profit ratios can be explained by the attempt of banks to smooth the
absolute levels of dividends, as net profits have declined. We do not find any
evidence of excessive dividend payments by credit institutions with very low
capital buffers or subject to high credit risk.
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Chapter 2
Securitization, incentives, and
bank lending: A principal-agent
model
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A principal-agent model of securitization
2.1 Introduction
The core business of banks is the funding of illiquid long-term loans by col-
lecting demand deposits. The structure is crucial to give bank managers the
right incentives. The maturity mismatch of the asset and liability side of
their balance sheets makes banks prone to runs and gives rise to an inher-
ent fragility. However, it also induces relationship lenders to pay the entire
amount they expect to collect from borrowers to depositors.1 The illiquid-
ity of originated loans implies simply that banks hold them until maturity.
Ultimately, all the risk and benefits associated with a loan are bundled and
stay with the bank. This ensures a careful screening of loan applicants and
diligent monitoring once a loan has been granted.
As the current crisis evolved, it became apparent that illiquid financial
claims, i.e. mortgages, had been transformed into tradable debt securities on
a large scale. These, in turn, were sold to investors all over the world. The
large scale mortgage securitization was accompanied by origination of riskier
“sub-prime” mortgages and lax underwriting standards. High delinquencies
rates on those mortgages made the securities structured out of them worthless
and triggered a global financial crises with devastating repercussions to the
real economy.
To understand the trigger of the crisis we have to explore how the transfor-
mation of illiquid loans into marketable securities affects bank lending. This
paper focuses on the effect of securitization on incentives for diligent monitor-
ing of borrowers and on the amount of bank lending provided. I use a simple
principal-agent model featuring risk-neutral banks and risk-neutral investors
in asset-backed securities, both subject to limited liability rules. The driving
assumption in the framework is that banks have a superior knowledge about
the loans they have originated. The optimal securitization contract between
investors and banks is a debt-like covenant, as shown in a general setting by
Innes (1990). A similar optimality result for the securitization contract is
1See Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), the fragile capital
structure remedies a hold-up problem between bankers with a rare expertise in extracting
repayments from borrowers and the bankers’ creditors.
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shown by Pennacchi (1988). The contract has the basic features of real-life
true securitization, in which originating banks retain a subordinated stake,
i.e equity piece or first-loss piece, and sell a senior claim on the interest and
principal payments of the securitized loans.
Securitization allows banks to reduce their costs but gives rise to a moral
hazard problem. Ultimately banks lend more, as there are more profitable
lending opportunities given the lower funding costs. The additionally sup-
plied loans are, however, inefficiently monitored. Furthermore, banks may
be seduced into securitizing a higher fraction of loans than they would do
in the first best case. Loan quality is on average lower than optimal be-
cause securitized assets are poorly monitored and too many of them may be
securized.
The aggregate lending in the economy increases at the cost of inefficient
monitoring. Nevertheless, in this simple framework overall welfare is im-
proved as the cost reduction advantage of securitization outweighs the ad-
verse effects of inefficient monitoring. Securitization, though, can lead to
substantial welfare losses by mis-allocating funds away from more profitable
investment projects to poorly underwritten and thus badly performing loans
if investors in asset-backed securities do not carefully assess the risks associ-
ated with the securities they buy.
The literature on securitization can be traced back to Greenbaum and
Thakor’s (1987) “Banks funding modes”. In the equilibrium of their ad-
verse selection model banks hold riskier assets and securitize the “good”
ones. Pennacchi (1988) focuses on why banks engage in securitization and
which securitization contract allows banks to maximize the loan sales vol-
ume under asymmetric information. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) stress the
distortionary effect of loan sales on monitoring incentives. In a recent pa-
per Cerasi and Rochet (2008) come to the opposite conclusion. They show
that loan sales and credit derivatives can provide optimal insurance to banks
without impairing incentives. Arping (2004) and Chiesa (2008) show that
securitization may even lead to better incentives for monitoring.
My approach is closely related to Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and Pen-
nacchi (1995). I use the basic structure of a principal-agent model and the
9
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optimal securitization contract proposed by Pennacchi (1988). However, a
more general proof of the optimality of the debt-like contract is available
in Innes (1990). Therefore, I stick to Innes’ (1990) line of argument in this
paper. Using the optimal contract, I focus on how securitization affects the
aggregate amount on bank lending and the average quality of bank credit.
I use a richer setting, in which banks choose the scale of lending and are
allowed to fully retain some of the loans. Depending on whether loans are
subsequently securitized or retained, banks are allowed to monitor loans with
a different intensity. The more complex setting allows me to directly address
the question how securitization affects the amount of lending and whether
securitized loans are less carefully monitored compared to retained loans.
In the next section I briefly describe what securitization is and give a short
summary of the related literature. Subsequently, I present the regulatory
requirements and accounting practices affecting my modelling strategy in
section 2.4. I set up the baseline model in section 2.5 and describe the
securitization contract in section 2.6. To simplify the analysis I first describe
the credit market outcome in case securitization is not feasible and in case
no asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring intensity exists,
in sections 2.7 and 2.8.1. The outcomes are used as benchmarks for the
main result in sections 2.8.2 and 2.9. Subsequently I discuss the driving
assumptions and the limitations of the model in section 2.10 and conclude.
2.2 The basic securitization process
Securitization is the transformation of illiquid financial assets into tradable
securities.2 In a typical transaction3 the assets are pooled and transfered
to a separate entity settled only for the purpose of holding such assets - a
special purpose vehicle. In the next step the special purpose vehicle issues
debt-like securities and uses the proceeds to pay the originator of the assets.
The securities represent claims on the future cash flow from the underlying
2See Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), p. 379.
3See Schwarzs (1994), among others.
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asset pool.4
Ultimately, the assets are removed from the balance sheet of the “seller”
onto the asset side of the balance sheet of the special purpose entity. The
asset-backed securities are its liabilities. In the simplest possible transac-
tion only one class of securities is issued and the cash flow is distributed
proportionally to investors. More often though, special purpose vehicles is-
sue multiple classes of securities that differ in their seniority and maturity -
“tranches”. In that case, the cash flows are first distributed to the holders
of the most senior tranche. Subsequently, investors in more junior tranches
are paid. The holder of the most junior tranche, called the “equity piece” or
the “first loss piece”, is not paid until all the other investors have received
the due payments.
The order in which investors are affected by occurring defaults is the
opposite. The equity piece is affected from the very first. It covers all the
losses up to its par value so that the more senior tranches are impaired
only if defaults exceed this threshold; effectively, it is a credit enhancement.
Originators typically retain the equity piece.
2.3 Literature review
The theoretical literature on credit risk transfer and securitization can be
traced back to Greenbaum and Thakor’s “Bank Funding Modes”, published
in 1987 in the Journal of Banking and Finance. They analyze why banks
choose to fund assets via securitization versus the traditional issuance of
deposits in an adverse selection framework. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987)
emphasize the role of bank regulation and the advancing information process-
ing technology. In the equilibrium of their model banks hold riskier assets
and securitize the “good” ones. Subsequent literature can be roughly di-
vided into two main strands: The first explores the scope for risk sharing
between the banking sector and other sectors in the economy as well as its
effects on the stability of banks and possible contagion. The second puts
4Often the originating institution acts as a servicing agent: it collects the interest and
principal payments and passes them to the investors for a fee.
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more emphasis on the implications for the monitoring of loan applicants and
the quality of originated loans. Those two strands are intrinsically linked.
Risk sharing via securitization insulates banks from losses and, in a world
with asymmetric information and limited liability, alters incentives to pre-
vent defaults. Thus, any beneficial effect from risk transfer from the arguably
more vulnerable banking sector to more stable sectors in the economy will be
attenuated by the adverse effect on the monitoring incentives. Additionally,
incentive problems in securitization can lead to origination of bad loans and
thus can undermine the safety and soundness of banks if part of the risks
associated with those loans are retained by the originator.
Let me very briefly summarize the most recent theoretical contributions,
starting with the theoretical papers on risk sharing and its effects on the
financial system stability. In Allen and Gale (2007) banks securitize assets
to circumvent capital regulation. They show that inefficiently high capital
adequacy requirements for banks induce credit risk transfer to an insurance
sector. The link between the two sectors gives rise to systemic risk: problems
in the insurance sector can spread to the banking industry. Based on an
augmented version of this model, Allen and Carletti (2006) focus on the
interaction between idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and credit risk transfer
to create contagion. In their model securitization is truly driven by risk
sharing considerations. Risk sharing is desirable because the sectors engage
in activities with imperfectly correlated returns. Credit risk transfer induces
insurers to hold a long term security, which otherwise is held by banks only.
Contagion arises because bad outcomes for insurance companies force them to
sell the long security. This in turn harms banks hit by adverse liquidity shocks
as they use the long security to refinance in the interbank market. Depressed
prices of the long security do not allow them to collect the necessary resources
to pay out depositors and leads to bankruptcies.5 In those models banks do
not perform screening and monitoring of borrowers, the emphasis lies on
the implications for the stability of individual banks and arising contagion
effects.
5See also Wagner and Marsh (2006).
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One of the early papers focusing on incentives is the work of Gorton
and Pennacchi (1995). The authors stress the adverse effect of securitization
on the quality of originated loans. Banks selling a proportional claim on
loans do not bear the full loss if those loans default and thus their incentives
for borrower monitoring are distorted. In a recent paper, Fecht and Wag-
ner (2007) show that securitization alleviates the hold-up problem between
bank managers and shareholders, which ceteris paribus allows a safer capital
structure with a higher equity share. Securitization can therefore potentially
improve the stability of banks. However, because rents collected by managers
are lower, their incentives to monitor borrowers are damaged. On the con-
trary, Chiesa (2008) shows that securitization can lead to better incentives
for monitoring. The result arises in a framework of banks prone to gamble
on good economic outlook instead of stringently screening whom to grant a
loan. Securitization alleviates the incentives for gambling and induces banks
to exert monitoring effort. Arping (2004) demonstrates that securitization
can have a beneficial effect on the incentives of borrowers without to impair
the monitoring by lenders. In his framework securitization facilitates the ex-
post enforcement of the debt contract between borrower and lender. Cerasi
and Rochet (2008) show that loan sales and credit derivatives can provide
optimal insurance to banks without impairing incentives.
The most closely related papers to my research agenda are Pennacchi
(1988), focusing on why banks securitize assets and on the design of the
optimal securitization contract, and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), on the
effects of loan sales on monitoring incentives. In a first step Pennacchi (1988)
derives the after-tax profit maximization problem of a bank subject to capital
adequacy constraints. A tax-disadvantage makes equity funding more costly
than funding via deposits. In the optimum the capital constraint is binding
and banks are forced to use more equity than they would freely choose. Banks
are then allowed to finance a fraction of all of their one-dollar loans via loan
sales. For simplicity, the fraction is assumed to be equal for all individual
loans held by the bank. By selling loans a bank can partially circumvent the
necessity to fund them via equity and therefore can lower its funding costs.
The optimal contract is determined for the sale of an individual one-dollar
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loan. If no loan sales with recourse are allowed, the optimal contract features
a payment to the originating bank only if no default of the borrower occurs.
In the case of default, all proceeds from collateral, restructuring etc., accrue
to the buyer of the loan. The contract cannot support first best levels of
monitoring.
In Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) the focus is on the incentive effect of
the sale of one-dollar loan by banks. Banks selling a proportional claim on
loans do not bear the full loss if those loans default and thus their incentives
for borrower monitoring are distorted. The sale contract is, however, not
the optimal, but an exogenously given linear one. Pennacchi (1988) further
argues that a specialization in banking may emerge: banks with a competitive
advantage in deposit collection would buy securitized assets, whereas large
money-center banks would focus on the origination and subsequent sale of
assets.
Similarly to Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), in my
framework an informational asymmetry undermines the efficient monitoring
by banks. Banks use the optimal covenant given limited liability restrictions.
I do not prove the optimality but rather use the poof by Innes (1990). I
focus on how securitization affects the aggregate amount on bank lending
and the average quality of bank credit. I use a richer setting, in which banks
choose their overall scale of lending and are allowed to retain some loans
fully. Depending on whether the loans are subsequently securitized or not,
banks are allowed to monitor at different intensities. The more complex
setting allows me to directly address the question how securitization affects
the amount of lending and whether the securitized loans are less carefully
monitored compared with the retained loans.
2.4 Related regulation and accounting rules
Several features of the current banking regulation and accounting rules af-
fect bank behavior and constrain the feasible securitization contracts. Before
incorporating the restrictions in the theoretical model, I briefly review the
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relevant rules, focusing on the Basel Capital Accords and accounting stan-
dard related to securitization.
According to the Basel Capital Accord 1988, banks are required to hold
a minimum amount of capital of 8% of their risk weighted assets and off-
balance-sheet exposures. It is generally accepted that minimum capital ad-
equacy requirements increase the funding costs of banks as they are forced
to hold a higher amount of “expensive” equity than they would have cho-
sen otherwise.6 To smooth the effects of possible adverse profitability shocks
and avoid becoming capital constrained, banks hold capital well above the
minimum required amount.7 Securitization of assets can help fund loans at
lower costs, as it leads to regulatory capital relief. The credit risk associated
with securitized loans is transferred to the market, and, the bank is thus no
longer required to hold capital against these risks. Capital is set free to back
the credit risk inherent to newly originated loans.
To get regulatory capital relief, transactions must be structured so that
a significant part of the risk is transferred to investors.8 Assets must be
transferred to an independent special purpose vehicle and the bank does not
maintain effective or indirect control over them. In that case the special
purpose vehicle is considered “bankruptcy remote” in the sense that the
assets that used to be owned by the bank are legally isolated from it and
6Forcing banks to hold a higher capital cushion is the aim of the regulation. The
more equity a bank holds, the bigger the loss to bank owners in the case of bankruptcy,
which should foster incentives for efficient monitoring and curb incentives for excessive
risk-taking.
7Capital constrained depository institutions can either be forced to let possible new
profitable lending opportunities forgo, which lowers their market value, or try to raise
new capital by issuing new stocks, which is very expensive. This effect has been widely
discussed in the literature on the capital crunch and the bank capital channel of monetary
policy. For empirical evidence of the effects of capital constraints on bank lending, see
for example Bernanke and Lown (1991) for the USA, whereas a theoretical model can be
found in Van den Heuvel (2007). Thus banks hold capital buffers to self-insure against
this risk.
8Currently the securitization framework of the New Basel Capital Accord (2006) is
applicable in the EU, whereas in the USA it is not implemented yet. The applicable capital
adequacy guidelines for risk exposure to asset securitization in the USA became effective
on January 1 2002. See Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 230/Thursday, November 29, 2001/
Rules and Regulations. Despite some minor differences, the necessary requirements for
obtaining regulatory capital relief in the USA and EU are common.
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are no longer part of its bankruptcy estate. They are beyond the reach of
its creditors in case of bankruptcy or receivership. This is stated in §554 of
the New Basel Capital Accord and is a prerequisite in the USA for special
purpose vehicles to gain acceptance as issuers of securities in the capital
markets.9 The issued asset-backed securities are not a liability of the bank.
They represent claims against the special purpose vehicle. Thus on the one
hand the bank generally has no obligation to reimburse investors in case its
assets do not perform as well as expected, and on the other hand investors
do not need to fear the financial distress of the bank. They can evaluate how
risky the asset-backed securities are by assessing the risks associated with the
underlying asset pool and considering the exact structure of the transaction.
They do not need to acquire additional information regarding the chance of
a bankruptcy of the originating bank.
A further important feature of securitization is that investors and origi-
nating banks are not equally well-informed about the quality of the under-
lying assets. Potential borrowers apply for credit at the bank, and they are
approved or denied credit after their creditworthiness has been evaluated ac-
cording to its proprietary credit scoring program. In that sense, banks have
a superior knowledge both about individual loans in a pool and about the
scoring technique. Investors are concerned that the bank may exploit its
informational advantage and sell assets with lower quality whilst “cherry-
picking” the good ones to keep them in its possession.10
The easiest way banks could assure potential investors of the good quality
of the assets is by selling them with recourse or by fully guaranteeing the
timely payments of interest and principal. The risks associated with the
securitized assets remain with the bank, and thus it has the same incentives
to evaluate and monitor credit applicants in the origination process as if the
9See Schwarz (1994), page 135.
10See US Securities Exchange Commission (2003), section IV: “Some market partici-
pants have expressed concerns that participants in the MBS markets use information they
obtain in their capacities as originators, guarantors and servicers, among others, to select
for purchase, sale or retention MBS or underlying mortgage loans that have more favor-
able characteristics than the average universe of MBS or mortgage loans. Assertions have
been made that these entities have an unfair advantage over the marketplace generally in
purchasing and selling MBS.”
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loans are to be held on its balance sheet. However, this does not lead to
any regulatory capital relief. 11 By retaining a portion of the risk - typically
the first loss piece - banks attempt to signal to investors that the securitized
assets are worth holding and attain some capital relief.12
Besides such explicit contractual risk retention, banks may provide im-
plicit credit enhancements and assume substantially higher risks than one
would infer by just looking at the balance sheet. Since outsiders cannot eas-
ily observe and verify whether an implicit agreement has taken place, it is
not possible to account for such implicit recourse in the calculation of the
risk based capital. This undermines the safety and soundness of the bank-
ing system and authorities penalize banks for providing any non-contractual
support.13
2.5 A principal-agent model of securitization
I incorporate those features in a simple model of a competitive banking in-
dustry and investors in asset-backed securities and analyze the impact of
securitization on bank lending. There are two dates: t = 0 and t = 1. There
are n banks and numerous investors. Both types of agents are risk neutral
and have limited liability. n is high enough to assure competitive credit
markets.14
11See the New Basel Capital Accord (2006) §83(i) and 83(ii), such full guarantees con-
stitute direct credit substitutes. For them a credit conversion factor of 100% is applicable.
12Banks are required to hold regulatory capital against all of the exposures they have
retained, for regulatory purposes the first loss piece is to be deducted from capital.
13Implicit recourse is identified ex post if for instance banks support securitization be-
yond their contractual obligation. By doing so on one occasion banks can signal to markets
that the risk associated with their securitized assets stays with them. If implicit support
has taken place the bank is required to hold capital against all underlying exposures of a
structure, as if they were not securitized. The bank has to disclose publicly that it has
done so and the resulting increase in capital charge. If it happens more than once the bank
can be required to hold capital against all assets it has securitized, and not be allowed to
gain capital relief on securitized assets for a period of time or even be required to hold cap-
ital in excess of the minimum risk-based capital ratios, see the New Basel Capital Accord
(2006) §792 and the Interagency Guidance on Implicit Recourse in Asset Securitization
(2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/2002/SR0215a1.pdf
14I assume the number of banks competing in the market to be exogenously given
and fixed. This is, admittedly, a weakness of the model. However, the number can be
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Banks in the economy are ex ante identical. Each one of them is managed
by a risk-neutral entrepreneur, who maximizes the expected profit of his
bank. A representative bank i receives a stochastic pay-off of pii ∈ [0, L]
per unit of funding Ii given to borrowers. The assumption is justified if the
identical banks in the competitive economy offer potential borrowers similar
contracts, featuring a contractual payment of L per unit of funding received.
In case no borrower defaults, bank i gets LIi back. As some get into financial
distress, the actual realization of pi will regularly be lower than L.
The banker can not perfectly control defaults. However, he influences
their probability by exerting managerial effort e. The stochastic pay-off pi
is distributed according to the conditional distribution function H(pi|e, Y ),
the respective probability density function is h(pi|e, Y ). Here Y denotes the
aggregate amount of credit in the economy.
It is assumed that higher entrepreneurial effort e makes higher outcomes
of pi more likely, so that E(pi|e1, Y ) > E(pi|e2, Y ) if e1 > e2. One can interpret
e in this banking application as the effort a banker must exert to properly
asses the creditworthiness of potential borrowers and monitor their projects
as he grants a loan. It is further assumed that the probability density function
h(pi|e, Y ) has the monotone likelihood ratio property with respect to e. In
that case a higher realization of pi is a strong signal that the banker has
diligently assessed risks and monitored borrowers. Additionally H(pi|e, Y ) is
convex in e for any given level of pi.15 The level of ei is private knowledge of
the banker i and is not observable by outsiders, in particular by investors.
This captures the informational asymmetry between originating banks and
investors in asset-backed securities with regard to the quality of the loans.
The expected return further depends on the aggregate amount of lending
Y in the economy. The higher Y is, the lower is the expected return other
made endogenous in a general setting if fixed costs of banking exist. Given these fixed
costs, exactly n banks can operate in the marketplace and make zero economic profits.
Securitization will generally influence the number of banks that the market can support.
The interaction between the competitiveness of the credit market and securitization is not
addressed in the current paper.
15This assures that the maximization problem is concave in e and allows the usage
of the first order approach in a principal-agent model, see Holmstro¨m (1979), Rogerson
(1985), Jewitt (1988).
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things being equal: E(pi|e, Y1) > E(pi|e, Y2) if Y1 < Y2. It is motivated by
diminishing marginal returns to capital at the aggregate level of the economy.
I interpret E(pi|e, Y ) as broadly capturing the aggregate demand for capital
in the economy.16
Bankers dislike exerting effort. Having to monitor a loan portfolio of
size Ii with an intensity of ei leads to a disutility measured in monetary
units of c(ei, Ii) = ceiIi. The chosen cost function implies constant marginal
monitoring costs per euro of funding granted to borrowers.17
The usual way banks fund loans is by issuing demand deposits and retain-
ing earnings or issuing new equity. I label this “on-balance-sheet” funding.
The on-balance-sheet funding costs are f(Ii). The cost function is strictly
increasing and strictly convex. We can interpret this in the light of capi-
tal adequacy regulation in the following way: if at a given point of time a
bank is well capitalized, it can easily issue demand deposits or other forms
of debt. As the loan portfolio of the bank grows, so does its leverage. It
becomes more expensive to raise additional non-insured debt. At some point
the bank becomes capital constrained and needs to issue new equity to fulfill
its minimum regulatory capital requirements. As Ii grows arbitrarily large
the on-balance-sheet costs approach infinity. Let us additionally assume that
f ′(0) = 0 and f(0) = 0.
Alternatively, the bank can originate loans and securitize them. I la-
bel this “off-balance-sheet” funding. This does not imply disintermediation.
Potential borrowers still first approach the bank, apply for a loan, and are
denied, or approved and monitored by the banker. In this framework banks
are the only institutions endowed with the special ability to influence the out-
come of pi by exerting entrepreneurial effort. Banks can, though, figuratively
outsource the funding of the loans to investors.
Investors in the economy are identical, risk neutral, and competitive.
They require an expected return of at least ρ to hold asset-backed secu-
rities. It is further assumed that investors, like bankers in the economy,
know the distribution function H(pi|e, Y ) and the maximization problem of
16Even though I do not model borrowers explicitly.
17The assumption is made for simplicity.
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bankers. Because for values of I higher than a certain threshold the marginal
on-balance-sheet costs f ′(I) become higher than ρ, bankers can reduce the
overall funding costs by financing a part of the loans via securitization.
The time structure of the model is simple: at time t = 0 banks in the
economy originate loans. They decide at the time of the origination which
of them they would like to keep on their balance sheets, how many are to
be securitized and the banker exerts effort e. It is possible that the loans to
be held and those to be securitized are monitored with a different intensity.
Banks offer investors a securitization contract that maximizes the bank’s
expected profits. Investors accept or deny. At time t = 1 the payoff are
realized and split according to the securitization contract.
2.6 The securitization contract
The unobservability of monitoring effort gives rise to a moral hazard problem.
Once the bank has sold loans to investors, it is no longer adversely affected
by defaults. Thus, it has no incentives to exert effort and improve the future
performance of loans if it plans to sell them without retaining any exposure.
This is correctly anticipated by investors and lowers their willingness to pay
for asset-backed securities. The only way the bank can credibly commit itself
to exert monitoring effort is by retaining a stake. Thus in a real world setting,
banks would originate loans, transfer them to a special purpose entity and
hold some of the asset-backed securities issued. The rest of the securities are
sold to investors.
A securitization contract in this set-up specifies the distribution of the
cash flows from the underlying assets among the stakeholders conditional on
the t = 1 realization of the pay-off.
Let us consider a bank i which plans to securitize a pool of loans with
a par value of 1. Let pisi denote the stochastic pay-off from these assets in
t = 1. To signal the quality of the underlying assets, the bank retains a stake
in the pool. Let B(pisi ) denote the payment to investors conditional of the
outcome of pisi . The bank receives the residual pi
s
i −B(pisi ).
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The set of admissible contracts is restricted by the limited liability rules
in force in the economy. Limited liability of investors impose the restriction:
B(pisi ) ≥ 0 (2.1)
Furthermore, the liability of the originating bank is limited by its retained
stake, thus:
pisi −B(pisi ) ≥ 0 (2.2)
Equation 2.2 simply states that issued asset-backed securities are not
liabilities of the originating bank. Therefore, investors can at most get the
entire pay-off stream of the securitized loans and do not have a recourse to
the originating bank in case the pay-off is not as high as expected.
Furthermore, B(pisi ) is constrained to be non-decreasing in pi
s
i . This re-
striction can be imposed as proposed by Innes (1990), p.50, because other-
wise investors would have an incentive to sabotage the bank in any decreasing
segment of B(pisi ). Alternatively, if the bank observes a perfect signal of pi
s
i
slightly before investors, it would have an incentive to secretly supplement
the pay-off in any decreasing region of B(pisi ). Thereby it could reap a higher
payment of pisi − B(pisi ) at the expense of investors. In this application the
later justification is particularly relevant. Originators often act as servic-
ing agents in exchange for a small fee. They collect the incoming interest
and principal payments and keep records of the outstanding balances. The
cash flow is distributed with a slight delay to investors in the asset-backed
securities, so banks may indeed observe the pay-off slightly earlier.
Given the limited liability and monotonicity restrictions, the optimal con-
tract is of the form B(pisi ) = min{pisi , R}, where R is a constant, see Innes
(1990), Lemma 2. The optimality result is fairly intuitive: this kind of con-
tract gives banks the lowest possible payment in bad states of the world
given its liability limits, namely nothing. In good states, the bank is residual
claimant on the margin. The contract induces the bank to prevent bad out-
comes and to make good states more likely by exerting effort. First best effort
levels, though, can only be supported by harsher punishments in bad states.
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Figure 2.1: Cash flows
Limited liability on the side of banks makes such outcome not feasible, see
Innes (1990), page 54, discussion of Lemma 2.
This contract has the distinctive properties of real securitization. The
incoming t = 1 cash flow from the underlying assets is split and repackaged
to form two securities: a first loss piece retained by the originating bank and
a senior tranche held by investors in asset-backed securities. Just to illustrate
this, let the size of the equity piece be z and investors hold debt-like asset-
backed securities with a par value of 1−z and interest rate of X. If the pay-off
pisi in t=1 is greater than (1− z)X investors are fully paid and the bank gets
the residual. Otherwise, the bank gets nothing and the full pisi is paid to
investors. Effectively, at time t=0 the banks sells a derivative contract on
the pool of loans of the form B(pisi ) = min{pisi , R}, where R = (1− z)X.
Figure 2.1 shows the cash flows to investors and bank contingent on the
realization of pisi .
In my further analysis I concentrate on the moral hazard issues arising
between originating bank and investors in asset-backed securities if they sign
contracts of the previously described form. I am particularly interested in
the effects of securitization on the amount of bank credit available in the
economy and the monitoring intensity of securitized loans. I do not explore
whether the securitization contract is renegotiation-proof and do not consider
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possible adverse or beneficial effects of anticipated subsequent renegotiation
on the initial incentives of banks and investors.18
Before I start exploring securitization and its implications for the bank
lending in the economy, I briefly characterize a benchmark economy, in which
only on-balance-sheet funding is possible.
2.7 Benchmark: no securitization
Each bank chooses the intensity of monitoring ei of its loan portfolio and the
amount of lending Ii as to maximize expected profits, taking the aggregate
amount of lending Y as given.19
max
ei,Ii
Ii
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ei, Y )− f(Ii)− ceiIi (2.3)
The first order conditions with respect to ei and Ii are:∫ L
0
pidHei(pi|ei, Y ) = c (2.4)
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ei, Y )− cei = f ′(Ii) (2.5)
The first order condition with respect to ei states that in the optimum
the increase in the expected pay-off per unit of funding given to borrowers
due to higher monitoring is exactly offset by the surge in monitoring costs
on the margin. Equation 2.5 determines the amount of lending provided by
bank i: the marginal on-balance-sheet funding costs equal the marginal gross
income minus induced additional monitoring effort costs at the optimum.
18First, the only renegotiation on which both parties can agree in real world would
take place in bad states of the world, when pisi ≤ R, and be favorable to investors. Banks,
concerned that they may lose their reputation, and therefore be unable to securitize loans
in the future, may be willing to renegotiate and cover part of the losses incurred by
investors. Any such “investor friendly” renegotiation is deemed “implicit recourse”. Banks
are penalized by supervisory authorities for providing such support.
19I use the following notation:
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ei, Y ) is equivalent to
∫ L
0
pih(pi|ei, Y )dpi. Fur-
thermore, for any function f(x, y, z), fx(x, y, z) captures the first derivative with respect
to the variable x.
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Figure 2.2: Credit market without securitization
Symmetry among competing banks implies that the same level of moni-
toring and the same amount of lending is chosen. Let ens = ei = ej denote
the optimal intensity of monitoring and Ins = Ii = Ij be the optimal amount
lent per bank in the no-securitization case. The aggregate bank lending in
the economy is Y ns = nIns. In the equilibrium of the credit market Y adjusts
so that given its level no individual bank has an incentive to further reduce
or increase its supply of credit. This is the case if condition 2.6 is fulfilled:∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ens, Y ns)− censi = f ′(
Y ns
n
) (2.6)
There exists a unique equilibrium, in which Y ns is the aggregate amount
of lending and ens the monitoring intensity banks optimally choose given
Y ns.20
For levels of Y < Y ns individual banks can increase their expected profits
by offering additional credit since expected marginal gross income is greater
than the sum of marginal monitoring and funding cost and vice versa. Figure
2.2 depicts the credit market equilibrium.
20A proof of the uniqueness is provided in Appendix A.
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2.8 Securitization
Now we assess how securitization affects monitoring and the amount of bank
lending. Let us consider again a competitive bank i. Like in the previous
analysis it chooses the optimal amount of lending Ii and the optimal intensity
of monitoring of loans as to maximize its profit. However, now it can fund
a portion of the loans through off-balance-sheet funding. Let αi denote the
fraction of loans that are retained, 1 − αi are securitized. I allow banks
to choose different effort levels for loans which are held until maturity and
those which are later securitized. Let ai denote the monitoring intensity of
on-balance-sheet loans and bi the one for securitized. Let pi denote the pay-off
per unit of loans that are held until maturity and pis of later securitized ones.
Additionally, let Pi denote bank i’s income from issuance of asset-backed
securities.
If bi is observable and verifiable by outsiders, the securitization contract
could be written contingent on the effort choice of the banker. Retaining a
first loss piece to commit to proper monitoring of loans is not necessary under
first best conditions. As already discussed in section 2.4, it is more realistic
to assume bi is private information to the originating bank. Before outlining
the effects of the informational asymmetry on incentives and indirectly on
the amount of bank lending in more detail, let me briefly characterize the
first best case.
2.8.1 The first best case
The bank i chooses how much lending to provide Ii, what fraction of the
originated loans to hold to maturity αi and how intensely to monitor on-
balance-sheet and to be securitized loans - ai and bi, knowing that investors
require an expected gross return of at least ρ to buy asset-backed securities.
Its maximization problem is:
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max
ai,bi,αi,Ii
αiIi
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ai, Y )− f(Ii − Pi)− c(aiαiIi + bi(1− αi)Ii) (2.7)
s.t. : Pi ≤ 1
ρ
(1− αi)Ii
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|bi, Y ) (2.8)
The participation constraint for investors equation 2.8 will always hold
with equality at the optimum, so one can substitute for Pi in the objective
function 2.7. From the first order conditions with respect to ai,bi,α,Ii we
get equations 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12.21
ai = bi = e
FB
i (2.9)
∫ L
0
pidHa(pi|ai, Y ) = c =
∫ L
0
pisdHb(pi
s|bi, Y ) (2.10)
f ′(Ii − Pi) = ρ,where Pi = 1
ρ
(1− αi)Ii
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|bi, Y ) (2.11)
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ai, Y )− cai = ρ (2.12)
The bank chooses αi so that the overall funding costs are minimized.
This is the case if the marginal on-balance-sheet funding costs f ′(Ii − Pi)
equal the marginal off-balance-sheet funding costs of ρ, as stated in equation
2.11. Sufficient condition for having an interior solution of αi ∈ (0, 1) is
that f ′(Insi ) > ρ. This assures that securitizing some of the originated loans
would allow banks to reduce their funding costs and thus increase profits.
Since f(0) = 0 and f ′(0) = 0, it is never optimal to securitize all loans.
At the optimum the marginal increase in per-unit of lending pay-off in-
duced by more intense monitoring is exactly offset by the surge in per-unit
monitoring costs for both type of loans, see equation 2.10. The bank moni-
21The exact derivation is presented it in Appendix A.
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tors retained and securitized loans with the same intensity of ai = bi = e
FB.
The reason is simple: marginally higher monitoring of either loans increases
the monitoring costs of the originating bank by the same amount of c. The
expected marginal gross income of monitoring is the same, too. Better mon-
itoring of retained loans increases of the expected t = 1 period gross income
of the bank. Better monitoring of securitized loans leads to a higher expected
pay-off to investors. Since they can observe bi, this translates into a higher
willingness to pay for asset-backed securities and thus increases the t = 0
issuance income of the bank proportionally. As bank and investors discount
expected future playoffs at the same rate of ρ in the optimum, the net present
value of an increase in expected t = 1 pay-off due to better monitoring of
loans held on balance sheets equals exactly the increase in t = 0 issuance
income due to higher monitoring of securitized loans. It makes no sense to
choose different ei, and so ai = bi = e
FB is optimal.
The bank originates additional loans as long as the marginal gross income
minus induced monitoring costs is higher than the marginal funding costs.
In the optimum equation 2.12 must hold.
Again, symmetry among competing banks implies that the same level of
monitoring, the same amount of lending and the same fraction of loans to
be securitized is chosen. Let eFB denote the optimal intensity of monitoring,
IFB be the optimal lending and (1− αFB) be optimal fraction of securitized
loans in case effort is observable by outsiders. The total bank lending in the
economy is therefore Y FB = nIFB. In the equilibrium of the credit market
Y must adjust so that given its level no individual bank has an incentive to
further reduce or increase its supply of credit. This is the case if condition
2.13 is fulfilled: ∫ L
0
pidH(pi|eFB, Y FB)− ceFB = ρ (2.13)
Again there exists a unique equilibrium, in which Y FB is the aggregate
amount of lending and eFB the monitoring intensity banks optimally choose
given Y FB.22 In the end, compared to the situation in which only on-balance-
22The uniqueness of the equilibrium can be easily shown by applying the same line of
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Figure 2.3: Credit market in the first best case
sheet funding of loans is possible, the aggregate amount of lending increases
and the funding costs get lower. Figure 2.3 depicts the credit market equi-
librium in the first best case.
Securitization of bank loans has the potential capacity to increase the
availability of credit in the economy at lower costs and thus to boost welfare.
However, so far we did not account for effects of asymmetric information on
the monitoring incentives of banks. This is incorporated in the next section.
2.8.2 The second best case
I consider the case of unobservable monitoring effort now. bi is private infor-
mation to the bank. Because investors cannot directly observe how well the
underlying pool of loans has been monitored, they try to infer bi from the
observables αi, Ii, Ri. Investors rationally assume that bank i chooses the
monitoring intensity as to maximize its own profit given the securitization
contract proposed to investors B(pi) = min{pi,Ri}. Bankers in the economy
argument as in the proof in section A.1.
28
A principal-agent model of securitization
are aware of it and take it into account. The maximization problem is:
max
ai,bi,αi,Ii,Ri,Pi
αiIi
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ai, Y ) + (1− αi)Ii
∫ L
Ri
(pis −R)dH(pis|bi, Y )
(2.14)
−f(Ii − Pi)− c(aiαiIi + bi(1− αi)Ii)
s.t. P ≤ (1− αi)Ii
ρ
[
∫ Ri
0
pisdH(pis|bi, Y ) +
∫ L
Ri
RidH(pi
s|bi, Y )] (2.15)
b ∈ arg max
bi
equation 2.14 (2.16)
The bank maximizes its expected profit subject to two constraints: the
participation constraint for investors equation 2.15 and an incentive con-
straint 2.16. The incentive constraint captures that, as it chooses αi, Ii, and
Ri, the bank also bears in mind how this affects investors’ beliefs for bi
and ultimately their willingness to pay for asset-backed securities. Using
the First Order Approach, see Holmstro¨m (1979), the incentive constraint
can be simplified to: ∫ L
Ri
(pis −Ri)dHb(pis|bi, Y )− c = 0 (2.17)
Equation 2.17 defines the intensity of monitoring bi, to which the bank can
credibly commit. It depends solely on the retained stake in the securitized
assets - measured by Ri: bi = b
∗
i (Ri).
23 The bigger the stake, the better the
bank will monitor securitized loans and the higher is investors’ anticipation
of bi.
24
Again the participation constraint will always hold with equality at the
optimum, so we can substitute for Pi in the objective function and set up
the Lagrangian function. The detailed derivation of the optimally conditions
2.18, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21, and 2.22 is shown in Appendix A.
23Solely in the sense that Ri is the only variable the bank directly influences.
24Note that in this set-up the lower R is, the higher is the stake retained by the bank.
By implicitly differentiating equation 2.17 one can show that decreasing Ri leads to a
higher bi.
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∫ L
0
pidHai(pi|ai, Y ) = c (2.18)
bi = b
∗
i (Ri) such that
∫ L
Ri
(pis −Ri)dHbi(pis|bi, Y )− c = 0 (2.19)
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ai, Y )−cai =
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|bi, Y )−cbi+[f
′(Ii − Pi)
ρ
−1] Piρ
(1− αi)Ii
(2.20)∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ai, Y )− cai = f ′(Ii − Pi) (2.21)
(1− αi)Ii(f
′(Ii − Pi)
ρ
− 1)
∫ L
Ri
dH(pis|bi, Y ) + f ′(Ii − Pi)∂Pi
∂bi
∂b∗i (Ri)
∂Ri
= 0
(2.22)
Proposition 1 Loans held on the balance sheet of the originating bank are
monitored at a higher intensity than securitized loans: ai > bi, see Innes
(1990), Proposition 1. The marginal on-balance-sheet funding costs exceed
the off-balance-sheet funding costs: f ′(Ii − Pi) > ρ. The proofs follow in
Appendix A.
The optimality condition for the monitoring intensity of retained loans,
equation 2.18, not surprisingly, is the same as in the first best case. Since for
on-balance-sheet loans the originating bank bears all the risk and costs and
gets all the returns from prudent monitoring, nothing changes. Though, this
does not necessarily imply that same level of ai is set at the optimum. The
marginal expected per-unit return of monitoring in general may depend on
the aggregate lending Yi. To keep the line of argument as simple as possible,
I impose the admittedly restrictive assumption that
∂2E(pi|ei, Y )
∂ei∂Y
= 0.
Securitized loans are monitored at a lower intensity than retained loans,
see Proposition 1. Since banks bear all the cost of monitoring but only part
30
A principal-agent model of securitization
of the downside risks of securitized loans, their monitoring incentives are
damaged.
Equation 2.20 determines how many of the originated loans are held until
maturity - αi. Holding more loans, instead of securitizing them, has three
effects on profits. First, it increases the expected pay-off from the bank’s
retained loan portfolio. Second, because less loans are securitized, the ex-
pected pay-off from the retained stake in them decreases and the income
from issuance of asset-backed securities drops. Third, as the on-balance-
sheet funding costs f ′(Ii − Pi) are higher than ρ, the overall funding costs
rise. At the optimum, the marginal income from holding one more unit of
loans on the balance sheet (the left hand side) exactly equals the sum of
the foregone marginal benefits: income from retained interest and issuance
activity (first two terms on the right hand side), and a possible reduction of
funding costs (the third term).
The optimal amount of lending Ii is such that the marginal costs are
off-set by the marginal gross income net of induced monitoring, see equation
2.21.25
The last optimality condition, stated in equation 2.22, concerns the size
of the retained stake Ri. Retaining a smaller stake
26 has two effects. First,
incentives for proper monitoring are spoiled, so the intensity of monitoring
decreases. This lowers the investors’ willingness to pay for asset-backed se-
curities and thus the issuance income of the bank and the expected pay-off
from the retained stake. Cost reduction through securitization becomes less
effective. This effect is captured by the second term on the left hand side
and has a negative sign. Second, holding bi fixed, a higher R implies issuance
of asset-backed securities with a higher par value.27 This leads to a higher
issuance income. This is reflected in the positive first term on the left hand
side. Increasing R leads to a higher par value of the senior tranche of asset-
backed securities. These, though, are of lower quality. R is optimally chosen
25The equation sets marginal cost equal to marginal gross income on retained loans,
this also holds securitized loans, as at the optimum marginal gross income from both type
of lending is equal.
26Which corresponds to a higher Ri.
27Or a larger senior tranche.
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such that the two effects offset.28
I apply the symmetry argument again. All banks in the economy make
the same choices. Thus loans originated by different banks are monitored
with the same intensity, banks originate the same amount and securitize the
same fraction, retaining first loss pieces of the same size. Let aSB denote the
optimal intensity of monitoring for retained loans, bSB - the one for securitized
loans, ISB be the amount of originated loans and (1−αSB) be optimal fraction
of assets securitized in case effort is not observable by outsiders. The total
lending in the economy is Y SB = nISB. In equilibrium Y SB adjusts so that
given its level no bank has an incentive to further increase or reduce its loan
supply. This is the case if equation 2.23 is fulfilled:
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|aSB, Y SB)− caSB = f ′(Y
SB
n
− P ), (2.23)
where P =
(1− α)Y SB
ρn
[
∫ L
R
pisdH(pis|bSB, Y SB) +
∫ L
R
RdH(pis|bSB, Y SB)]
If Y < Y SB banks originate additional loans, since the marginal gross
income minus of monitoring costs exceed the marginal costs of funding. Y
increases and drives the marginal gross income down, and the funding and
monitoring costs up until condition 2.23 is fulfilled.
2.9 Welfare implications
Securitization techniques allow banks to lower their overall funding costs and
provide additional lending. The total amount of credit Y SB is higher com-
pared to the equilibrium amount in the benchmark case of no securitization,
although not as high as in the first best case.
However, the additional lending comes at the cost of impaired monitoring
incentives for securitized loans. Furthermore, the fraction of securitized loans
28Since Ri ∈ [0, 1], there always exists at least one value of R, which maximizes the
objective function.
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(1− αSB) may under circumstances be higher than first best. Proposition 2
states this result.
Proposition 2 The fraction of securitized loans (1−αSB) can exceed the one
that would emerge if monitoring effort was observable by outsiders, (1−αFB).
(1− αSB) < E(pi|e
FB, Y FB)
E(B(pis)|bSB, Y SB)︸ ︷︷ ︸(1− αFB) (2.24)
> 1
The shaded area in Figure 2.4 denotes this case. The proof follows in Ap-
pendix A.
0 (1-FB) 1
(1-  SB)
Figure 2.4: Securitized loans in the second best case
Intuitively the result captures the following argument. To generate a
certain level of income from issuance of asset-backed securities, a bank has
to securitize more loans compared to the first best. The reason is simple.
First, under second best circumstances it can only sell a senior tranche and
needs to retain a stake and finance it via on-balance-sheet funding. Second,
investors anticipate the lower quality of securitized loans. Therefore, their
willingness to pay for asset-backed securities is lower compared to the first
best case. If the cost reduction opportunities are particularly high compared
to the impact of monitoring on the expected return, banks would engage
more strongly in securitization.
The trade-off between efficiency gains due to cost reduction and losses
out of inefficient monitoring are depicted in Figure 2.5.
Securitization allows banks to reduce their funding costs, see Arrow 1.
The welfare increase due to better access to bank credit at lower costs is
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Figure 2.5: Credit market in the second best case
marked by the triangular area A(SB)(ns). It reflects the change in the sum
of bank profits and consumer surplus of borrowers, as competition induces
banks to pass the lower funding costs to them. We do not need to take
into account how investors in asset-backed securities are affected since banks
extract all their rents.
The average quality of originated loans, however, is inefficiently low due to
the impaired monitoring incentives. Arrow 2 captures this effect. Securitized
loans are less carefully evaluated and therefore the average marginal returns
to capital in the economy are inefficiently low.29 The area ACB(ns) indicates
this inefficiency.
The cost reduction effect of securitization outweighs the effect of ineffi-
29Note that ens = eFB = aSB > bSB . Arrow 2 therefore shows the decline in the
average quality of loans in the second best case compared to the no securitization case, or
similarly to the first best case. The average quality of loans in the second best is measured
via the weighted average of the pay-off of securitized and retained loans E(αpi+(1−α)pis).
Would the Figure further include the locus for E(pi|bSB , Y ) − cbSB , it would be located
under the piSBnet-line.
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cient monitoring in this framework. Compared to the no securitization case,
the outcome is constrained optimal. The inefficient monitoring of securitized
loans is correctly anticipated by investors and feeds into lower issuances in-
come of banks. Therefore banks take it indirectly into account in their max-
imization problem. Securitization may not lead to the first best outcome
but it improves the capital allocation: funds that would otherwise be used
to finance investment projects yielding the reservation return of ρ are chan-
neled to more profitable ones, although not as profitable as they would be if
efficiently monitored.
2.10 Discussion of results and some policy
implications
The two assumptions driving the result are:
• Investors correctly anticipate bSB
• Securitization allows a reduction of the funding costs
In this section I briefly discuss how the results would change if these
assumptions are relaxed starting with the assumption of rational expectations
of investors.
Let us assume for the time being, that the issued asset-backed securities
are complex and investors in the economy are not sophisticated enough to
correctly anticipate bSB. Overestimation of the profitability of asset-backed
securities by investors leads to a welfare loss. As investors expect a unreal-
istically high pay-off from asset-backed securities, their willingness to pay is
biased upwards. This has two compounding effects on bank lending. First,
banks no longer fully internalize the effect of less stringent monitoring as it
does not fully translate into lower prices for asset-backed securities. There-
fore, incentives for diligent monitoring become even weaker than they are in
the second best case. Therefore securitized loans would be even less efficiently
monitored.
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Second, a systematical overvaluation of asset-backed securities effectively
implies that investors accept securities which deliver a return lower than their
reservation return ρ. Banks are tempted to originate and securitize exces-
sively as asset-backed securities are easily sold at prices above fair value. In
this scenario resources are mis-allocated away from more profitable invest-
ment projects into poorly monitored and thus badly performing securitized
assets.
Any additional frictions which lead to investors not being able or willing
to assess the risk and profitability of assets can produce outcomes similar to
one described above. For instance investors relying heavily on the opinion
of rating agencies, who may benefit from labeling those securities less risky
than they actually are, see Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008). They provide a
detailed overview of the numerous interlinked frictions arising in the mortgage
securitization process.
The second driving assumption is that the on-balance-sheet funding costs
f(I) can and do exceed the reservation return of investors for high values of
I. I argue that minimum capital adequacy regulation of banks forces them to
fund loans to a higher extent via equity than they would choose themselves
and therefore raises the funding costs of banks relative to the costs of other
non-bank institutions.30 Implicitly assumed is that, besides the negative
impact on costs, the regulation does not have any positive impact on the
economy.
Securitization allows banks to partially circumvent regulation and supply
additional credit at lower costs to borrowers. The additional lending though
comes at the cost of impaired monitoring incentives. We are in the second
best constrained optimum. In this framework the first best outcome can be
achieved if banking is deregulated. The funding costs of banks would equal
ρ, no securitization would take place and thus all loans would be funded at
the low cost of ρ and monitored at the optimal intensity.
30Pennacchi (1980) shows how the tax disadvantage of equity makes it more “expen-
sive” compared with debt. He furthermore shows, based on a bank’s profit maximization
problem that capital regulation indeed harms the profitability of banks.
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I would like to emphasise that the model is not meant to be used to
derive policy recommendations with regard to capital adequacy regulation of
banks. For simplicity of the argument I omit some basic features of banks
that make capital adequacy regulation desirable.31 For instance, banks fund
long-term, illiquid assets by issuing short-term demand deposits. Deposits
are held by many dispersed small depositors and thus coordination between
agents is difficult. This makes them vulnerable to panics and can lead to bank
runs. Explicit deposit insurance systems and emergency liquidity provision
of modern central banks help remedy this problem. However, as deposit
insurance and lender of last resort provision insulate banks from runs and
thus reduce the risk of bankruptcy, banks have incentives to engage in too
risky activities. Regulation, including capital adequacy guidelines, attempts
to remedy the arising moral hazard and thus improves the overall efficiency
of banking.
Since my aim is to study the effects of securitization on the quantity and
quality of originated bank loans, I have chosen the simplest possible way of
modeling a banking institution. To deduct any policy recommendations re-
garding the design and efficiency of capital adequacy regulation of banks, one
has to consider the effects of deposit insurance and central bank emergency
assistance on banks’s incentives.32
If we agree for the time being that capital adequacy regulation of banks
is desirable, another relevant question is whether it is desirable to leave in-
vestors in asset-backed securities and the securitization process unregulated.
If investors have the necessary skills to carefully evaluate risks and are fully
liable for possible losses, nothing speaks against leaving them unregulated.
As they exert due diligence, the economy ends up in the constrained second
best case and welfare improves. If not, however, combinations of agency
problems on the side of originators and investors can lead to highly ineffi-
cient outcomes and justifies more stringent regulation. In a similar vein, any
31See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), chapter 2.2, and Freixas and Rochet (1998),
chapter 9 for an overview.
32The implicit government support of banks considered to be “too-big-to-fail” under-
mines incentives too.
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rules and regulations aiming at a reduction of the complexity and opacity of
asset-backed securities facilitating their valuation, are welfare enhancing.
2.11 Conclusion
I introduce a simple pricipal-agent framework for the analysis of the effect of
securitization on bank lending. Securitization allows banks to reduce their
funding costs. However, it also impairs banks’ incentives for diligent moni-
toring. Bank lending in the economy increases at the cost of inefficient mono-
toring of, possibly too many, securitized loans. Overall welfare is improved
as the cost reduction due to securitization in the framework outweighs the
adverse effects of inefficient monitoring. However, securitization may lead
to substantial welfare losses and mis-allocate funds away from more prof-
itable investment projects to poorly underwritten and thus badly performing
securitized assets, if additional frictions impair the willingness or ability of
investors to adequately price asset-backed securities.
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A Appendix to chapter 2
A.1 Proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium in Sec-
tion 2.7
Proof. For the equilibrium to be unique it is sufficient that a) the left hand
side of equation 4 is strictly decreasing in Y, where as b) the right hand side
is strictly increasing in Y. If that is the case there exists no more than one
value for Y, for which the right hand side equals the left one. Because of the
assumed strictly convex on-balance-sheet cost function, the condition b) is
fulfilled by assumption. What we need to show now is that the condition a)
is fulfilled. This is a little bit more tricky because a variation of Y influences
the left hand side in two ways. First of all an increase of Y leads to a
lower expected pay-off per unit, so the value of the integral becomes smaller.
Additionally however, this also has indirect effects as the optimal monitoring
intensity ens by banks generally may depend on Y. One can show that the
indirect effect is not important by totally differentiating the left hand side .
d
(∫ L
0
pidH(pi|ens, Y )− cei
)
= (2.25)(∫ L
0
pidHY (pi|ens, Y )
)
dY +
(∫ L
0
pidHens(pi|ens, Y )− c
)
∂ens
∂Y
dY
The indirect effect disappears since for each level of Y , ens is such that∫ L
0
pidHei(pi|ei, Y ) = c holds. Thus the only term that matters is the one
capturing the negative direct effect and the l.h.s. of equation 2.6 is indeed a
decreasing function of Y.
A.2 Derivation of the optimality conditions for the ob-
servable effort choice
To simplify the notation, I suppress all subscripts i in the below derivation.
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max
a,b,α,I
αI
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− f(I − P )− c(aαI + b(1− α)I) (2.26)
where P =
1
ρ
(1− α)I
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )
The first order conditions with respect to a, b, α, I respectively give us:
∂.
∂a
= 0⇒
∫ L
0
pidHa(pi|a, Y ) = c (2.27)
∂.
∂b
= 0⇒ f
′(I − P )
ρ
∫ L
0
pisdHb(pi
s|b, Y ) = c (2.28)
∂.
∂α
= 0⇒
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )−ca = f
′(I − P )
ρ
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )−cb (2.29)
∂.
∂I
= 0⇒ (2.30)
α[
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− ca] + (1− α)[f
′(I − P )
ρ
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )− cb] = f ′(I − P )
Substituting for c in in the left hand side of equation 2.29 from equation
2.27 and in the right hand side from equation 2.28 we get:
E(pi|a, Y )− a∂E(pi|a, Y )
∂a
=
f ′(I − P )
ρ
(
E(pi|b, Y )− b∂E(pi|b, Y )
∂b
)
, (2.31)
, where I use the shorter expression E(pi|., Y ) instead of ∫ L
0
pidH(pi|., Y ).
Rearranging the equation gives us:
E(pi|a, Y )− a∂E(pi|a,Y )
∂a
E(pi|b, Y )− b∂E(pi|b,Y )
∂b
=
f ′(I − P )
ρ
, (2.32)
44
A principal-agent model of securitization
Now it is easy to show that it can never be optimal to choose a 6= b.
Proof.
By E(pi|e, Y ) being monotone increasing and concave in e, the function
E(pi|e, Y ) − e∂E(pi|e,Y )
∂e
is non-negative and strictly increasing in e, see the
Lemma at the end of this section.
Proof by contradiction:
Suppose a > b is optimal. Than the nominator in the left hand side of
2.32 is greater than the denominator. Therefore f(I − P ) > ρ.
From a > b and the strict concavity of E(pi|e, Y ) follows that:
∂E(pi|a, Y )
∂a
<
∂E(pis|b, Y )
∂b
(2.33)
Further from f(I − P ) > ρ follows:
∂E(pis|b, Y )
∂b
<
f ′(I − P )
ρ
∂E(pis|b, Y )
∂b
(2.34)
Combining inequalities 2.33 and 2.34 we get ∂E(pi|a,Y )
∂a
< f
′(I−P )
ρ
∂E(pis|b,Y )
∂b
.
According to the FOC with respect to a and b, equations 2.27 and 2.28,
E(pi|a,Y )
∂a
= c = f
′(I−P )
ρ
∂E(pis|b,Y )
∂b
. We have a contradiction, thus a > b cannot
be optimal.
Analogically, suppose a < b is optimal.
Than the nominator in the left hand side of 2.32 is smaller than the
denominator. Therefore at the optimum f(I − P ) < ρ.
From a < b and the strict concavity of E(pi|e, Y ) follows:
∂E(pi|a,Y )
∂a
> ∂E(pi
s|b,Y )
∂b
.
Further from f(I − P ) < ρ follows: ∂E(pis|b,Y )
∂b
> f
′(I−P )
ρ
∂E(pis|b,Y )
∂b
.
Combining the two inequalities gives us:
∂E(pi|a,Y )
∂a
> f
′(I−P )
ρ
∂E(pis|b,Y )
∂b
.
According to the FOC with respect to a and b, equations 2.27 and 2.28,
E(pi|a,Y )
∂a
= c = f
′(I−P )
ρ
∂E(pis|b,Y )
∂b
. We have a contradiction, thus a < b cannot
be optimal.
Thus a = b = eFB
Using a = b and equations 2.29 and 2.32 gives us that f(I − P ) = ρ.
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Using f(I−P ) = ρ in equation 2.30 we get ∫ L
0
pidH(pi|eFB, Y )−ceFB = ρ.
Lemma 3 If f(x) is monotone increasing and concave, than f(x)− f ‘(x)x
is positive and increasing.
Proof. Differentiating the expression f(x) − f ‘(x)x with respect to x
gives us −f“(x)x. By the concavity of f(x) , −f“(x)x is positive. Thus
f(x) − f ‘(x)x is an increasing function. The Figure below demonstrates
graphically that f(x)− f ‘(x)x is positive.
x
f(x)


x*
f(x*)=  x*
f `(x*) x*= x*
A.3 The second best case
max
a,b,α,I,R
αI
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y ) + (1− α)I
∫ L
R
(pis −R)dH(pis|b, Y )
−f(I − P )− c(aαI + b(1− α)I) (2.35)
s.t. P ≤ (1− α)I
ρ
[
∫ R
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y ) +
∫ L
R
RdH(pis|b, Y )] (2.36)∫ L
R
(pis −R)dHb(pis|b, Y )− c = 0 (2.37)
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The incentive constraint equation 2.37 gives us b as an implicit function
of R: b = b∗(R). I use this implicit function representation of the incentive
constraint from now on.
The participation constraint for investors equation 2.36 holds with equal-
ity at the optimum, so P can be inserted in the objective function. The
Lagrangian is:
max
a, b, α, I, R, λ
αI
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y ) + (1− α)I
∫ L
R
(pis −R)dH(pis|b, Y )
−f(I − P )− c(aαI + b(1− α)I)− λ[b− b∗(R)] (2.38)
where P =
(1− α)I
ρ
[
∫ R
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y ) +
∫ L
R
RdH(pis|b, Y )] (2.39)
From the FOC w.r.t. a we get:∫ L
0
pidHa(pi|a, Y ) = c (2.40)
From the FOC w.r.t. λ we get:
b = b∗(R) ⇒
∫ L
R
(pis −R)dHb(pis|b, Y )− c = 0 (2.41)
From the FOC w.r.t. b we get:
(1− α)I[
∫ L
R
(pis −R)dHb(pis|b, Y )− c] + f ′(I − P )∂P
∂b
− λ = 0 (2.42)
Using 2.41 and rearranging we get:
λ = f ′(I − P )∂P
∂b
(2.43)
From the FOC w.r.t. α we get:
I[
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− ca]− I[
∫ L
R
(pis−R)dH(pis|b, Y )− cb] +f ′(I−P )∂P
∂α
= 0
(2.44)
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Using that ∂P
∂α
= − I
ρ
[
∫ R
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y ) + ∫ L
R
RdH(pis|b, Y )], see equation
2.39, and rearranging we get:
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− ca =
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )− cb+ [f
′(I − P )
ρ
− 1] Pρ
(1− α)I
(2.45)
From the FOC w.r.t. I we get:
α[
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− ca] + (1− α){
∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )− cb (2.46)
+[
f ′(I − P )
ρ
− 1] Pρ
(1− α)I } − f
′(I − P ) = 0
Using the equation 2.45 and rearranging we get:∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− ca = f ′(I − P ) (2.47)
or equivalently:∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )− cb+ [f
′(I − P )
ρ
− 1] Pρ
(1− α)I = f
′(I − P ) (2.48)
From the FOC w.r.t. R we get:
(1− α)I{− [(pi −R)f(pis|b, Y )]pi=R −
∫ L
R
dH(pis|b, Y )} (2.49)
+
f ′(I − P )(1− α)I
ρ
{[pisf(pis|b, Y )]pis=R − [Rf(pis|b, Y )]pis=R +
∫ L
R
dH(pis|b, Y )}
+λ
∂b∗(R)
∂R
= 0
Rearranging and substituting for λ from equation 2.43 we get:
(1− α)I(f
′(I − P )
ρ
− 1)
∫ L
R
dH(pis|b, Y ) + f ′(I − P )∂P
∂b
∂b∗(R)
∂R
= 0 (2.50)
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The first statement of Lemma 1, a > b, is directly implied by Innes
(1990), page 56, Proposition 1. Below, I restate his proof using my notation
for completeness.
As implied by equation 2.16, b is chosen as to maximize:33∫ L
R
(pis −R)h(pis|b, Y )dpis − cb (2.51)
all other terms of the objective function do not depend on b and are therefore
suppressed in the outline.
I slightly rearrange the term:∫ L
R
(pis −R)h(pis|b, Y )dpis − cb (2.52)
=
∫ L
0
pish(pis|b, Y )dpis −
(∫ R
0
pish(pis|b, Y )dpis +R
∫ L
R
h(pis|b, Y )dpis
)
− cb
Integration by parts of the first integral in parentheses and using that∫ L
0
h(pis|b, Y )dpis = 134 gives us:
∫ L
0
pish(pis|b, Y )dpis − ([pisH(pis|b, Y )]R0 −
∫ R
0
H(pis|b, Y )dpis +R(1−H(R|b, Y )))− cb
(2.53)
=
∫ L
0
pish(pis|b, Y )dpis −
(
R−
∫ R
0
H(pis|b, Y )dpis
)
− cb
Banks set b is so that
∂
(∫ L
0
pish(pis|b, Y )dpis −
(
R− ∫ R
0
H(pis|b, Y )dpis
)
− cb
)
∂b
= 0⇒
∫ L
0
pishb(pi
s|b, Y )dpis − b+
∫ R
0
Hb(pi
s|b, Y )dpis = 0 (2.54)
The last term on the left hand side of equation 2.54 is negative, implied
33Here I use the longer notation of h(pi|b, Y )dpi instead of dH(pi|b, Y ).
34Property of any probability density function
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by the monotone likelihood ratio property of h(pi|e, Y ) with respect to e.
If b were equal to the optimal level of monitoring aSB on-balance-sheet
loans get, then
∫ L
0
pishb(pi
s|b, Y )dpis − b would equal 0. Since E(pis|b, Y ) is
concave in b, the term
∫ L
0
pishb(pi
s|b, Y )dpis − b is positive for b < aSB, and
negative in the opposite case. Thus for b > aSB the left hand side of equation
2.54 is strictly negative. Any value of b that solves equation 2.54 must be
lower than aSB.
To show that f ′(I−P ) > ρ is much easier. The function ∫ L
0
pidH(pi|e, Y )−
ce attains its maximum for e = aSB, see 2.18. So for any level e 6= aSB,
including bSB, its value is strictly lower than this maximum. The optimality
condition for α is:
∫ L
0
pidH(pi|a, Y )− ca = ∫ L
0
pisdH(pis|b, Y )− cb+ [f ′(I−P )
ρ
−
1] Pρ
(1−α)I . To be fulfilled, the term [
f ′(I−P )
ρ
− 1] Pρ
(1−α)I must be positive. This
is the case if f ′(I − P ) > ρ.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Proposition 1 and equation 2.11 imply that
f ′(ISB − P SB) > ρ = f ′(IFB − P FB)
From the convexity of f(.) follows
ISB − P SB > IFB − P FB.
Using the equilibrium condition that Ij = Y
j
n
, for j = {SB, FB} and the
exact values for P SB, P FB as stated in equations 2.39, 2.11 we get:35
Y SB
n
(
1− (1− α
SB)
ρ
E(B(pis)|bSB, Y SB))
)
>
Y FB
n
(
1− (1− α
FB)
ρ
E(pi|eFB, Y FB)
)
.
35Here I use E(B(pis)|bSB , Y SB) instead of the longer expression∫ R
0
pisdH(pis|bSB , Y SB) + ∫ L
R
RdH(pis|bSB , Y SB).
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Since Y SB < Y FB we get
1− (1− αSB)E(B(pis)|bSB, Y SB) > 1− (1− αFB)E(pi|eFB, Y FB).
Simplifying the inequality leads to the following condition:
(1− αSB)
(1− αFB) <
E(pi|eFB, Y FB)
E(B(pis)|bSB, Y SB) (2.55)
It can never be the case in optimum that E(B(pis)|bSB, Y SB) > ρ. Other-
wise any bank i would find it profitable to originate an additional loan of size
one unit, retain the first loss piece and sell the senior tranche B(pis). The
issuance income of this would be strictly higher than the unit it originally
lent and it would cover its monitoring costs out of the future proceeds of
the retained stake. Additional origination would increase profits and would
be undertaken until it is no longer profitable. Thus the right hand side of
equation 2.55 is strictly greater than one, as E(pi|eFB, Y FB) = ρ + caFB >
E(B(pis)|bSB, Y SB).
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Chapter 3
The empirics of securitization
by banks: Determinants and
incentive effects1
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Ivan Andreev.
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3.1 Introduction
Between 2000 and 2007 the market for asset-backed securities was one of the
largest and fastest-growing segments in the fixed-income securities market.
Despite its size and the vibrant issuance activity, it attracted the attention of
policy makers, researchers, and the general public only after the onset of the
current crisis. Figure 3.1 depicts the evolution of the outstanding amount
of asset-backed securities in the US compared with securities issued by non-
financial corporations, commercial banks, and foreign issuers. Between 2000
and 2007 the segment of asset-backed commercial paper was the largest one
in short-term debt markets. With regard to longer-term debt, depicted in the
right panel, the amount of asset-backed securities outstanding experienced
a remarkable growth until mid-2007. By the end of the year it had become
larger than the outstanding amount of non-financial corporate bonds.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that the observed surge in se-
curitization activity had been accompanied by poor underwriting standards
and the origination of riskier credit. Defaults on those risky financial claims
led to losses accruing to the investors in asset-backed securities and triggered
a global financial crisis. Right now asset-backed securities are still called by
some “toxic waste” assets. Exploring why securitization takes place, partic-
ularly whether it is solely driven by attempts to circumvent capital adequacy
regulation and whether it leads to unsound bank lending and excessive risk
taking, can help us understand better the observed development. Further-
more, it can help in improving the regulation of capital markets to foster the
resilience of the financial system. Therefore, the questions we address in this
paper, focusing on the banking sector, are: why do banks securitize loans
and does securitization affect the incentives of banks for prudent screening
and monitoring of borrowers.
Securitization can be broadly defined as the transformation of illiquid
financial claims into tradable securities; see Greenbaum and Thackor (1987).
The central feature of securitization is that it allows assets to be removed from
the balance sheet of the institution that originated them onto the balance
sheet of a special trust company. For these assets the bank is no longer
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of the amount outstanding of securitized assets in the
US during the period 1970-2007
required to hold regulatory capital. Theory gives us roughly two views on why
banks may choose to securitize assets: on the one hand, for instance, Allen
and Carletti (2006), Allen and Gale (2007), and Cerasi and Rochet (2008) see
securitization as a largely beneficial financial innovation that allows a better
allocation of risk, lowers the distress costs for the issuer, and (see Arping
(2004) or Chiesa (2008)) leads to better incentives for monitoring. On the
other hand, there is a more pessimistic view of securitization as being largely
driven by attempts to circumvent capital regulation and impairing incentives;
see for instance Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) and Fecht and Wagner (2007).
Our empirical results confirm the latter view. Using panel data on large
US banks we find evidence of the existence of a regulatory arbitrage motive
in securitization. The novel feature of our analysis is the introduction of a
corrected measure for the tier 1 capital to total assets and total regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets ratios. In most empirical studies regressions
of the issuance activity of banks on their leverage and a set of controls are
performed; see for instance Minton et al. (2004) and Bannier and Ha¨nsel
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(2008). Such studies find that the probability of securitizing rather decreases
as leverage ratios increase, implying that banks with a high capital basis
tend to securitize more often than capital-constrained banks. The finding
contradicts the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, according to which banks
with low capital available to back additional lending benefit the most from
securitization. They can seize new profitable lending opportunities without
having to issue new equity or build it up slowly via retained earnings, thus
one would expect that securitization rather becomes more probable as lever-
age grows. The approach of Minton et al. (2004) is problematic because
the observed leverage ratios are endogenous. If banks use securitization to
circumvent capital regulation, they will structure the transactions so that
the ex-post observable leverage in their balance sheet is lowered.
We propose a different approach: instead of using observable but endoge-
nous capital ratios we construct a proxy for the unobservable counterfactual
capital ratio. It allows us to capture the effect of capital on securitization
but cuts the reverse influence of securitization on capital adequacy. We ar-
gue that by doing so we use the variable actually relevant to the decision to
securitize: namely, how high the disclosed ratio would have been if the assets
were, instead of being securitized, retained on the balance sheet. Banks with
low counterfactual capital ratios benefit from securitization, as they are able
to remove assets from their balance sheet and free capital to back new loans.
As a result, the standard capital ratios do not appear low any more. Looking
at the extensive margin of securitization we find that a low counterfactual
capital ratio, measured either via the tier 1 capital to total assets or the to-
tal regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratios, increases the probability
of securitizing. Further, we focus on the sample of securitizing banks only
and shed light on banks’ decision on how many assets to securitize. We find
evidence that capital arbitrage is an important determinant of the intensive
margin of securitization too. Furthermore, our empirical results show that
banks facing higher costs of on-balance-sheet debt financing will use secu-
ritization techniques on a larger scale. This finding is consistent with the
efficient risk-sharing view of securitization.
Next, we investigate how securitization affects the quality of securitized
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loans. Currently, there is relatively little literature on that topic. We assess
the effects of securitization by comparing the ex-post observed delinquencies
on loans of the same type during the same quarter originated by the same
institution that are securitized with those retained. The observed higher
delinquencies we interpret as evidence of adverse effects of securitization on
incentives for monitoring or adverse selection of loans by originators. We also
analyze how commonly used techniques for overcoming such incentive prob-
lems - the retention of a subordinated stake in securitized assets - affect the
delinquencies of securitized loans. The results suggest that such techniques
are not successful in reducing moral hazard or adverse selection problems in
securitization. Rather the amount of bank capital at originating institutions
influences significantly positively the quality of originated and securitized
loans.
In a way our research indicates that capital adequacy regulation is a
double-edged sword: whereas loopholes in the regulatory framework can se-
duce banks to securitize assets just for the sake of not having to hold regula-
tory capital, sufficient levels of capital do give banks the right incentives for
prudent behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review
of the related theoretical and empirical literature. The subsequent section
provides a brief look at our data set. Section 3.4 describes the potential
determinants of securitization activity. In sections 3.5 and 3.6 we present
our empirical models on the extensive and intensive margins of securitization.
The estimation strategy and results are presented too. Section 3.7 looks at
the incentive effects of securitization. Finally, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on credit risk transfer and securitization can be
traced back to Greenbaum and Thakor’s “Bank funding modes”, published
in 1987 in the Journal of Banking and Finance. They analyze why banks
choose to fund assets via securitization versus the traditional issuance of
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deposits in an adverse selection framework. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987)
emphasize the role of bank regulation and the advancing information process-
ing technology. In the equilibrium of their model banks hold riskier assets
and securitize the “good” ones. The subsequent literature can be roughly di-
vided into two main strands. The first one explores the scope for risk sharing
between the banking sector and other sectors in the economy as well as its
effects on the stability of banks and possible contagion. The second one puts
more emphasis on the implications for monitoring of loan applicants and the
quality of originated loans. Those two strands are intrinsically linked. Risk
sharing via securitization insulates banks from losses, and in a world with
asymmetric information and limited liability, alters incentives to prevent de-
faults. Thus, any beneficial effect from risk transfer from the arguably more
vulnerable banking sector to other sectors in the economy will be attenuated
by the adverse effect on monitoring incentives. Additionally, incentive prob-
lems in securitization can lead to the origination of bad loans and thus can
undermine the safety and soundness of banks if part of the risks are retained
by the originator or banks themselves invest in asset-backed securities.
Let us very briefly summarize the most recent theoretical and empirical
contributions, starting with the theoretical papers on risk sharing and its
effects on the financial system stability. In Allen and Gale (2007) banks se-
curitize assets to circumvent capital regulation. They show that inefficiently
high capital adequacy requirements for banks induce credit risk transfer to
a hypothetical insurance sector. The link between the two sectors gives rise
to systemic risk: problems in the insurance sector can spread to the banking
industry. Based on an augmented version of this model, Allen and Carletti
(2006) focus on the interaction between idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and
credit risk transfer to create contagion. In their model securitization is truly
driven by risk-sharing considerations. Risk sharing is desirable because the
sectors engage in activities with imperfectly correlated returns. Credit risk
transfer, though, induces insurers to hold a long-term security, which oth-
erwise is held by banks only. Contagion arises because bad outcomes for
insurance companies force them to sell the long security. This in turn harms
banks hit by adverse liquidity shocks as they use the long security to refi-
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nance in the interbank market. Depressed prices of the long security do not
allow them to collect the necessary resources to pay out depositors and lead
to bankruptcies.2 In all those models banks do not perform screening and
monitoring of borrowers; the emphasis lies rather on the implications for the
stability of individual banks and arising contagion effects.
One of the first papers to focus on incentives is the work of Gorton and
Pennacchi (1995). The authors stress the adverse effect of securitization on
the quality of originated loans. Banks selling a proportional claim on loans
do not bear the full loss if those loans default and, therefore, their incentives
for borrower monitoring are distorted. In a recent paper Fecht and Wag-
ner (2007) show that securitization remedies the hold-up problem between
bank managers and shareholders, which ceteris paribus allows a safer capital
structure with a higher equity share. Securitization can therefore potentially
improve stability. However, because rents collected by managers are lower,
their incentives to monitor borrowers are damaged. On the contrary, Chiesa
(2008) shows that securitization can lead to better incentives for monitoring.
The result arises in a framework of banks prone to gamble on a good economic
outlook instead of stringently screening whom to grant a loan. Securitization
alleviates the incentives for gambling and induces banks to exert monitoring
effort. Arping (2004) demonstrates that securitization can have a beneficial
effect on the incentives of borrowers without impairing the monitoring by
lenders. In his framework securitization facilitates the ex-post enforcement
of the debt contract between borrower and lender. Finally, Cerasi and Ro-
chet (2008) show that loan sales and credit derivatives can provide optimal
insurance to banks without impairing incentives.
The existing theoretical literature, while giving a consistent prediction
that securitization leads to contagion effects, is rather inconclusive on both
why banks securitize and whether this leads to the origination of bad loans.
This is the starting point for our empirical analysis. There are several em-
pirical studies on the determinants of securitization and only a few on the
incentive issues.
2Wagner and Marsh (2006) follow a very similar line of research.
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With regard to the determinants of securitization, most studies cannot
find evidence of a capital arbitrage motive. For instance Minton et al. (2004)
use data on US financial firms, among others banks, in the period 1993-2002.
They show that unregulated finance companies and investment banks are
more likely to securitize than regulated commercial banks, which they inter-
pret as evidence against the regulatory capital arbitrage view. Focusing on
banks only they find that banks with higher capital ratios are more likely
to securitize, which again confirms the previous result. Very similar is the
empirical study of Bannier and Ha¨nsel (2008), suggesting that there is lit-
tle or no evidence of capital arbitrage in securitization. They use data on
collateralized loan obligations (CLO) issued by large European banks dur-
ing the period 1997-2004. Throughout most of the specifications the capital
ratios seem to have no significant impact on the probability of securitizing.
The only exception is a fixed-effects logit specification based on a restricted
sample of listed institutions only. Bannier and Ha¨nsel (2008) conclude that
securitization is mainly used as an efficient funding tool, especially for banks
with high credit risk and low liquidity, which reduces the overall costs of
financing. Gorton and Souleles (2006) and Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007)
also do not support capital arbitrage as a driving motive for securitization
but rather suggest that liquidity needs or lower debt funding costs are the
main drivers. Contrary to most of the literature, Calomiris and Mason (2004)
find that circumventing regulation is motivating banks to securitize assets.
Focusing on credit card debt securitizations of US commercial banks, they
find evidence that the desire to reach lower levels of capital than the regula-
tory requirement is a driving motive. Finally, Dionne and Harchaoui (2003)
study the relationship between bank capital, securitization, and credit risk
using Canadian bank data. One result of their analysis is that securitization
is negatively related to capital ratios.
The empirical literature on incentive problems in securitization is some-
how scarcer. In a recent paper Keys et al. (2010) ask whether securitization
impairs the incentives of financial firms to screen borrowers properly based
on US data on securitized subprime mortgages. They use the fact that mort-
gages given to borrowers with a creditworthiness measured by the FICO
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scores3 of 620 and above are easily securitized whereas mortgages granted to
borrowers with a FICO of 619 or lower remain on the balance sheet of the
originator with a very high probability.4 Originators take this into account
at the time mortgages are granted and, therefore, may screen more carefully
loan applicants with a FICO of 619 or lower. Indeed, Keys et al. (2010)
find that securitized loans with a FICO of 619 perform ex post better than
those with a FICO of 621. Hence, securitization has adverse effects on the
screening incentives of loan originators. Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2008) and Mian
and Sufi (2009) also provide some evidence of poor screening due to securi-
tization using loan-level data for sub-prime mortgages, even though this is
not the main focus of their work. Both studies find that denial rates on loan
applications are lower in regions in which a bigger fraction of mortgages were
securitized and interpret it as evidence that lending standards deteriorate
due to securitization.
Our study adds to both strands of the empirical literature. With regard
to identifying a capital arbitrage motive in securitization we propose a cor-
rected version of the standard capital ratios used in empirical works that does
not suffer from endogeneity. Using the proposed corrected capital ratios we
find evidence of capital arbitrage. Additionally to giving evidence of poor
incentives for borrower screening, we show how bank characteristics and the
amount of provided credit enhancements relate to the quality of securitized
loans. Our results suggest that a sufficient level of bank capital rather than
the retention of a first-loss piece gives banks the right incentives and leads
to the origination of better quality loans.
3.3 Data and summary statistics
The data come from the Uniform Bank Performance Report, collected by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation5, and cover the period starting
3Fair Isaac Credit Score. A greater value of the FICO score indicates lower credit risk.
4This threshold arises due to regulation constraints. Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae
generally do not accept such mortgages.
5The data is available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council web-
page at www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm.
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in the third quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2008. It contains the
income statements and balance sheet statements, data on regulatory cap-
ital and risk-weighted assets, securitization activities, past due loans and
leases, and off-balance-sheet exposure. In the second quarter of 2008 a total
of 7622 banking institutions insured by the FDIC were operating. For our
analysis of the determinants of securitization we concentrate on the activities
of big commercial banks with assets of more than 1 billion US dollars and
the credit card specialty banks in the United States. This leaves us with a
cross-sectional dimension of our panel of 506 banks. We are aware that we
concentrate on a group of banks that may be systematically different from
smaller banks. Nevertheless, we believe that this is the relevant sample for
our purposes since securitization activity decreases sharply with the size of
institutions. Among the 186 banks with assets of more than $3 billion in the
second quarter of 2008 approximately 33% have securitized assets at least
once during the period. Looking at the 297 banks with assets between $1
billion and $3 billion, we observe less than 5% active banks. If we consider
the peer group of even smaller banks with assets of more than $0.3 billion but
less than $1 billion the share of banks that participate in securitization drops
even further to around 2.5%. Given that bigger banks also securitize bigger
pools of assets, we believe that we cover most of the actual securitization
activities of commercial banks in the United States. In our analysis we also
include FDIC insured banks specializing in credit card loans. We restrict our
attention to private label securitization activities only. We do not analyze se-
curitization transactions settled via the Government Sponsored Enterprises.
Our data sample covers approximately 83% of banking assets and 42% of
securitized assets backing outstanding private label asset-backed securities6
in the fourth quarter of 2007.
Regarding the question of whether securitization leads to incentive prob-
lems, we have a sample of 110 banks that reported past dues and losses for
both their securitized assets and those retained on the balance sheet.
6Asset-backed securities in the sense of our analysis include all the securities issued in
a securitization transaction, which are backed by financial claims to third parties. These
include MBS, CDO, CLO, etc.
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Figure 3.2: Number of banks reporting securitization activity during the
quarters
Let us have a first look at the data. Out of the total 506 banks 86 have
securitized assets at least once during the period; 83% of the banks in the
sample are never-securitizers. The left panel of Figure 3.2 reveals that in ev-
ery single quarter a relatively constant number of around 60 banks reported
a positive amount outstanding of securitized assets. Reporting a positive
amount outstanding of securitized assets does not necessarily imply that the
bank has been involved in new securitization activities. Assets that have
been securitized in previous periods and have not matured yet are part of
the reported volume. In the right panel of Figure 3.2 we depict the number
of banks whose reported outstanding securitized assets have increased during
the quarter. These banks engaged in new securitization activities definitely.
However, this measure of issuance activity slightly underestimates the fre-
quency of new securitization activity by banks,7 as the amount of maturing
assets plus the amount charged off due to defaults may be larger than the
amount of assets that were securitized during a quarter.
In the next Figure 3.3 we contrast the size of banks that have never
7And certainly the volume of newly securitized assets.
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Figure 3.3: Bank size
securitized with the size of banks that have securitized assets at least once.
Active banks were significantly bigger and were able to increase their size
more quickly during the relevant period. The difference in size is remarkable
given that we choose to concentrate on big banks only.
Securitizing banks seem to engage in more risky lending activities or
operate in more risky segments of the credit market. Figure 3.4 depicts
that securitizing banks have been experiencing considerably higher losses on
their on-balance-sheet loans and leases throughout the period. Against the
higher expected losses they also hold higher loan loss reserves on average.
Those riskier lending practices, though, appear to be profitable. The
lower-left panel of Figure 3.5 shows that the yields on loans and leases realized
by securitizing banks are slightly better than those of non-securitizers.
The overall profitability of securitizers is higher too; see the difference
in the average return on assets in the upper-left panel of Figure 3.5. It can
be largely explained by the higher non-interest income those banks generate,
including income from securitization and servicing activities. Comparing the
returns on equity, in the upper-right panel, the finding is slightly different.
Securitizers do not perform better throughout the whole period; since the
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Figure 3.4: Credit risk
last quarter of 2006 the return on equity of non-securitizers has been higher
on average.
The lower-right panel of Figure 3.5 shows the ratio of dividends to profits.
Up until the third quarter of 2007 securitizing banks paid out a larger fraction
of net income. The two big negative outliers in the second quarter of 2006
and the second quarter of 2007 arise because banks that had booked losses
nevertheless paid dividends. Since the onset of the crisis this pattern has
changed: in three out of the four quarters since mid-2007 non-securitizers
payed a higher fraction of net income to shareholders.
In Figure 3.6 we compare the regulatory capital ratios of banks. Banks
in the United States are required to hold sufficient capital to maintain both
a ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets of at least 4% and a ratio of total risk-
based capital to risk-weighted assets of at least 8%. There are no systematical
differences in the tier 1 capital ratio shown in the left panel of Figure 3.6. The
ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, however, is substantially
higher for non-securitizing banks up until the end of 2006. During the last
7 quarters of the period, the difference in regulatory capital has become
smaller; nevertheless, it remains positive in the data.
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Figure 3.6: Regulatory capital ratios
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Figure 3.7: Securitization exposure
66
The empirics of securitization by banks
The aim of securitization is the transfer of a significant part of the risk
associated with the underlying pool of assets. Banks, though, retain some of
the risk in the form of a subordinated claim, that serves as a credit enhance-
ment, or as a pro-rata share of the issued asset-backed securities. The left
panel of Figure 3.7 shows us how much credit enhancement banks provided
to their securitized assets. On average such enhancements amount to around
8 percent of the outstanding securitized assets.8 In the right panel we de-
pict the total of subordinated claims and retained ownership9 in securitized
assets. The total exposure to securitization as a percentage of the amount
outstanding of securitized assets seems to decrease very slowly up to the first
quarter of 2007 and increases quite sharply in the course of the crisis. The
extreme peak in the second quarter of 2008 is most probably due to banks
providing support to previously securitized assets.10
3.4 Determinants of securitization activity
The observed securitization activity is an equilibrium outcome, determined
by both demand- and supply-side factors. The main aim of our analysis is to
8Interesting is the significant drop in seller-provided credit enhancements from the
third quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2004. The regulation regarding the treatment
of securitization exposures in calculating the regulatory capital ratios was changed in
January 2002, see Federal Register (2001). The new rule obliged banks to hold one dollar
of bank capital against each dollar of outstanding retained subordinated claims. The
previous regulation had limited the maximal capital charge to the minimum of either the
retained subordinated stake or the capital the bank would have had to maintain, had
it, instead of securitizing those assets, left them on the balance sheet. Under the old
regulation a bank that securitized a pool of f.e. consumer credit of $100 and retained a
subordinated claim of size $10 had to hold only $8 of capital against the pool, whereas
under the new rule the capital charge increases to $10 - the size of the subordinated claim.
This may have made it no longer profitable for banks to retain a large subordinated
exposure to securitized assets. The data on seller-provided credit enhancements in 2003
partially capture the structure of older securitizations. The retained credit enhancements
starting from the last quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2007 amounted to less than
8% of the amount outstanding of securitized assets and thus indeed allowed a lower capital
charge.
9The so-called retained seller’s interest, which does not provide any credit enhancement
and carries a pro-rata share of the risk.
10We provide disaggregated data on the seller-provided credit enhancements by type of
securitized loans in Figure 3.9 of Appendix B.
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identify the factors affecting the decision of banks to securitize assets. Thus,
we focus on the supply of asset-backed securities by credit institutions in the
baseline analysis, while controlling for possible changes in demand over time
by using quarter dummies. According to theory, there are two main drivers:
risk-sharing considerations11 and the possibility of gaining regulatory capital
relief via securitization.12 Additionally, securitization may allow banks to
fund assets at more favorable debt costs. This is the so-called “efficient
contracting view”. The transfer of the ownership of the underlying assets to
a special purpose vehicle removes them from the bankruptcy estate of the
originating institution.13 Thus, investors in asset-backed securities do not
bear the risk of bankruptcy of the bank itself, but only risks associated with
the performance of the underlying assets.14 We also account for economy
of scale and scope effects and a possible self-selection into securitization of
more profitable banks.
To complement our analysis, we also try to identify demand-side effects by
including a set of macroeconomic variables capturing investors’ risk appetite
and the monetary policy stance. We follow a purely empirical strategy, as
performed in the literature for instance by Minton et al. (2004) and Bannier
and Ha¨nsel (2008), among others.
These are our working hypotheses:
• Regulatory capital relief : The “regulatory capital arbitrage” hy-
pothesis calls for a negative relationship between capital ratios and
securitization activity.15 Capital constrained banks will use securitiza-
tion techniques in order to improve their disclosed regulatory capital
ratios. There are two challenges for the econometric identification of
this causal relationship. First, banks will not wait until the regulatory
11See Allen and Carletti (2006) and Wagner and Marsh (2006).
12See for instance Allen and Gale (2007).
13The securitized assets are not part of the bank’s bankruptcy estate and thus investors
in asset-backed securities continue to receive the interest and principle payments even in
the case it becomes bankrupt. Special purpose vehicle are structured in a way that makes
it impossible to become insolvent. See Schwarcz (1994).
14See for instance Calomiris and Mason (2004) and Gorton and Souleles (2006).
15See Duffie and Garleanu (2001) and Calomiris and Mason (2004) among others.
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constraint becomes binding. We believe that they act in a forward-
looking manner and use the techniques preemptively. Second, if banks
are successful in circumventing capital regulation, the ex-post observed
capital ratio should not appear low any more. We argue that using
such ex-post observed capital ratios in the regression analysis, as per-
formed in the existing literature, is misleading and propose a different
approach: we use a proxy of the unobservable counterfactual capital
adequacy ratio. Since this is a departure from the existing literature,
let us explain our idea in some detail.
Consider a credit institution, which intends to use securitization for
capital relief purposes. Let us assume that it would like to originate
new loans, but by doing so it risks becoming capital constrained. To
prevent this from happening, it can securitize part of its loans. Suppose
that it has risk-weighted assets Yt−1 and regulatory capital Ct−1 and
expects to grant new loans ∆Yt > 0. Without the use of securitization,
its regulatory capital ratio in period t would be lower, equal to Ct−1
Yt−1+∆Yt
,
and possibly leave no buffer to the regulatory threshold. Let Zt denote
the amount of assets to be securitized and zt the size of the first-loss
piece. After the assets have been securitized, the capital ratio changes
to:16
Ct−1 − zt
Yt−1 + ∆Yt − Zt (3.1)
If the term zt/Zt is lower than Ct−1/(Yt−1 + ∆Yt), securitization activi-
ties will improve the ratio. This is probably why people find a positive
relationship between securitization and capital adequacy. However,
this is not the casual link from capital constraints to securitization.
We generally do not observe how low capital ratios would have been if
securitization had not taken place. The observed capital ratio suffers
from endogeneity: a low capital ratio induces banks to securitize assets
16The regulatory rules, see Federal Register (2001), for securitization state that the first-
loss piece must be deducted from capital for regulatory purposes; therefore, the numerator
decreases. As the securitized assets Zt are no longer on the balance sheet of the bank, the
denominator decreases too.
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but once securitization has taken place, capital ratios do not appear
low any more. We construct a proxy for the counterfactual capital
ratio by putting the securitized assets back on the balance sheet and
adding the retained credit enhancements zt to the regulatory capital.
Intuitively, we focus on how low capital levels affect the decision to
securitize by suppressing the positive effect of securitization on capital
adequacy. In this manner we are able to solve the reverse causality
from securitization back to the observed capital ratio.17
Since the capital adequacy regulation in the USA imposes two restric-
tions, we construct the counterfactual proxies for the two minimum
capital ratios required: a Capital/RWA, defined as the regulatory total
risk-based capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, and Tier1/Total
Assets, defined as the tier 1 capital to total assets.18
Table 3.10 in Appendix B reports the mean of the “original” and
the “corrected” capital ratios.19 Since those do not differ for non-
participating institutions, we should compare the means calculated for
the subsample of securitizers who were active at least once during the
sample period. On average the corrected measure is about 1% lower
than the standard one.
• Risk sharing: If securitization is used to transfer risk from the bank
to outside investors, we would expect higher risk to be associated with a
higher probability of securitizing. To capture this idea we use the vari-
able loss allowances. The variable controls for credit risk as perceived
17A similar approach is followed by Calomiris and Mason (2004). They use a ratio of
capital to the sum of on-balance-sheet and securitized assets, but do not take into account
the size of the first-loss piece in the numerator.
18We have data on the amount outstanding of provided credit enhancement at period t
and the amount outstanding of securitized assets by type. We calculate the counterfactual
Tier1/Total Assets ratio by adding the amount of credit enhancements to tier 1 capital
and the amount of securitized assets to total assets; for the Capital/RWA ratio we again
add the provided credit enhancements to the total capital for regulatory purposes and add
the risk-weighted securitized assets to the risk-weighted assets. For weights we use 0.50
for mortgages and home equity loans and 1 for other loans, as required for assets held on
the balance sheet of banks.
19In addition Table 3.8 in Appendix B provides a pairwise correlation matrix for these
capital ratios.
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by the bank. It is measured as the ratio of the allowances for future
loan and lease losses to total loans and lease-financing receivables.
• Financing costs: Securitization can be used as an efficient tool for
lowering the debt financing costs. The interest and principal payments
to investors in asset-backed securities are not affected in the event of
the bankruptcy of the originator. Consequently, the financing costs by
issuing asset-backed securities do not include a premium for this risk.
We use the average costs of bank debt (including subordinated notes
and debentures) as a measure of financing costs. The more costly debt
financing is for individual institutions, the higher the probability of
securitizing should be.
• Economies of scope: Securitization comprises activities similar to in-
vestment banking. The key steps in the securitization process - pooling
the underlying assets, underwriting the securities, and placing them on
the market - require expertise that is very similar to the one acquired
in investment banking. Therefore, potential synergy effects arise. To
capture this idea we use the variable investment banking measured as
investment banking income to total income. We expect that the more
strongly involved a bank is in investment banking, the higher the prob-
ability of securitizing.
• Economies of scale: Since there are substantial fixed costs for setting
up a special purpose vehicle, we expect bigger banks that securitize
bigger loan pools to experience lower average costs of securitization.
We capture this idea by using the total assets as the measure of bank
size and expect a positive relationship.
• Profitability: Securitization may be more easily feasible for more prof-
itable banks, as they possibly can afford to pay the high up-front fixed
costs20 of issuing asset-backed securities. Hence, there might be some
20These are for example administrative and legal costs for setting up a SPV as well as
rating agency fees.
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sort of “selection” of more profitable banks into securitization. To cap-
ture this idea we use the yield on loans and leases as our measure of
profitability. More profitable banks become more likely securitizers.21
• Average tax rate: Financing through securitization has the disad-
vantage of non-deductibility of costs from the pre-tax income compared
with on-balance-sheet debt finance.22 Thus, we expect banks with high
effective tax rates to be less likely to securitize assets. The variable
average tax rate is defined as applicable income taxes as a share of the
pre-tax net operating income.
We now turn to the possible demand factors. Two macroeconomic vari-
ables are included:
• Fed funds rate: A low level of interest rates and high money supply
might induce investors to search for more profitable investment oppor-
tunities, among others in asset-backed securities. For that reason we
expect a negative sign here.
• Baa risk premium: We want to capture the overall risk appetite of
investors. The Baa risk premium is calculated as the difference between
the yield on corporate bonds with a Baa rating and the yield on 10-year
government bonds.23 We expect a lower risk premium to be associated
with a higher demand for asset-backed securities.
We concentrate on two main questions. The first one asks why do (or do
not) banks securitize assets? Here we try to identify systematic differences
between the groups of securitizers and non-securitizers, which relate to this
decision. We call this the extensive margin of securitization. The second
question we ask is why some banks securitize more than other banks. Here
we identify differences between banks within the group of securitizers relating
21Previous studies use return on equity as a measure of profitability. However, this
measure is likely to be endogenous, because securitization itself directly influences the
return on equity via increased non-interest income.
22See Minton et al. (2004).
23We obtain the data from the web page of the Board of the Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov.
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to the scale of securitization activity, calling it the intensive margin. Let us
first turn our attention to the extensive margin.
3.5 The extensive margin of securitization
We start with the standard binary choice model, which can be derived from
the following latent variable model. Let ∆pi denote the unobservable change
in expected discounted profits if a bank chooses to securitize assets.24 We
assume that it is a linear function of observables:
∆pi = xβ +  (3.2)
where x represents the row vector of determinants of securitization (including
a constant), β is the column vector of coefficients, and  is a random error
term. Let s be a binary choice variable, equaling 1 if the bank securitizes
assets during the quarter and 0 otherwise.
A profit-maximizing bank participates in securitization if ∆pi > 0. Hence,
the probability of securitizing is given by:25
P (s = 1|x) = P (∆pi > 0|x) = P (xβ +  > 0|x) =
= P ( > −xβ|x) = 1−G(−xβ) = G(xβ) (3.3)
where G(.) is the cumulative distribution function of . We further assume
that G(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, which
leads to the probit model.
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. The log likelihood func-
tion for a sample of N banks observed over T periods is given by:
24We use the term profits even though this could stand for any benefits to stakeholders,
managers, or other decision makers that cannot be expressed monetarily.
25Here we assume that the distribution of  is symmetric, with a mean of zero.
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L(β) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
{sitln [G(xitβ)] + (1− sit)ln [1−G(xitβ)]} (3.4)
To account for a possible serial correlation within panel units and het-
eroskedasticity across panels, we use a cluster-robust variance-covariance es-
timator, with banks as cluster units.26
Before outlining the estimation results, let us briefly explain how we gen-
erate the left-hand side variable. The most natural way to proceed would be
to define an active bank, sit = 1, if we observe new issuance of asset-backed
securities by bank i in quarter t, as performed for instance by Minton et al.
(2004) or Bannier and Ha¨nsel (2008). Unfortunately, we have data on the
amount outstanding of securitized assets only. Given the available data we
can choose among three strategies:
• treat banks as participating in every period if we observe a positive
amount outstanding of securitized assets at least once. This strategy
is suitable for identifying determinants that do not depend on the par-
ticular time period, like the relative size difference of securitizers vs.
non-securitizers as visible in Figure 3.3. However, it does not allow us
to find factors accounting for the dynamics of the decision of banks to
securitize over time, as their status as securitizer would not depend on
issuance in any particular period.
• treat banks as participating in period t if we observe a positive amount
outstanding of securitized assets. This approach has a drawback: ob-
serving a positive outstanding amount does not necessarily imply that
26The alternative strategy would have been to use a random effects probit estimator.
This specification deals with serial autocorrelation in the composite error term due to the
presence of an unobserved random effect. More specifically, it assumes that the autocorre-
lation of the error terms is equal at all lags. We decided to use a pooled probit estimator
with corrected standard errors because Monte Carlo studies, for instance Guilkey and
Murphy (1993), suggest that it performs as well as the computationally intensive random
effects probit estimator. It is further recommended as, first, one does not have to assume
equicorrelated error terms and, second, if there is another form of clustering on the bank
level in our data, inference based on the random effects estimates would be misleading.
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new issuance has occurred. Bank loans typically have a maturity of
more than one quarter, therefore, a positive amount outstanding can
be observed even though no new assets were securitized. Thus, some
institutions, which were not active at time t, will be misclassified as
securitizers.
• treat banks as participating at time t only if we observe an increasing
amount outstanding of securitized assets. Even though this approach
captures new issuance more accurately, it has a similar drawback to
the previous strategy. Whereas observing an increase implies that new
issuance has occurred, it is possible that the amount outstanding of
securitized assets decreases despite the issuance of asset-backed secu-
rities during the period if the newly issued amount is lower than the
amount of previously securitized loans maturing during the quarter.
Thus, some institutions, that issued new asset-backed securities will be
misclassified as non-participating.
Since we would like to capture the possible dynamics in banks’ securiti-
zation activity, we consider the second and third options. Both strategies
lead to a non-classical measurement error in the left-hand side variable. We
believe that the misclassification is only minor if we use the latter one and
treat banks as participating at time t if we observe an increase in the amount
outstanding of the securitized assets. The misclassification biases coefficients
downward in absolute value but preserves their signs.27 Thus, we interpret
the absolute value of the estimated coefficients rather as lower bounds of the
true relationship and focus on the direction of the relation.
Throughout all the specifications we exclude the last two quarters in our
sample, as at that time the crisis had already intensified, asset-backed secu-
rities were considered “toxic” and securitization was for practical purposes
not feasible. We report the estimation results using the counterfactual total
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio in Table 3.1 and alternatively
using the tier 1 capital to total assets ratio in Table 3.2. In all the spec-
27See Hausman et al. (1998).
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Table 3.1: The extensive margin of securitization: using Capital/RWA Cor-
rected
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Capital/RWA Corrected -6.20* -5.60* -5.60* -7.21* -5.63* -5.73* -6.57*
(3.26) (3.18) (3.13) (3.87) (3.10) (3.11) (3.68)
Log of Total Assets 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045)
Credit Card Bank 1.82*** 1.38*** 1.73*** 1.44*** 1.80*** 1.78*** 1.32***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.43) (0.27) (0.27) (0.39)
Yield Loans and Leases 5.30** 2.65
(2.68) (4.32)
Financing Costs 2.52 2.36
(11.1) (12.1)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 10.7 8.89
(8.49) (10.4)
Investment Banking 5.77* 5.81*
(3.48) (3.51)
Tax Rate -0.010 -0.011*
(0.0063) (0.0062)
Fed Funds Rate -0.16
(0.13)
Baa Risk Premium -1.48*
(0.89)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 224 223 240 270 212 214 298
Pseudo R-squared 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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ifications we use the first lags of the explanatory variables28 to reduce the
problems due to omitted variables or reverse causality, as lags are naturally
correlated with the contemporaneous values and at the same time they are
less likely to be correlated with the error term.29 We control for possible
changes in securitization activity over time for instance due to changes in
investor demand by using time dummies. Only in the last specification in
column (7) we control directly for the stance of monetary policy and the
risk appetite of investors.30 Furthermore, we include a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the institution is a credit card specialty bank in addition to the
variables described in the previous section, as banks specialized in credit card
loans use credit risk transfer instruments more often than other commercial
banks. We finally estimate the model using the standard capital ratios and
compare the results to check to what extent endogeneity is a problem. These
results are reported in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 in Appendix B.
Let us first have a look at Table 3.1. Reported are the coefficients31 of a
pooled probit estimation of the probability of securitizing on the corrected
total capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the logarithm of total assets, the
debt financing costs, the yield on loans and leases, loan loss allowances, in-
vestment banking activities, average tax rate, and a credit card bank dummy.
Banks indeed seem to use securitization techniques to circumvent capital
regulation. Throughout all the specifications the coefficient for the counter-
factual capital to risk-weighted assets ratio is negative and significant at the
10% level. As expected, banks whose corrected capital ratio is low securi-
tize with a higher probability. We interpret the result as evidence of capital
arbitrage in securitization.
28Table 3.10 in Appendix B provides descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables.
Furthermore, Table 3.11 in Appendix B shows their pairwise correlations.
29Non-linear estimation techniques, like maximum likelihood, are particularly sensitive
to small endogeneity problems, which can cause a bias in the set of all the estimated
coefficients.
30We continue to control for other time fixed effects by keeping a set of time dummies.
Compared with the specifications without the two macro variables, we reduce the number
of included time dummies by two.
31Note that in non-linear models the coefficients do not match the marginal effects,
thus one cannot interpret their magnitude in the usual way but only their sign.
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Using the standard capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the results are
quite different; see Table 3.12 in Appendix B. The coefficient is positive,
though insignificant, suggesting, contrary to the capital arbitrage hypothesis,
that capital-constrained banks tend to securitize with a lower probability.
Again, as already pointed out, the standard capital ratio is endogenous and
the estimated coefficient biased upwards. The endogeneity problem seems to
be severe enough to alter the sign of the coefficient.
The size of the credit institution also matters for the securitization deci-
sion. The coefficient for the logarithm of total assets is positive and significant
in all the specifications in Table 3.1, implying that larger institutions securi-
tize assets with a higher probability. Our intuition for the result is that high
fixed costs associated with securitization act as a barrier to market entry for
smaller banks. The average securitization cost for these institutions would be
higher, as they would generally want to securitize smaller pools of assets and
the fixed costs cannot be spread across a large pool of loans. Furthermore,
as expected banks specializing in credit card lending also securitize with a
higher probability due to their special business model.32
To test whether profitability influences the probability of securitizing, we
include the yield on loans and leases in columns (2) and (7). The coeffi-
cient reported in column (2) is significant and positive, which at first sight
supports the idea of profitable banks more easily affording the high up-front
costs of securitization. Once we also control for all the other determinants,
though, the coefficient becomes insignificant; see column (7). The estimate
in column (2) possibly suffers from an omitted variable bias. The origination
of riskier credit is associated with higher yields. Therefore, if higher credit
risk increases the probability of securitizing, the yield on loans and leases
may capture some of its effect. Not controlling for credit risk induces an
upward bias in the coefficient in specification (2). Once we control for it
in column (7), the bias disappears and the coefficient on yield on loans and
leases becomes insignificant.
We are not able to find evidence in support of banks engaging in securiti-
32Gorton and Souleles (2006) point out that credit card securitization is the second
largest segment after mortgage backed securities issuance.
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zation either as a means to share credit risk or as a way to fund loans at more
favorable debt financing costs. Both coefficients have the expected positive
sign,33 but are insignificant. Thus, our empirical results do not confirm the
hypothesis of securitization mainly used as a tool for transfering credit risk
from the banking industry to sectors more capable or willing to bear them.
Capital arbitrage rather seems to be the driving motive for the extensive
margin.
The degree to which banks engage in investment banking activities influ-
ences as expected their decision to securitize positively. The coefficient for
investment banking activities is positive and significant in both columns (5)
and (7). Additionally to economies of scope, tax considerations seem to be
important. Banks with higher tax rates benefit more from tax deductibility,
therefore, we expect that higher tax rates correlate negatively with the prob-
ability of securitizing. The coefficient is indeed negative, but significant only
in the last specification.
Even though the main focus of our empirical analysis lies in identifying
supply-side factors in securitization, we include the federal funds rate and
the Baa risk premium in the last specification (7). Both regressors capture
variations in investor demand for asset-backed securitites. The respective
coefficients have the expected negative sign. Loose monetary policy, cap-
tured by low levels of the fed funds rate, generally leads to higher investor
demand for more risky but higher yielding investment opportunities, among
others also in asset-backed securities. In turn, it should increase the prob-
ability of securitizing for all the institutions in the sample. Similarly, low
levels of the Baa risk premium relate to a high appetite for risk of investors
and are expected to lead to a higher probability of securitizing. Only the
coefficient for the Baa risk premium is significant, though. The results are
sensitive to changes in the set of included time dummies and should not be
overemphasized.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of the same analysis, using the corrected
tier 1 to total assets ratio instead of the corrected ratio of capital to risk-
33Both when included individually in columns (3) and (4), respectively, and when
controlling for all the possible determinants in column (7).
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Table 3.2: The extensive margin of securitization: using Tier 1/Total Assets
Corrected
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tier 1/Total Assets Corrected -5.28** -5.00* -4.82* -6.63** -4.94* -4.76* -5.98*
(2.60) (2.77) (2.57) (3.22) (2.61) (2.52) (3.28)
Log of Total Assets 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
Credit Card Bank 1.95*** 1.49*** 1.85*** 1.65*** 1.92*** 1.90*** 1.46***
(0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.44) (0.30) (0.30) (0.39)
Yield Loans and Leases 5.52** 3.38
(2.67) (4.18)
Financing Costs 2.63 1.54
(10.8) (12.0)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 9.85 7.54
(8.52) (10.3)
Investment Banking 5.18 5.18
(3.30) (3.28)
Tax Rate -0.0089 -0.0095
(0.0062) (0.0062)
Fed Funds Rate -0.14
(0.12)
Baa Risk Premium -1.36
(0.87)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 196 195 220 242 186 187 274
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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weighted assets. All the coefficients are very similar in magnitude to those
reported in Table 3.1. Capital arbitrage considerations, economies of scale,
and being a credit card bank significantly influence the probability of securi-
tizing of banks in our sample. The previously significant effects of taxes and
investment banking activities are no longer so.34
Worthwhile is again the comparison of estimation results with those using
the standard tier 1 ratio instead of the corrected one. Table 3.13 in Appendix
B reveals that the coefficient of the standard ratio is positive and significant
at the 5% level throughout all the specifications. Recall that when using the
standard capital to risk-weighted assets ratio the positive coefficient was not
significant. We believe that the endogeneity problem for the standard tier 1
ratio is more severe, as securitization for regulatory capital purposes leads to
a higher increase in the Tier 1/Total Assets ratio than in the Capital/RWA
ratio. The reason is quite straightforward: whereas securitization leads to
a similar reduction in the numerator of both ratios because the provided
credit enhancements have to be deducted, the denominator of the tier 1
ratio decreases typically more strongly as the assets are not weighted and on
average the risk weighting is lower than 1. Again, endogeneity is indeed a
problem, and if not considered biases the results significantly.
3.6 The intensive margin of securitization
After having analyzed the participation decision of banks, we turn our at-
tention to the question of why some banks use securitization on a larger
scale and/or more often. We label it the intensive margin of securitization.
Among the securitizing banks in our sample, the median bank securitizes in
4 out of 19 quarters, with around 44% of the banks being active only once or
twice during the sample period. The securitized assets of the median bank
amount to only around 3.7% of its on-balance-sheet assets, whereas banks
at the 75th percentile of the distribution have around 23% securitized to re-
tained assets. A natural question, thus, is which factors account for these
34The p-values rise to 12-13%.
81
The empirics of securitization by banks
observed differences within the group of securitizing banks.
In this section we use a more structural model of securitization activities.
Instead of grouping the banks into securitizers and non-securitizers, based
on the change in the amount outstanding of securitized assets, we try to
model the evolution of the stock of those assets and “difference out” the new
issuance of asset-backed securities.35
We start with the following identity, which shows the evolution of the
amount outstanding of securitized assets:
Sit = Si,t−1 + newissuanceit − repaymentit − chargeoffsit (3.5)
where Sit denotes the amount outstanding of assets securitized by bank i
in period t. The identity simply says that the stock of securitized assets
increases with the issuance of new asset-backed securities and decreases with
loan repayments as well as loan charge-offs. Since we observe the charge-offs
on the securitized assets in each period we can rewrite the equation as:
Sit + chargeoffsit = S
gross
it = Si,t−1 + newissuanceit − repaymentit (3.6)
In the next step we model the unobserved “repayment” term as a func-
tion of observables. The amount of repayments depends positively on the
outstanding amount of assets. Further determinants are macroeconomic fac-
tors like the interest rates or the business cycle, because for example a low
unemployment rate raises the probability that loans will be payed back on
time and low interest rates lead to prepayments and refinancing of loans at
more favorable terms. Finally, we add time-invariant, bank-specific factors
to account for unobserved characteristics that potentially influence the re-
payment series for each bank in our sample. We end up with the following
35Prior literature using stock data, e.g. Gorton and Souleles (2006) among others,
pursues a different empirical modeling strategy. Researchers typically use models that
ignore the dynamics of the outstanding securitized assets. However, given the observed
dependence of the stock data over time, this is an unnatural assumption.
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linear structure on repaymentit:
repaymentit = αSi,t−1 + ωt + ψi + ξit (3.7)
where ωt captures all the relevant time-varying factors (e.g. interest rates, un-
employment rate, GDP growth), ψi stands for time-invariant determinants,
and ξit is a well-behaved random error term.
Plugging equation (3.7) into (3.6) delivers:
Sgrossit = (1− α)Si,t−1 + newissuanceit − ωt − ψi − ξit (3.8)
Next, we use the determinants of new issuance described in the previous
section to complete the estimable equation. Assuming further that there
are time-specific, but bank-invariant and time-constant, bank-specific factors
that influence the decision to securitize new assets, we end up with our final
specification:36
Sgrossit = (1− α)Si,t−1 + xitγ + ω∗t + ψ∗i + ξ∗it (3.9)
The main advantage of this specification as opposed to the previous probit
model is that here we can partially account for the heterogeneity between
banks using bank fixed effects. Moreover, this dynamic model will allow us
to test whether our main regressors are exogenous and hence whether our
predictions are valid.
Estimating the above relationship via simple OLS and treating ψ∗i + ξ
∗
it
as the composite error term is problematic in several ways.37 First, ψ∗i and
Si,t−1 are mathematically related and this will lead to biased estimates. A
solution is to eliminate the bank fixed effects by substracting the time mean
36ω∗t , ψ
∗
i , and ξ
∗
it are the composite terms. xit is the vector of determinants of securi-
tization as described in the previous section.
37Equation (3.9) is close to the one with a lagged dependent variable because Sgrossit and
Sit are highly correlated. The sample correlation coefficient is corr(S
gross
it , Sit) = 0.999.
Charge-offs are small relative to the outstanding amounts; hence the variation in the
dependent variable is driven by the variation in Sit. Including charge-offs on the right-
hand side (as the regressor) instead of on the left-hand side, which leads to a standard
model with a lagged dependent variable, delivers the same results.
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for each bank.38 However, a problem still remains, because the transformed
lagged dependent variable (LDV) is correlated with the transformed error
term. Nickell (1981) showed that this introduces a bias into the estimates,
that disappears only for T → ∞.39 We use a technique, first proposed by
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) to solve the problem. In order to eliminate the
fixed effects first differences are taken from both sides of equation (3.9):
Sgrossit − Sgrossi,t−1 = (1− α)(Si,t−1 − Si,t−2) + (xit − xi,t−1)γ +
+(ω∗t − ω∗t−1) + (ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1) (3.10)
Again there is a correlation between the Si,t−1−Si,t−2 term and the trans-
formed error term ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1. To solve the endogeneity problem, one uses
an instrumental variable estimator. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose the
lagged level Si,t−2 or the lagged difference Si,t−2 − Si,t−3 as natural instru-
ments, because they are correlated with Si,t−1−Si,t−2, but not with the error
term.40 The instruments are valid if ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1 is not first-order autocorre-
lated or equivalently the level ξ∗it doesn’t follow a second-order autoregressive
process.41
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991)
propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of equation
(3.10), which is more efficient than that of Anderson and Hsiao (1982). As
we go further in time more lagged values can serve as instruments, and more
moment conditions can be used to improve efficiency. The GMM framework
allows us in addition to test for the exogeneity of the instrument set.42
38The within-group transformation.
39Further, Judson and Owen (1999) find that this bias is important (around 20%) even
for T = 30.
40Instrumenting in this manner does not work with the within-group transformation.
41The first-difference representation introduces serial correlation of the transformed
errors (assuming no autocorrelation in levels), but this can be easily treated by using GLS
or by using robust variance-covariance estimators.
42Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that “difference”
GMM may perform poorly when the time series are very persistent. In this case lagged
levels are poor instruments of first differences, which produce the “weak instrument prob-
lem”. They propose the so-called “system” GMM estimator, where an equation in levels
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The following moment conditions can be used in the estimation:
E[Si,t−l(ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1)] = 0 for each t ≥ 3 and l ≥ 2 (3.11)
We decide to exploit the “collapsed” version following Roodman (2009b)
to reduce the problem of “too many instruments”.43 Thus, we use the fol-
lowing moment conditions:
E[Si,t−l(ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1)] = 0 for each l ≥ 2 (3.12)
The additional usual moment conditions are of the form:
E[(xit − xi,t−1)′(ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1)] = 0 for t ≥ 2 (3.13)
where the row vector x contains all the strictly exogenous explanatory vari-
ables. If some of the covariates are potentially predetermined or endogenous
we use suitable lagged levels to instrument the difference xit − xi,t−1.44
We address several issues in our estimation. First, we use the amount
outstanding of securitized assets as a share of the total managed assets of
the bank instead of the level of Sit.
45 The total managed assets are defined as
the sum of the total on-balance-sheet assets and the total securitized assets.
This helps us to avoid problems due to non-stationarity of the series.46 Sec-
is added to the system of differenced equations. Here the intuition is to instrument levels
with differences. However, a crucial and non-trivial assumption requires that the covari-
ance E[Sitψ∗i ] is constant over time (stationary) so that E[(Sit − Si,t−1)ψ∗i ] = 0. The
condition is required for all the instruments. We believe that the initial stationarity of the
time series for the securitized assets is not satisfied because there is a clear upward trend
in the stock of asset-backed securities between 2003 and 2007. Therefore, system GMM is
not appropriate.
43This problem arises because as we go further in time, there are more lags of the
dependent variable, which can potentially serve as instruments.
44We start by treating these variables as strictly exogenous and perform Difference-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets. If these reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity we use appropriate lagged levels instead.
45The average bank has about 15% and the median bank about 3.5% securitized in all
managed assets.
46Furthermore, the approach has the following advantage over using on-balance-sheet
assets only in the denominator. If a bank securitizes assets, without expanding its on-
balance-sheet lending, we will observe higher Sit as well as lower retained assets. The
share of securitized to retained assets will increase sharply, since both the nominator
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ond, we perform the “one-step” GMM estimation and produce test statistics
by applying the cluster-robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix
of residuals, which allows for arbitrary correlation within banks and het-
eroskedasticity across banks.47 Third, we test for AR(1) and AR(2) in the
first-differenced errors using the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation to
check whether our instruments are valid. In theory there is a negative first-
order autocorrelation in first differences, but there should be no second or
higher order autocorrelation. Fourth, we conduct a Hansen (1982) test of
overidentifying restrictions to test for the exogeneity of the instrument set as
a whole. In addition, to test whether our “corrected” capital ratio measure is
exogenous, we perform a Difference-in-Hansen test. We test further whether
all the other strictly exogenous explanatory variables are indeed orthogonal
to the residuals, but we do not present them in the tables for sake of clarity.
Finally, we address the problem of “too many instruments”. Since we have a
relatively small sample “overfitting” endogenous variables by using too many
moment conditions may be a problem.48 Therefore, we decide to restrict the
lag length to using only up to the first five available lags. In addition we
“collapse” them into a smaller instrument set. As a consequence, our system
of equations has two or three overidentifying restrictions.
Table 3.3 shows the estimation results using the Capital/RWA Corrected
ratio, whereas Table 3.4 uses the Tier1/ Total Assets Corrected ratio.49 The
results are qualitatively comparable; therefore, we focus on the results re-
ported in Table 3.3. We use two samples in our analysis. The narrow sample
in columns (3) and (4) consists of all the securitizers from the sample used
increases and the denominator decreases.
47In theory “two-step” GMM estimation produces a heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust variance-covariance matrix and is more efficient than the one-step
approach. However, as Arellano and Bond (1991) and Roodman (2009a) point out, stan-
dard errors can be severely downward biased in small samples. In this case standard errors
can then be adjusted using the finite-sample correction of Windmeijer (2005), but since
this is only an approximation we decide to stick to our one-step results.
48Roodman (2009b) emphasizes that the available instruments may rise quadratically
with the number of time periods. For our sample with 18 quarters the maximum poten-
tially available moment conditions amount to (18− 2)(18− 1)/2 = 136.
49We use the xtabond2 command in Stata provided by Roodman (2009a) to obtain our
results.
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Table 3.3: Dynamic difference GMM estimation results using Capital/RWA
Corrected
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Instruments: L2-L4.S L2-L5.S L2-L4.S L2-L5.S
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.(Securitized to Total 
Managed Assets) 0.59* 0.55** 0.81** 0.80**
(0.31) (0.28) (0.41) (0.37)
Capital/RWA Corrected -1.13** -1.15** -1.20* -1.21*
(0.54) (0.54) (0.61) (0.62)
Log of Total Assets -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Yield Loans and Leases 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
(0.097) (0.095) (0.11) (0.11)
Financing Costs 1.70*** 1.69*** 1.93*** 1.93***
(0.64) (0.63) (0.72) (0.70)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 0.037 0.071 0.096 0.11
(0.59) (0.56) (0.61) (0.58)
Investment Banking -0.034 -0.034 -0.047 -0.047
(0.066) (0.065) (0.073) (0.072)
Tax Rate -0.000063 -0.000063 -0.000070 -0.000071
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00015)
Fed Funds Rate -0.047 -0.042 -0.20 -0.19
(0.37) (0.36) (0.53) (0.52)
Baa Risk Premium -0.039 -0.034 -0.19 -0.19
(0.39) (0.38) (0.55) (0.55)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1141 1141 955 955
Number of bank clusters 103 103 77 77
Number of instruments 26 27 26 27
F statistic 2.62 2.67 2.33 2.37
F-Test (p-value) 0.0004 0.0003 0.003 0.002
AR(1) Test -1.68 -1.70 -1.83 -1.95
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05
AR(2) Test -0.79 -0.75 -1.16 -1.15
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.43 0.45 0.25 0.25
Hansen-J statistic 0.72 1.20 0.056 0.12
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 3 2 3
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.70 0.75 0.97 0.99
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for 
Capital/RWA Corrected 0.36 0.03 0.03 0.01
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.55 0.87 0.86 0.94
Securitized to Total Managed Assets (gross)
broad narrow
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Estimates are one-
step difference GMM. The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of
the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen J-test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a
group is exogenous. A Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of the capital
ratio) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Dynamic difference GMM estimation results using Tier1/Total
Assets Corrected
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Instruments: L2-L4.S L2-L5.S L2-L4.S L2-L5.S
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.(Securitized to Total 
Managed Assets) 0.70** 0.64** 0.92** 0.87**
(0.33) (0.30) (0.44) (0.40)
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected -1.44* -1.48* -1.63* -1.65*
(0.79) (0.80) (0.84) (0.84)
Log of Total Assets -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Yield Loans and Leases 0.12 0.11 0.099 0.097
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Financing Costs 1.96*** 1.95*** 2.27*** 2.26***
(0.74) (0.73) (0.82) (0.80)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 0.13 0.19 0.30 0.34
(0.57) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54)
Investment Banking -0.028 -0.029 -0.041 -0.041
(0.065) (0.064) (0.072) (0.070)
Tax Rate -0.000064 -0.000064 -0.000049 -0.000049
(0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Fed Funds Rate -0.22 -0.22 -0.55 -0.55
(0.39) (0.38) (0.56) (0.55)
Baa Risk Premium -0.22 -0.22 -0.57 -0.57
(0.41) (0.40) (0.59) (0.57)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1141 1141 955 955
Number of bank clusters 103 103 77 77
Number of instruments 26 27 26 27
F statistic 2.26 2.34 2.08 2.15
F-Test (p-value) 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.006
AR(1) Test -1.96 -1.95 -2.00 -2.06
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.050 0.051 0.046 0.040
AR(2) Test -1.36 -1.39 -1.39 -1.44
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15
Hansen-J statistic 0.73 1.80 0.48 0.81
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 3 2 3
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.69 0.61 0.79 0.85
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for 
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.07
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.89 0.72 0.81 0.79
Securitized to Total Managed Assets (gross)
broad narrow
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Estimates are one-
step difference GMM. The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of
the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen J-test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a
group is exogenous. A Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of the capital
ratio) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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in our binary choice model. In addition, we collected data on all the secu-
ritizers with assets between 300 million and 1 billion dollars in the second
quarter of 2008. There are 30 banks reporting securitization activities in
this sub-group. By adding these banks to our narrow sample we obtain the
broad sample used in columns (1) and (2). Beyond the advantage of using
more observations this allows us to see whether the inclusion of other banks
alters our results. We further present results using two different instrument
sets: the first includes the second, third, and fourth lags of Sit in column (1)
whereas the second includes in addition the fifth lag in column (2).
Throughout all the specifications the Arellano-Bond test suggests the ex-
istence of negative first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced resid-
uals at the 10% significance level, that is expected by construction. The
test cannot reject the null hypothesis of the absence of AR(2) in the first-
differenced residuals, indicating that the lagged levels of the dependent vari-
able are valid instruments. Furthermore, the p-value of the Hansen J-test
ranges between 0.70 and 0.99. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the in-
strument set as a whole cannot be rejected. Therefore, endogeneity is not
driving our results.
A brief look at the table reveals that the results are in general not sensitive
to different samples or to the use of different instrument sets. Therefore, we
interpret only the results in column (1). Banks with a lower capital ratio
securitize more. The estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero
at the 5% level. To quantify the effect we compare a bank at the 75th
percentile of the distribution of the capital ratio with a bank at the 25th
percentile. The latter has an approximately 2 percentage points lower ratio
of capital to risk-weighted assets. The coefficient of −1.13 implies that this
bank will have 2.26 percentage points higher securitized in total managed
assets. However, since we have a dynamic model, the coefficient represents
only the contemporaneous effect. The long-run impact is given by γ/(1−(1−
α)).50 Given the estimate for (1 − α) of 0.59, the long-run effect amounts
to 2.26/(1 − 0.59) = 5.51 percentage points. The result suggests that the
50This is approximately true, because Sgrossit and Sit have almost equal values.
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capital arbitrage is important for both the extensive and the intensive margin
of securitization. The performed Difference-in-Hansen test cannot reject the
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of Capital/RWA Corrected.51
A second important finding is that the financing costs seem to be a fur-
ther important determinant of the scale of securitization activity. This result
supports the efficient contracting view of securitization and is in line with
other empirical papers. Looking at column (1) of the table, the coefficient on
this variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. An orig-
inating bank in the 75th percentile of the distribution faces 1.5 percentage
points higher debt financing costs compared with a bank at the 25th per-
centile. This bank will therefore have around a 1.7 ∗ 1.5 = 2.55 percentage
points higher share of securitized in the total managed assets. In the long
run the impact is even higher - 6.22 percentage points.52
Another interesting result is the negative, significant at the 1% level coef-
ficient on the total assets variable. Bigger banks seem to have a lower share
of securitized in the total managed assets.
Finally, the variables tax rate and investment banking activities do not
have a significant impact on the decision on the scale of securitization. These
factors seem to determine only the participation decision. If expertise in
investment banking influence only the amount of up-front fixed costs of en-
tering the market, like setting up a special purpose vehicle and placing the
securities on the market, then this variable will influence indeed only the
participation of banks. Bank profitability and credit risk exposure have the
expected positive sign, but are again not significant.
Finally, we want to emphasize the appropriateness of our estimation pro-
cedure and the importance of bank fixed effects. Therefore, we estimate the
model in equation (3.9) using the fixed-effects (FE) as well as the random-
effects (RE) estimator. Table 3.14 in Appendix B shows the estimation
results.
First, to indicate the importance of fixed effects, we compare the estimates
in column (1) for the random-effects case with column (2) for the fixed-effects
51The test statistic is χ2(1) distributed. The computed p-value is 0.55.
526.22 = 2.55/(1− 0.59).
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case, in both of which use the capital/RWA corrected as the measure for the
capital adequacy of a bank.53 There are significant differences. Comparing
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, we see in the RE case that
it is biased upwards. The result is reasonable, because we expect a positive
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the unobserved fixed
effect ψ∗i . Further, we see an upward bias towards zero for the coefficient on
the capital ratio, which is plausible for a positive correlation between it and
the unobserved fixed effect ψ∗i . The table shows in addition the estimated
variance due to the fixed effects relative to the overall variance. The Rho
statistic for the fixed-effects within-estimation is near 1, which confirms the
importance of including bank fixed effects.
Second, we can compare the Arellano-Bond estimates in column (3) of
Table 3.3 with the fixed-effects estimates in column (2) of Table 3.14. Both
use the same narrow sample. Although both estimators account for fixed
effects, the latter suffers from the “Nickell” bias. The coefficient on the cap-
ital ratio is clearly biased towards 0. The bias is significant and amounts to
around 33%54 of the coefficient. Furthermore, the coefficient on the financing
costs variable is around 17%55 biased downward. In line with the economet-
ric literature, this suggests that the within-group estimator is not suitable
for our small T sample.
Overall when considering the intensive margin, we find support for both
the capital arbitrage view and the efficient contracting view of securitization.
3.7 The incentive effects of securitization
After having provided evidence that capital arbitrage drives asset securiti-
zation by banks, we turn to the question of whether and how securitization
affects the quality of originated loans. First, we compare the ex-post perfor-
53A clearer way to test the appropriateness of both estimators would be to perform a
Hausman specification test. A necessary assumption for the test is that the fixed-effects
estimator is consistent. However, in the presence of a lagged dependent variable this
assumption is not fulfilled.
540.33 = (1.20− 0.80)/1.20.
550.17 = (1.93− 1.61)/1.93
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mance of securitized and retained loans and interpret the observed disparity
as evidence of incentive problems. Second, we identify which contractual
features and bank characteristics can remedy such problems.
In this section we focus only on the sub-sample of securitizing banks. We
argue that pooling securitizers with non-securitizers will be misleading and
probably overstate the true impact of securitization on the quality of orig-
inated loans. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose for a moment that
securitization does not lead to bad incentives so that loans originated by the
same bank exhibit the same delinquency rates, irrespective of whether they
are securitized or not. However, securitizing banks may be systematically
involved in a riskier lending.56 There will be a different performance of secu-
ritized loan pools vs. on-balance sheet loan pools simply due to a selection
of securitizers into such riskier business. However, the disparity would not
relate to bad incentives. By focusing on the sub-sample of securitizing banks
we rule out such a selection. In a way our empirical strategy boils down
to comparing the ex-post observed performance of loans originated by the
same institution, of the same type,57 observed at the same time, which are
securitized to those retained on the balance sheet.
Figure 3.8 summarizes the delinquency rates of home equity loans for the
time period between the fourth quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of
2008. The blue bars denote the average delinquencies of retained loans and
the red bar the delinquencies of loans originated and securitized by the same
group of banks. The two upper panels summarize data on loans more than
30 days past due. Throughout the time period securitized home equity loans
had a higher fraction of borrowers failing to meet the due payments than
home equity loans originated by the same group of banks and retained by
the originator. The lower-left panel features data on the charge-offs. Up
until the last quarter of 2007 the development resembles the upper panels.
In the last 3 quarters during which the current crisis emerged and intensified,
however, the losses on retained loans were substantially higher. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that securitization in that particular period was practically
56Figure 3.4 indicates this.
57For example, credit card debt or residential mortgages.
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Figure 3.8: Delinquencies on securitized and retained home equity lines
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impossible and banks were forced to retain loans they planned to securitize.
Additionally, banks had to put recently securitized assets, that had quickly
become sour, back on their balance sheets in an act of implicit support for
reputational purposes. Thus, some of the defaults denoted in the graph as
defaults on retained loans could actually reflect losses on either loans that
were originally securitized but had to be put back on the balance sheet or
loans that were planned to be securitized.
The lower-right panel sums up all the non-performing loans - between
30 and 89 days past due, more than 90 days past due, and those charged
off - as the total delinquency rate on home equity loans. This is how we
measure “quality”. The measure has some caveats. First of all it is an ex-
post measure so the poor performance of securitized assets might be the result
of “bad luck”. A more serious caveat is that the measure does not capture
the true profitability. Even though securitized loans are riskier and default
more often, the interest rates charged for such loans may be sufficiently high
to make them a profitable investment. We do not have any data on interest
income for securitized loans, thus, we cannot take it into account in our
analysis.
We observe the same pattern for other types of loans too. Table 3.5
summarizes the total delinquencies for home equity loans, credit card loans,
commercial loans, and other loans.58 For residential mortgages we do not
have data on past dues, so instead of total delinquencies we report booked
losses only. The t-test reported in Table 3.5 reveals that total delinquencies
on securitized loans are significantly higher for every loan category apart
from residential mortgages. We interpret this as evidence that moral hazard
and/or adverse selection are a problem in securitization. Obviously banks
tend to originate and securitize substantially riskier loans compared with the
ones they retain and for which they are liable with their own equity.
Complementary to Table 3.5 we perform a regression-based mean com-
58We provide additional details on the quality characteristics of retained and securitized
loans in Table 3.15 in Appendix B.
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Table 3.5: Mean comparison of total delinquencies on securitized vs. retained
loans
Diff(mean) > 0 
p-value
type of loan  securitized loans retained loans
Residential Mortgages* 0.18 0.17 0.370
Home Equity Loans 3.41 1.29 < 0.001
Credit Card Debt 7.87 6.23 0.046
Commercial Loans 3.05 2.34 0.006
Other Loans 3.02 0.85 < 0.001
Mean of Total Delinquencies
Notes: * The total delinquencies of residential mortgages contain booked losses only. The last column
reports the p-value of a paired t-test with the null hypothesis that the mean for the securitized loans is
equal to the mean for the retained loans vs. the alternative that the mean for the securitized loans is
higher than the mean for the retained loans.
parison:
delinqjit = µ0 + ci + ct + µ1 ∗ dummyji + µ2 ∗ controlsjit + ωjit (3.14)
where the subscript j denotes the securitized vs. the retained pool of loans
for each bank i at time t.
We pool the overall delinquency rates for retained loans and for securitized
loans for each securitizing bank i and want to know whether the securitized
loans (dummyji = 1) have higher overall delinquencies than the retained ones
(dummyji = 0), controlling for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and the
composition of both pools.59 Compared with the previous by-type-of-loan
comparison, the regression-based analysis using the overall delinquency rates
59Controlling for the composition of the portfolios here is crucial as certain types of
loan exhibit higher delinquencies. Compare for instance the delinquency rates on home
equity loans with those on credit card debt in Table 3.5. Differences in the average overall
delinquency rate for securitized vs. retained assets in this specification, thus, may arise
ceteris paribus if institutions for example securitize all of their credit card loans and retain
all of their originated mortgages. To rule out biases due to systematical differences in
the composition of the securitized and retained loan pools we explicitly control for their
structure.
95
The empirics of securitization by banks
Table 3.6: Regression-based comparison of total delinquencies on securitized
vs. retained loans
Dependent Variable: Total Delinquencies
Dummyji 1.47**
(0.35)
Composition of securitized portfolio yes
Composition of retained portfolio yes
Quarter dummies yes
Bank fixed effects yes
Observations 2026
Number of bank clusters 100
R-squared 0.2
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank
level in parentheses. The table shows fixed-effects within estimates.
Controls for the composition of securitized and retained portfolios,
quarter dummies, and a constant are suppressed. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
allows us to exploit a larger fraction of the data.60
Equation 3.14 is estimated using the within-bank-group transformation.
Inference is based on cluster-robust correction of the standard errors. We
again exclude observations after the fourth quarter of 2007.
Table 3.6 shows the results. The estimated coefficient µ1 is positive and
significant at the 5% level, indicating that indeed securitized loans are more
risky than retained loans. On average the overall delinquency rate of secu-
ritized assets in our sample is 1.47 percentage points higher. Given that the
overall delinquency rate on retained loans is 1.29%, this is a large number.
Further, the coefficients on the composition of both portfolios are jointly
significant (F-test not reported), which supports our approach.
Once we have stated that indeed securitized loans exhibit much higher
delinquency rates, a natural question to ask is: why? In a next step we
identify and test whether the poor performance of securitized loans arises
due to bad incentives for screening and monitoring.
The quality of securitized assets should depend on the segment of credit
60The reason is that even though banks report the overall delinquency rate for retained
and securitized loans some of them do not provide disaggregated delinquency rates by type
of loan.
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markets in which the bank operates, the screening and monitoring effort
exerted by bank staff, and unobserved bank characteristics, for instance how
accurate the screening technology is, the managerial culture, etc.
We expect that the total delinquencies of securitized loans are higher for
banks operating in riskier segments of the credit market, proxied by the total
delinquencies of retained loans. This measure also captures the efficiency of
the scoring technology available to individual banks for the assessment of
borrower creditworthiness. Intuitively, banks that use a less precise scoring
program and specialize in riskier lending will exhibit higher delinquencies on
both their retained and securitized assets. Any systematical difference in the
delinquencies of securitized and retained loans of the same type granted by
the same bank is related to the willingness of bank insiders to use the avail-
able technology to screen and monitor borrowers and to possible changes in
the bank’s tolerance to risk for loans to be securitized as opposed to old-
fashioned retained loans. Once we have controlled for the screening technol-
ogy and the segment of credit markets, we can attribute any variation in the
ex-post performance of securitized loans to incentives.
Theory suggests that screening and monitoring incentives could be un-
dermined for securitized loans because the originator sells the assets to a
third party and transfers most of the risk associated with them to the buyer.
The bank is liable with its own equity for any future defaults only up to the
stake it retains in the securitization transaction. This may induce banks to
originate and securitize riskier loans and monitor borrowers less stringently
once a loan is granted. The higher the fraction of the risk in a securitization
transaction the originating bank retains, the less severe such moral hazard
and adverse selection problems are, according to theory. We have data on
credit enhancements and pro-rata stakes in securitizations retained by the
originating banks and use them to test these predictions.
In addition to such contractually specified and disclosed retained risk,
banks may also provide “implicit recourse”, i.e. the bank implicitly promises
to support its securitizations beyond its contractual obligations and thus
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bears additional risks. Banks may do this out of reputational concerns.61
Such implicit, non-observable, and non-verifiable to outsiders guarantees
must be self-enforcing in order to be effective. In this sense the amount
of bank equity capital relative to assets influences incentives in two ways.
First, provided that banks care about their reputation and promise implic-
itly to support securitizations, they are liable with their available equity only.
The more capital relative to its assets a bank has, the better are its incen-
tives to screen and monitor implicitly guaranteed securitized loans. Second,
implicit recourse is only self-enforcing for banks with a large capital base
relative to their assets. To put it in a nutshell, if a bank is on the brink
of bankruptcy it would not care much about its future reputation, as the
probability that it has a future is small anyway. Therefore, capital adequacy
ensures self-enforceability.
For our regression analysis we use the overall delinquency rate of secu-
ritized assets (delinqsecit ) as a measure of the quality of these assets. As a
proxy for the quality of retained assets we use the overall delinquencies on
retained loans (delinqretit ). To make sure differences in the average delin-
quencies do not arise because for example riskier types of loans constitute a
higher fraction of the securitized portfolio, we control for the composition of
the retained and securitized loan pools.62
As measures of the retained stake in its securitized assets (retexpit) we use
the size of the credit enhancements provided by the originating bank as well
as the retained pro-rata ownership, both as a percentage of the securitized
pool. We expect that both a bigger first-loss piece and a higher retained
pro-rata share of ownership help overcome incentive problems and thus lead
61See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 235.
62Ultimately we are interested in the differences in delinquencies for loans of the same
type. Any comparison of the average delinquencies for all types of loans that does not
take into account that certain types of loans exhibit higher delinquencies, e.g. credit card
loans versus mortgages, could distort the results if banks for example securitize mortgages
more easily than credit card debt and thus the composition of its balance sheet is different
from the composition of its securitized assets. As not all the banks in our sample report
delinquencies for retained and securitized loans by type of loans, we have to use the average
delinquency rate of loans originated by a bank observed during a quarter and control for
possible differences in the composition of retained and securitized loan pools.
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to a better quality of securitized loans. We further expect that the marginal
effect of credit enhancements is stronger. The intuition is straightforward:
whereas an increase in the first-loss piece of 1 percentage point is associated
with an increase in the retained fraction of the overall risk of more than 1%,63
increasing the retained pro-rata ownership by the same magnitude increases
the risk by exactly 1%. The higher the retained portion of risk is, according
to theory, the more risk prevention is undertaken.
To test whether reputational concerns play a role we use four different
measures of the capital adequacy of banks (capratioit): a simple tier 1 lever-
age ratio, a ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets, and the cor-
rected version of the two ratios used previously. In the current setting the
corrected capital ratios measure the consolidated capital base that is there
to back the risk inherent in both the retained and securitized assets of bank
i. We expect that the better capitalized a bank is, the better the quality of
its securitized assets, all other things held equal.
To control for unobservable bank-specific factors we use bank fixed ef-
fects. For example, a different maturity structure of the securitized portfolio
relative to the retained portfolio can account for differences in the delinquen-
cies. If these are correlated with our main explanatory variables, they would
lead to inconsistent estimates.64 We also include quarter dummies to capture
aggregate time-specific effects. Finally, we control for bank size. The control
for size is important, as size and leverage are correlated and thus omitting
size may induce a bias into our estimates.
Our empirical model is given by the following linear relationship:
delinqsecit = β0 + ci + ct + β1 ∗ delinqretit + β2 ∗ capratioit +
+β3 ∗ retexpit + β4 ∗ controlsit + uit (3.15)
We first perform a fixed-effects estimation of equation 3.15 and report the
63The first losses on the securitized portfolio are born solely by the holder of the first
loss piece.
64The only assumption we need is that these factors are constant over our sample
period.
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results from our baseline model in Table 3.7.65 The data sample covers 100
banks and 1013 bank-year observations. Throughout all the specifications we
control for the composition of the retained and securitized portfolios as well
as time- and bank-specific effects. Clustered standard errors that account for
conditional heteroskedasticity between bank clusters and serial correlation of
the residuals uit within bank clusters are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) in the table reports the results of a regression of the total
delinquencies on securitized assets on the delinquencies of retained assets.
Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient βˆ1 is positive and significant at the
1% level. The point estimate of 1.58 indicates that indeed the delinquencies
of securitized assets depend closely on those on the retained portfolio.
Next, we include the size of the first-loss piece in column (2). Contrary
to what we expected, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5%
level. This implies that the higher the fraction of risk is retained, the worse
the securitized assets perform. Subsequently we include the retained pro-
rata ownership instead of the first-loss piece and report the results in column
(3). The coefficient has the expected negative sign but is insignificant at the
10% level. In column (4) we also use both measures for retained risk by the
originator simultaneously. The sign and significance of the coefficients do not
change. We suspect that there may be a problem of reverse causality with
regard to the variable first-loss piece. Banks that securitize assets with a less
good quality must provide higher credit enhancements so that nevertheless
asset-backed securities structured out of such collateral are granted a good
rating and can be placed on the market. As the amount of retained pro-rata
ownership does not provide any protection to investors against defaults and,
thus, should not influence the rating of asset-backed securities, there is no
reverse causality in this case. As a result we obtain the expected negative
sign but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. In the further
regressions we stick to using the first-loss piece as a control for the retained
stake.
In columns (5) to (8) we subsequently use the four bank capital measures
65Table 3.9 in Appendix B provides pairwise correlations of the explanatory variables.
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and control additionally for the size of banks. In all four cases the reported
coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at the 5% level, sug-
gesting that reputational concerns are indeed present. The more capital the
originating banks have, the lower are the delinquencies of assets securitized
by them. The effect of capital is quantitatively meaningful: increasing the
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets by 1 percentage point reduces ce-
teris paribus the delinquencies on securitized assets by approximately 0.3
percentage points. This makes up one-fifth of the observed discrepancy in
delinquencies between securitized and retained loans. The effect of the other
three capital ratios is even slightly higher. In a sense our results suggest that
a sufficient level of capital rather than the originator’s retained exposure is
an effective tool for assuring careful bank lending. This result stresses the
importance of the equity capital for incentives.
As a sensitivity analysis we also perform a random-effects estimation and
report the results in Appendix B, Table 3.16. This estimator is more ef-
ficient than the fixed-effects estimator, but it is consistent only under the
assumption that ci is not correlated with the covariates. Throughout all the
specifications the estimated coefficients of interest differ from those shown in
Table 3.7. Therefore, we perform a Hausman’s specification test, which al-
lows the use of cluster-robust standard errors.66 It indicates that fixed effects
should be used since the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is
consistent is rejected.
3.8 Conclusion
Financial institutions in the USA have increasingly used securitization tech-
niques since the beginning of the nineties. Prior to the financial crisis, the
general wisdom on securitization was that it is an efficient tool that allows a
66The standard Hausman test assumes that the random-effects estimator is fully effi-
cient. In the case that ci and uit are not i.i.d. this test is not valid. In our case this
is indicated by the fact that after random-effects estimation the default standard errors
differ considerably from the cluster-robust ones. Cameron and Trivedi (2009), pp. 261-
262, and Wooldridge (2002), pp. 290-291, describe how one can conduct this test using a
cluster-robust variance-covariance matrix.
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better allocation of risks and enhances the resilience of the financial system.
The onset of the current crisis has proved this view wrong and revealed some
serious misalignments in securitization markets.
Using panel data on big US commercial banks we find robust evidence of
banks using securitization techniques to relax regulatory capital constraints.
In order to identify this effect empirically we solve the issue of reverse causal-
ity by using a corrected capital ratio measure. We further put emphasis on
the different behavior of the extensive and intensive margins of securitization.
While capital arbitrage drives both margins, lowering the debt financing costs
via securitization seems to be only important for the scale of securitization
activities.
Subsequently we focus on the incentives for prudent screening and mon-
itoring of securitized loans by originating banks. Controlling for the het-
erogeneity of originators, loan portfolios, and other characteristics, we find
evidence of significantly poorer performance of securitized loans compared
with on-balance-sheet loans. Moreover, tools for overcoming incentive prob-
lems, like the retention of some of the risk in the securitized portfolio, seem
to be ineffective. Finally, our empirical results support minimum capital ade-
quacy regulation as a way to discipline originators to evaluate risk stringently.
However, our research also suggests that loopholes in the current regulatory
framework may have seduced banks to securitize assets only for the sake of
avoiding holding regulatory capital. Such behavior can undermine the safety
and soundness of the financial system.
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B Appendix to chapter 3
Table 3.8: Pairwise correlations of capital ratios
Capital/RWA Capital/RWA
Cor-
rected
Tier1/Total
Assets
Tier1/Total
Assets
Cor-
rected
Capital/RWA 1.00
Capital/RWA
Corrected
0.97 1.00
Tier1/Total
Assets
0.81 0.74 1.00
Tier1/Total
Assets Cor-
rected
0.80 0.82 0.93 1.00
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Table 3.9: Pairwise correlations
Total Delin-
quencies of
Retained
Loans
90 Days
Past Due
Retained
Loans
First-Loss
Piece
Retained
Securi-
tization
Ownership
Total Delinquen-
cies of Retained
Loans
1.00
90 Days Past Due
Retained Loans
0.85 1.00
First-Loss Piece 0.05 0.01 1.00
Retained Securiti-
zation Ownership
0.01 0.23 0.01 1.00
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Table 3.10: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Sample All banks
Securitization Dummy 10553 0.06 0.23 0 1
Capital/RWA 10553 0.140 0.088 0 0.79
Capital/RWA Corrected 10549 0.138 0.087 0 0.79
Tier1/Total Assets 10553 0.095 0.061 0 0.52
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 10549 0.092 0.055 0 0.49
Log of Total Assets 10557 14.58 1.49 8.35 21.07
Yield Loans and Leases 9978 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.22
Financing Costs 10053 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.05
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 10475 0.01 0.01 0 0.26
Investment Banking 10053 0.01 0.01 0 0.44
Tax Rate (in %) 10051 32.39 11.31 -5.16 60.83
Credit Card Bank 10740 0.04 0.20 0 1
Fed Funds Rate 10740 3.33 1.61 1 5.25
Baa Risk Premium 10740 2.07 0.47 1.56 3.38
Sample Securitizers (once during sample period)
Securitized to Total Assets (gross) 1487 0.38 0.88 0 5.70
Securitized to Total Assets 1487 0.36 0.84 0 5.37
Total Delinquencies of Securitized Loans (in %) 1344 3.67 4.57 -0.01 45.59
Total Delinquencies of Retained Loans (in %) 1294 0.67 2.93 -17.44 20.89
90 Days and less Past Due Retained Loans (in %) 1340 1.59 1.57 0 27.86
First Loss Piece (share of outstanding amount) 1340 0.08 0.18 0 1
Retained Securitization Ownership (share of 
outstanding amount) 1340 0.05 0.14 0 1
Capital/RWA 2265 0.134 0.058 0 0.79
Capital/RWA Corrected 2261 0.124 0.048 0 0.79
Tier 1/Total Assets 2265 0.096 0.065 0 0.52
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 2261 0.086 0.042 0 0.49
Sample Securitizers (new issuance only)
Capital/RWA 610 0.142 0.064 0 0.68
Capital/RWA Corrected 610 0.116 0.044 0 0.49
Tier1/Total Assets 610 0.108 0.082 0 0.52
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 610 0.082 0.039 0 0.43
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Table 3.12: The extensive margin of securitization: using Capital/RWA
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Capital/RWA 0.11 0.37 0.26 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.24
(0.74) (0.79) (0.78) (0.79) (0.77) (0.73) (0.83)
Log of Total Assets 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Credit Card Bank 1.72*** 1.28*** 1.61*** 1.47*** 1.68*** 1.67*** 1.28***
(0.26) (0.24) (0.32) (0.43) (0.27) (0.27) (0.37)
Yield Loans and Leases 4.98** 3.68
(2.39) (3.89)
Financing Costs 3.32 1.19
(10.2) (11.3)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 6.66 4.36
(8.18) (9.81)
Investment Banking 4.70 4.65
(3.45) (3.48)
Tax Rate -0.0089 -0.0092
(0.0060) (0.0061)
Fed Funds Rate -0.13
(0.12)
Baa Risk Premium -1.20
(0.85)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 213 214 226 229 203 206 272
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.13: The extensive margin of securitization: using Tier1/Total Assets
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tier1/Total Assets 2.31** 2.42** 2.44** 2.41** 2.38** 2.37** 2.38**
(0.99) (1.04) (1.04) (1.00) (1.03) (1.02) (1.10)
Log of Total Assets 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.43***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Credit Card Bank 1.47*** 1.09*** 1.34*** 1.22*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.07***
(0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.41) (0.28) (0.28) (0.38)
Yield Loans and Leases 4.28* 2.72
(2.34) (3.72)
Financing Costs 4.95 3.25
(8.64) (10.0)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 6.25 4.64
(7.66) (9.24)
Investment Banking 4.48 4.51
(3.54) (3.61)
Tax Rate -0.0088 -0.0088
(0.0062) (0.0062)
Fed Funds Rate -0.13
(0.12)
Baa Risk Premium -1.19
(0.86)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 250 260 246 268 242 244 316
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
otes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.14: The intensive margin of securitization: random- vs. fixed-effects
estimates
Dependent Variable:
Capital Ratio:
Estimation: RE FE RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.(Securitized to Total 
Managed Assets) 0.96*** 0.71*** 0.96*** 0.73***
(0.029) (0.088) (0.026) (0.082)
Capital Ratio -0.17 -0.80 -0.13 -0.99
(0.15) (0.52) (0.16) (0.66)
Log of Total Assets -0.0014 -0.073** -0.0014 -0.081**
(0.0013) (0.032) (0.0014) (0.036)
Yield Loans and Leases 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.20
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Financing Costs 1.18** 1.61*** 1.18** 1.81***
(0.53) (0.55) (0.53) (0.63)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 0.36 -0.13 0.33 -0.069
(0.26) (0.46) (0.27) (0.42)
Investment Banking 0.065 0.00068 0.037 0.047
(0.067) (0.038) (0.044) (0.051)
Tax Rate -0.00014 -0.000063 -0.00012 -0.000021
(0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Fed Funds Rate -0.019* -0.014 -0.018* -0.012
(0.010) (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0078)
Baa Risk Premium -0.066 -0.067 -0.061 -0.056
(0.055) (0.057) (0.054) (0.050)
Credit Card Bank 0.0054 0.0056
(0.019) (0.018)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes
Bank fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 1043 1043 1043 1043
Number of bank clusters 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.98 0.69 0.98 0.70
Rho 0.97 0.97
Securitized to Total Managed Assets (gross)
Capital/RWA Corrected Tier1/Total Assets Corrected
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows random effects (RE) and fixed
effects (FE) within estimates. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. Rho is the fraction of variance due to the fixed
effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. The table shows
random-effects (RE) and fixed-effects (FE) within estimates. Constant and quarter dummies are sup-
pressed. Rho is the fraction of variance due to the fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.15: Mean comparison of delinquencies by type of loan and time past
due
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean . . . . 0.18 0.17 . .
sd . . . . 0.85 0.50 . .
N* 0 0 0 0 709 709 0 0
min . . . . -3.12 -0.21 . .
max . . . . 12.01 6.39 . .
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.67 0.66 0.96 0.16 0.99 0.46 3.61 1.28
sd 2.66 0.67 1.57 0.18 1.87 0.92 5.55 1.53
N* 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
min 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -3.43 -0.07 0.00 0.04
max 14.52 3.52 8.40 0.90 6.91 7.15 22.33 9.98
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.85 1.95 1.49 1.55 4.71 4.21 8.06 7.70
sd 0.90 0.86 0.80 0.86 2.35 2.24 3.72 3.65
N* 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.35 0.00 0.00
max 6.50 4.41 4.15 4.00 10.85 9.81 17.36 17.20
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.01 0.79 0.88 0.42 1.17 1.14 3.07 2.35
sd 1.65 0.95 2.16 0.76 2.72 2.28 4.57 3.44
N* 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.11 -0.41 -3.11 -0.16
max 8.56 8.52 18.36 5.19 9.73 10.35 18.36 15.36
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.24 0.55 1.00 0.13 0.80 0.18 3.04 0.86
sd 1.70 0.51 1.50 0.19 2.29 0.31 4.37 0.72
N* 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.24 -0.14 0.00 0.00
max 8.47 4.32 9.78 1.32 18.98 2.38 21.66 4.32
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.39 0.96 0.81 0.30 0.51 0.17 2.71 1.42
sd 2.11 0.68 1.83 0.55 1.35 0.58 3.93 1.24
N* 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.43 -3.29 0.00 0.00
max 19.97 4.89 25.87 10.43 12.01 5.50 39.86 14.31
Residential first lien mortgages
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Notes: N* denotes the number of time*bank observations. Sample statistics are computed for the sample that is not missing for any of
the four variables within each type of loan.
Total
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Other loans
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Commercial loans
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Credit card debt
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Home equity loans
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
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Chapter 4
Bank dividends in times of
crisis1
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Katri Mikkonen, European Central Bank.
Opinions expressed are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the European Central Bank.
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4.1 Introduction
The year 2008 was marked by financial system stress. In the aftermath of
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the interbank market effectively stopped
functioning. Banks felt unable to assess the creditworthiness of counterparts
on the basis of balance sheet data and, as a consequence, they began to hoard
excess liquidity. The perceived banking system instability was reflected in
a dramatic plunge in the market capitalization of banks in 2008. It also
led to extensive intervention by governments and central banks to prevent a
meltdown of the financial system.
In that same period of turmoil, the ratio of aggregate bank dividends
to aggregate bank profits increased significantly both in the United States
and the European Union. In this paper we aim to identify what has driven
the observed surge and assess how dividend payout policies of banks affected
the stability of the banking system during the financial market turmoil. In
so doing we take into account how dividend payouts relate to bank capital
levels, profitability and risk.
Using balance sheet data on banks operating in the United States and
in the European Union, we find no evidence for clearly imprudent dividend
payout behavior. The data suggests that banks which received state capi-
tal injections in the United States significantly changed their payout policies
toward less dividend smoothing and higher sensitivity to credit risk. Their
competitors which were not directly supported by government aid, in con-
trast, did not significantly adjust their behavior. Dividend levels paid by
them seem to have been adjusted rather slowly and gradually to the sharp
profitability shock, a phenomenon which, in the short run, leads to capital
leaks out of the banking system. Our results based on the European data in-
dicate that credit institutions begun to consider the level of credit risk more
strongly when taking decisions about dividend payout. However, we also
find some evidence for stronger dividend smoothing during the crisis period
compared to the period before.
The surge in dividend payout ratios has not been connected with exces-
sive dividend payments by credit institutions with very low capital buffers
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or subject to high credit risk. However, dividend smoothing continued dur-
ing the crisis and contributed to the pro-cyclicality of the financial system.
Consequently, regulatory action to restrict dividend payments for banks that
have low capital buffers may improve the social welfare in terms of systemic
stability.
The paper is structured as follows: Sections 4.2 and 4.3 first discuss the
stylized facts and the policy debate they have induced. Section 4.4 then
briefly summarizes the related literature. Section 4.5 describes the datasets
we use and provides statistics on bank dividend policies over time. We sub-
sequently present the empirical model, and the results of the econometric
analysis for the United States and European Union in Sections 4.6, 4.7 and
4.8. Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Background
The first signs of the financial crisis emerged in the second quarter of 2007,
as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded a number of sub-prime
mortgage-backed securities. The downgrades continued in the third quarter
of 2007, and Bear Stearns had to liquidate two of its hedge fonds which had
invested heavily in mortgage backed securities. In the last quarter of 2007,
the financial market pressure intensified further, most visibly reflected in an
unprecedentedly high level of the LIBOR-OIS spread. The financial crisis
reached its height in the aftermath of the default of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008. So far, 181 banks have failed in the United States in the
course of the crisis.2 In comparison, the respective number after the burst of
the dot.com bubble in 2001 was 18.
Governments and central banks intervened extensively to prevent a melt-
down of the financial system. Besides interest rate cuts to the lowest histori-
cal levels by key central banks and fiscal stimuli to dampen the adverse effect
of the crisis on the real economy, exceptional measures to stabilize financial
2See the failed bank list of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2010) (cut-off
date 18.02.2010) and the financial crisis timeline, Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis
(2010). The number excludes institutions which have been acquired by competitors.
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markets were taken. To strengthen the capital base of ailing banks, the US
Department of Treasury injected USD 204.6 billion, or approximately 1,4%
of the GDP, into the banking system.3 In the European Union, capital in-
jections amounted to EUR 170 billion, or 0.5% of GDP.4 Furthermore, the
minimum deposit insurance limits were increased from EUR 20.000 to EUR
50.000 in the European Union;5 and from USD 100.000 to USD 250.000 in
the United States. Finally, governments guaranteed other bank liabilities,
established assets support schemes and temporarily prohibited naked short
selling of bank shares.
In that same period of turmoil, the aggregate dividend payments of banks
relative to their aggregate net income increased significantly both in the
United States and the European Union, see Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The ratio
appears to have been quite stable for the US sample for 2003-2006, vary-
ing between 40% and 60%, and hitting the 100% threshold only in the last
quarter of 2006. The upper panel of Figure 4.3 reveals that this quarter was
remarkably profitable.
The fraction of aggregate net income paid out to shareholders in the
United States increased slowly during 2007, as the first signs of the crisis
emerged, and then markedly rose up to over 200% in the last quarter, when
the turmoil intensified. Aggregate dividend payments also exceeded the prof-
its in the second and third quarters of 2008. Following the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in the third quarter of 2008, aggregate dividends of the US
banks in the sample continued to exceed aggregate profits until the end of
the sample period.6 Figure 4.2 shows that the pattern observed in the Euro-
pean Union is similar: aggregate dividends relative to bank profits increased
3This action is known under the title of the Capital Purchase Program of the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP). For more information, see the financial crisis timeline by
the Federal Reserve St. Louis, available at http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/, and the
TARP Transactions Report 04/02/2010, United States Department of Treasury, Office of
Financial Stability (2009).
4see Table III.2.1 in European Commission (2009).
5A further raise of up to EUR 100.000 is planned by end-2010. This additional in-
crease will take place unless the European Commission in its impact assessment deems it
financially not viable for some Member States.
6The two negative values in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009
arise because negative aggregate losses coincide with positive dividend payments.
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considerably in 2008 when compared to historical standards.
To better understand what has driven the observed the surge in the ratio,
Figure 4.3 depicts the development of the two variables for the US sample.7
Whereas profits fell unexpectedly sharply in the fourth quarter of 2007 and
did not recover until the third quarter of 2009, dividend payments decreased
only gradually until the second quarter of 2009. Consequently, dividends paid
between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008 were still
comparable to those in 2004-2005, even though profits remained far below
the levels generated at that time. Dividends dropped significantly only after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and returned to pre-crisis levels in the third
quarter of 2009.
4.3 Current regulatory debate
The observed aggregate pattern does not necessarily imply that ailing banks
have been remunerating shareholders at the expense of deposit insurance
and senior debt holders. A careful assessment should take into account how
the payout relates to bank capital, profitability and risk in the cross-section.
The recent events have nevertheless induced comments by policy makers on
both sides of the Atlantic. Concerns have been expressed that capital may
be leaking out of the banking systems via dividend payments.89 Some have
suggested that by paying dividends, banks attempt to signal strength in the
middle of the crisis, but in the end are weakening their position with the
7We do not present a similar graph for the EU sample due to its unbalancedness.
The number of available observations per year for the EU varies significantly. Therefore,
changes in the aggregate would arise not only due to changes in dividends and profits, but
also due to changes in the number of observations used to compute the aggregates.
8See e.g. J.-C. Trichet (2009) and Hildebrand (2009).
9The Bank of England has made an effort to quantify the capital leak for the United
Kingdom. According to the exercise, restricting UK banks from paying dividends in the
event of annual losses between 2000 and 2007 would have left GBP 15 billion more in their
balance sheets. In a similar vein, reducing staff costs by around one tenth and dividend
payout rates by around a third would have allowed UK banks to increase retained reserves
by close to GBP 70 billion over the next five years, boosting core Tier 1 ratios by 100 basis
points, see Bank of England (2009) and Haldane (2010).
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Notes: Author’s calculations using data from the UBPR, based on a sample of the 506 largest commercial
banks in the USA in 2q2008.
Figure 4.1: Ratio of aggregate dividends to aggregate net income in the
United States
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institution in the EU27.
Figure 4.2: Ratio of aggregate dividends to aggregate net income in the
European Union
action.10 These arguments have been matched with similar contributions
among the academic writers, for instance by Acharya et al. (2009).
The concerns that capital may be leaking out of the financial system have
given rise to recent proposals to restrict dividend payments via regulation.
In connection with the overhaul of the global regulatory and supervisory
framework that is taking place under the auspices of the Group of Twenty,
the Basel Committee has proposed that retained earnings of banks should
increase the closer their actual capital levels fall towards the minimum re-
quirement. The aim of this measure would be to mitigate the impact on the
procyclicalilty of the financial system that paying dividends in a situation of
deteriorating financial conditions can have. A more comprehensive proposal
is expected in July 2010, with possible implementation by end-2012.11
Finally, dividend payments are currently restricted for banks that receive
government support. For banks participating in TARP in the United States,
dividend payments on either junior preferred shares, preferred shares with
10See e.g. Dudley (2009) and the Basel Committee (2009).
11See Basel Committee (2009).
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Notes: Author’s calculations using data from the UBPR, based on a sample of the 506 largest
commercial banks in the USA in 2q2008.
Figure 4.3: Aggregate net income and dividends in the United States
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equal ranking to the TARP shares, or common shares can be made only after
dividends to the Department of Treasury have been fully paid. In Europe,
many of the EU Member States have conditioned their state aid to a stop on
dividends in line with the recommendations of the European Commission and
the Eurosystem. The Commission, which is responsible for the assessment of
the banks’ restructuring plans, clearly states in its guidelines that state aid
should not be used to pay dividends.12
4.4 Related literature
Literature on dividends has had to depart from the frictionless world of Miller
and Modigliani (1961), where dividend policy per se is irrelevant and where
the firm maximizes value by simply distributing the entire free cash flow.13
Empirical works have identified several stylized facts. Firms smooth divi-
dend payments, a general observation across industries that was present in
the influential survey of Lintner (1956), and that has been recently repro-
duced in the update of Brav et al. (2005). Firms seem to target the level
of dividends paid or a growth rate, rather than a payout-earnings ratio, and
they seem to be extremely reluctant to cut dividend payments. Applied
to banking, and as noted by the Basel Committee (2009), this might ex-
acerbate the pro-cyclicality of the banking system. Empirical evidence for
dividend smoothing and the weak relation between earnings and dividends
can be found in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), DeAngelo et al. (1992), and
Skinner (2008), among others.
12The recommendations of the ECB on government guarantees for bank debt, on
the pricing of recapitalizations and guiding principles for bank asset support schemes
are available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pub/prud/html/index.en.html. See
also in particular Article 26 in the Commission Communication on the return to via-
bility and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the cur-
rent crisis under the State aid rules, Official Journal of the European Union, C195 of
19.8.2009, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:52009XC0819(03):EN:NOT.
13See also Brennan (1971) and Rubinstein (1976). Free cash flow can be defined as
being in excess of cash flow that is required to finance all positive net present value projects
above the cost of capital (Jensen 1986). DeAngelo et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive
overview on research on dividend payout policy.
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Variation across firms may arise because of differences in the maturity
of the company in question, or be explained by so-called clientele effects.14
In particular in relation to financial distress, loss-making banks are the only
ones that resist the incentive to smooth dividends and usually do not pay
dividends at all (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1990 and DeAngelo et al. 1992).
Nevertheless, the recent crisis seems to have made an exception, as large
dividend to net profit ratios have been paid out at the height of financial
distress. Acharya et al. (2009) in particular criticize banks for not conserving
the capital in times when it is needed the most. Basel Committee (2009) and
others have lately referred to the possible use of bank dividends as a signaling
device.
Theoretical literature on dividends as a signaling device can be tracked
back to Bhattacharya (1979).15 Empirically, the information content of div-
idends has been contested. Besides the the majority contributions that have
not found any information role for dividends,16 DeAngelo et al (1992) in con-
trast show that knowledge on a dividend reduction improves the predicting
power of the current earnings on the future ones. Benartzi et al. (1997)
show that an increase in dividends increases the likelihood of a firm not to
experience a drop in future earnings. Hanlon et al. (2007) find evidence that
dividends convey information about future earnings, as the current returns of
dividend-paying firms are more associated with future earnings than returns
of firms that do not pay dividends. Also Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) con-
test the view that dividends would not convey information on future returns
by showing that dividend forecasts positively covary with changing forecasts
of excess stock returns over the business cycle.
14These arise when certain groups of shareholders prefer receiving dividend payments to
returns based on share price increases. Typically these are thought to be retail investors
which face high tax rates on dividend income and some special types of institutional
investors. Some countries might also be more inductive to dividend payouts because of
their legal systems and their influence on corporate governance. See Allen et al. (2000)
and LaPorta et al. (2000).
15In a model with outside investors having imperfect information on profitability and
a higher tax on cash dividends than on capital gains, dividends become a signal of future
cash flows. See also Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985).
16See e.g. Watts (1973), LaPorta et al. (2000), Skinner (2008), and Leary and Michaely
(2008).
128
Bank dividends in times of crisis
Signaling via dividends may make sense in particular in times of crisis.
Bank managers might be revealing their expectations that losses are tempo-
rary.17 Signaling such expectations in a credible way, whether true or not,
may have been reasonable in a situation of total loss of confidence that faced
an entire sector. The financial crisis might also have damaged the credibility
of other channels for the banking industry, rendering dividend policy a more
effective or a more credible supplementary tool.18
Alternatively to explanations related to the information content of div-
idends, agency theories provide some rationales for why dividends are paid
despite the ongoing crisis. Especially for the banking industry, the limited
liability may induce banks to pay high dividends to reduce shareholder risk
inherent capital buffers if they are close to a possible bankruptcy.19 The
pecking order model of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986) propose
that managers have an incentive to delay or to restrict dividend payouts in
order not to forego profitable investment opportunities that may arise, or in
order to gain more power over resources and let the firm grow to reach a size
that is socially sub-optimal but compatible with the managerial incentives.
Dividend payouts in such a situation can serve as a self-restrictive or share-
holder tool to reduce resources under management control. La Porta et al.
(2000) find evidence that investor pressure in countries with good minority
shareholder protection is successful in inducing dividend payments by firms.
Also Leary and Michaely (2008) find empirical support for agency consider-
ation theories, given the types of firms that tend to smooth dividends the
most.20
17DeAngelo et al. (1992) have found out that bank managers do not omit or reduce
dividends in particular when they expect losses to be temporary.
18Bhattacharya (1979) also points out that other channels, such as accountants’ reports,
may be subject to moral hazard. Relatedly, DeAngelo et al. (1992) conjecture that the
information content of dividends increases in situations where current earnings are unusual
or extreme and therefore represent an unreliable indicator of future earnings.
19This phenomenon is related to the so-called gambling for resurrection, which was
arguably present in the savings and loans crisis in the United States. See e.g. Dewatripont
and Tirole (1993).
20Dividends are smoothed more often by larger firms, firms with slower growth
prospects, firms with more tangible assets and with lower price volatility and earnings, and
firms with more significant presence of institutional investors. These attributes combine
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In particular in times of crisis, agency costs may have been increased
with the increased volatility, and therefore decreased predictability, of free
cash flow that the manager can invest in projects (Stulz 1990). Alternative
explanations for high payouts during the crisis include managerial incentives
to keep equity valuation high in order to avoid takeovers at low price, and
building a reputation for treating investors fairly in order to be able to sell
future equity at high prices. 21
The considerations stated above give rise to our hypotheses in Section 5.
Before we go into the model, however, we briefly present the data used in
the estimations and perform some preliminary summary statistics.
4.5 Data description and summary statistics
The data for the United States comes form the Uniform Bank Performance
Report collected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.22 Our sam-
ple comprises the income statements, the balance sheets and data on the reg-
ulatory capital of the 506 largest commercial banks operating in the United
States, with total assets exceeding USD 1 billion in the second quarter of
2008. We have quarterly data for the period between the fourth quarter of
2003 and the third quarter of 2009, and yearly data from 1998 to 2008.
The data for the European Union is obtained from the Bureau van Dijk’s
Bankscope Database. The data comprises consolidated yearly income state-
ments, balance sheets and regulatory capital of commercial, savings and co-
operative banks established in one of the 27 EU Member States.23
The US sample is balanced in the sense that we have information on
dividends for all banks in all periods. The variations in available bank obser-
vations over time arise because 42 of the 506 banks operating in the second
quarter of 2008 failed in the course of the crisis, and because 22 new in-
well with hypotheses that support agency theories.
21See e.g. Schleifer and Vishny (1997), Fluck (1998) and Gomes (2000).
22The data is available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council web-
page at http://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm.
23Dependent subsidiaries of institutions in the sample are consolidated if the stake of
the mother company is more 50%.
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stitutions were founded between end-2004 and mid-2008.24 In contrast, the
European dataset is highly unbalanced, with data on less than 150 banks
for 2002-2003 and between 350 and 480 credit institutions for 2004-2008.
In addition, focusing our attention on banks for which data on dividends is
available reduces the sample to a total of 287 banks. For the summary statis-
tics and graphs we use data starting from 2004, as the sample composition
is more stable for this period.
When interpreting the results of our analysis, one should note that the US
sample contains only large banks and that small banks are strongly under-
represented in the European sample. The results therefore apply to large
banks and do not capture the behavior of small banks that possibly follow
different business strategies. Owing to the high concentration in the banking
market, our sample nevertheless covers 77% of bank assets in the United
States in 2008.25
We in addition gathered information on state recapitalizations of banks in
our samples. For the USA, data was available from the TARP Transactions
Report of the Department of the Treasury.26 The report comprises data on
the name of the recapitalized bank, the amount of funds provided and the
dates of provision and repayment of funds. For the European sample, we
used the European Commission’s Overview of national measures, which lists
the names of banks supported by national authorities on an ad-hoc basis and
the date the Commission has adopted a decision regarding the action.27
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show how the mean of the dividend to net income
ratio evolved over time in the United States and the European Union. The
upper panels of the figures display the dividend payout ratios for banks with
24Table 4.8 in Appendix C provides an overview of observations available over time for
both the US and EU samples. We provide further summary statistics in Appendix C in
Tables 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13.
25See Table 4.9 in Appendix C.
26We used the 04/02/2010 TARP Transactions Report, United States Department of
Treasury, Office of Financial Stability (2009).
27European Commission (2010), memo/10/52, 26.02.2010. We are fully aware that this
list may not be comprehensive. However, no complete listing is published to our knowledge.
In this regard, the challenges in Europe are multiplied in comparison to the United States,
simply because of the existence of several sovereign states within the economic area.
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positive profits, and the lower panels of the figures show the same for banks
that have incurred losses. Splitting the samples along profitability is essential,
as an increase in the dividends paid to shareholders ceteris paribus leads to
a higher dividend payout ratio for banks with positive profits. Thus, high
dividend payout ratios for these banks indicate that more capital is paid
out in the form of dividends. For banks which incur losses the relation is,
however, opposite, as an increase of dividends leads to a higher but negative
payout ratio. By splitting the samples we can attribute an increase in the
observed mean of the payout ratio for banks with positive net income to
banks that are allocating profits to remunerate shareholders. Similarly, for
banks making losses, one can attribute the drop in the observed mean to
higher average dividends relative to (negative) net income.
Cross-checking the evolution of the cross-sectional means over time with
the observed aggregate patterns allows us to rule out that the increase in the
aggregate dividend payout ratio solely reflects the effect of big losses incurred
by a small group of banks. An increase in the aggregate ratio could emerge
if a group of banks incurs high losses and cuts dividends to zero, while the
remaining banks with stable and positive profits continue paying a constant
fraction of net income to shareholders. The losses incurred by the first group
of banks would lower the aggregate net income. The aggregate dividend
series would not drop proportionately as the dividends paid by unprofitable
banks cannot and would not become negative. As a result, the observed
aggregate ratio of dividends to net income would increase, despite prudent
behavior of all banks.
The evolution of the payout ratios in the United States, as depicted in
Figure 4.4, shows that the average ratio of dividends to profits is relatively
stable for profitable banks until the end of 2006.28 In contrast, banks which
had incurred losses canceled dividend payments prior to the crisis. The
average dividend to net income ratio for this group is zero most of the time
28Dividends are paid in the United States for most of the companies in the form of
regular quarterly dividends. One can easily spot an end-of-the-fiscal-year effect leading
to higher payout ratios in the fourth quarter compared to other quarters during the same
year.
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until mid-2007. The ratio of dividends to profits for profitable banks seems
to have started rising gradually in 2007. The increases gather momentum in
the course of 2008 and reach a peak in the last quarter of 2008, at the height
of the financial crisis. Contrary to their earlier behavior, many of the banks
incurring losses now also paid dividends.29
The pattern observed in the European Union in Figure 4.5 is similar,
albeit somehow less prominent.30 Banks with positive profits paid on average
over 50% of net income to shareholders at the end of 2008. In the years prior
to 2008, the payout ratio amounted to approximately 40%. Banks in the
European Union have been equally reluctant to cut dividends to 0 when
losses have materialized, not only in 2008 but also in the previous years.
Obviously, both banks with positive profits and banks incurring losses
in the European Union and in the United States have been reluctant to
cut dividends at the same rate at which profits dropped during the crisis.
The average retained income decreased both because profits decreased and
because a higher fraction of them was paid out to shareholders. The pattern
observed at the aggregate level is clearly not the pure result of losses incurred
by a small group of banks, but reflects a broader increase in the fraction of
profits paid out.
Nevertheless, to be able to understand the observed pattern, the relation
of dividend payouts to bank characteristics in the cross-section and their
possible change in the course of the crisis need to be taken into account.
4.6 Empirical model
The research question we investigate empirically is: What determines the
fraction of profits paid out to shareholders? And second: Did a shift in
dividend policy occur during the crisis?
29See also Table 4.14 in Appendix C.
30Dividend payments in most of the EU countries are made once a year, after the annual
meeting of shareholders. Thus, the availability of data on annual frequency does not lead
to a loss of information for our European sample.
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Notes: Author’s calculations using data from the UBPR, based on a sample of the 506 largest commercial
banks in the USA in 2q2008.
Figure 4.4: Mean of the dividend to net income ratio in the United States
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Figure 4.5: Mean of the dividend to net income ratio in the European Union
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Using the ratio of dividends to net income as the explanatory variable is
an intuitively appealing way to approach the issue, as a higher ratio normally
indicates a higher fraction being distributed to the shareholders. This logic,
however, does not apply to loss-making banks, for which a lower, negative,
ratio indicates higher dividend payouts.
Given that such negative observations cluster in the period of the financial
crisis,31 not accounting for this reversed relation could lead to misleading
estimates for a shift in payout policy during this period.32
To account for this effect, we adjust the ratio in the following way. We
use the standard payout ratio for dividend payments connected to a positive
profit. If, however, a bank pays dividends despite losses, we adjust the ratio
to equal to (dividend+ |netincome|)/|netincome|).
adj. div. ratioit = 0 if dividendit = 0
∈ (0, 1] if dividendit ≤profitit
> 1 if dividendit > profitit
(4.1)
The adjusted dividend payout ratio now equals 0 if banks cease dividend
payments. Thus, the ratio is the lowest for banks which do the best to
strengthen their capital base. For a bank with positive net income, the ratio
ceteris paribus increases when dividend payments go up. If dividends exceed
profits, equity is reduced and the ratio becomes greater than one.
In a similar vein, dividend payments by loss-making banks ceteris paribus
lead to a direct leak of equity capital.33 The adjusted ratio for these institu-
31See lower panel of Figure 4.4 and Table 4.14 in Appendix C for the US sample.
32To illustrate how such a bias may emerge, assume for the time being that high capital
ratios ceteris paribus lead to high dividend payouts. Before the financial crisis, negative
payout ratios were hardly observed, and therefore a true positive marginal effect of capital
on dividend payout can be found by regressing the dividend payout ratio on the equity ratio
and appropriate control variables. For the crisis period, however, the same regression would
give lower estimates of the marginal effect, even if no true change in payout policy had
taken place. On average, the correlation between capital and dividends becomes weaker for
this period, because for the significant number of loss-making banks the relation between
these ratios for would be the opposite: high capital buffers would tend to coincide with
higher dividend payments, which lead to higher in absolute terms but negative dividend
payout ratios.
33Additional to the loss of equity due to negative net income.
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tions is also greater than one. Thus, we argue that it captures the effect of
dividends on equity capital in a meaningful and monotonic way.34
For our regression analysis we use the following explanatory variables:
• Capital base: We expect that banks with large capital buffers will
ceteris paribus pay out a higher fraction of profits. In the line of ar-
gument of Myers and Majluf (1984), high capital buffers decrease the
risk of becoming capital constrained and having to subsequently incur
high flotation costs of new equity issuance after dividends payouts. A
large capital base should further lead to a distribution of a higher frac-
tion of profits to shareholders, in order to minimize any agency costs of
free cash flow in the meaning of Jensen (1986).35 Additional rationales
would include bank managers building up a reputation of prudence and
fairness to investors to achieve more favorable terms of capital issuance,
as in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and LaPorta (2000).
34An alternative way to pursue this kind of analysis would be to run regressions of the
levels of dividends on the levels of profits and other explanatory and control variables.
The approach has several caveats. The most severe one is the possibility of a spurious
regression as all variables in levels could follow a time trend. Given the fact that we
have a panel data set with a time dimension of 24 periods only, we cannot use time series
methods to distinguish between causality and pure correlation. Including time dummies
cannot fully remedy the problem.
Moreover, all variables obviously depend on the size of banks. Larger banks naturally
generate higher profits and pay higher dividends; they invest higher amounts of money in
risky projects, as they manage bigger portfolios and, thus, need to build up higher reserves
for losses on loans and leases. In the same way, large banks on average incur higher losses.
Size alone, however, does not imply that the profitability per unit invested is high or risk
per unit is excessive. In a way, the regression of levels on levels could give us a trivial and
possibly spurious result.
To remedy the problem with levels one could use growth rates instead of levels, as often
done in time-series models. The approach is, however, not suitable for our data set, as
a number of banks cancel dividends to zero during the crisis period. Calculating growth
rates is therefore mathematically impossible for these institutions.
Thus, we decided not to use levels or growth rates in our regression analysis.
35In the sense of Jensen (1986), free cash flow is the hypothetical fraction of profits that
remains after all positive net present value projects have been undertaken. Management
may be seduced to use such free cash flow to, for example, fund negative-present-value pet
projects. Thus, shareholders are better off if the free cash flow is entirely distributed to
them. In a way, the full distribution is a commitment devise that no unprofitable projects
are undertaken.
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For the US sample, capital abundance is measured by either the ratio
of regulatory capital to risk-weighted-assets or the ratio of equity to
total assets. For the EU sample, we use only the ratio of the balance
sheet equity to total assets because we do not have data on regulatory
capital for all institutions. We use lagged values of capital ratios to
rule out endogeneity problems.36
• Profitability: We expect that high profitability ceteris paribus leads
to a higher adjusted dividend payout ratio. The hypothesis relies again
on the free cash flow argument. Assuming that the amount of earnings
earmarked for retention rather depends on a bank’s capital and risk,
an increase of profits of one unit leads to a one-to-one increase of free
cash to be distributed, which should lead to a higher dividend payout
ratio.37
If dividend smoothing takes place in the banking industry, the relation
between profitability and dividend payout ratio would be the opposite:
Higher than average profits would lead to a lower dividend payout ratio,
as banks would be reluctant to increase dividends to an unsustainable
level. We use return on assets as a measure for profitability.38
• Losses: We include a dummy variable that equals one if a bank has
incurred a loss in the reporting period and zero otherwise. The loss
dummy allows a better identification of the effect of profitability on
dividend payout in case dividends are smoothed over time, given the
reluctance of managers to cut dividends except in extreme and pro-
longed financial stress (DeAngelo et al. 1992, Brav et al. 2005). In
36We further winsorize the capital ratios at the first and the 99th percentile.
37To illustrate this argument: dividends/profit = (profit− retention)/profit =
1− retention/profits. Now one can easily see that, if the amount to be retained depends
on factors other than current profitability, an increase in profits should lead to a higher
dividend payout ratio.
38There exists a substantial literature on the role of stock repurchases as a complement
to dividends for distributing transitory profits. We do not use net stock repurchases
as a control variable in our empirical model. We believe that stock repurchases do not
constitute a factor influencing dividend payout but rather are a separate decisions taken
simultaneously to the dividend decision.
138
Bank dividends in times of crisis
such a situation, even dividend-smoothing banks may be forced to can-
cel dividends. In case dividend smoothing is taking place, we would
expect the loss dummy to have a negative effect on dividend payout
and at the same time higher profitability to lead to a lower adjusted
payout ratio.
• Credit risk: We expect that higher credit risk ceteris paribus leads to a
lower dividend payout. Intuitively, the higher the credit risk, the bigger
the necessary capital buffers to prevent a bank closure and the higher
the fraction of retained income should be. A credit risk that threatens
the future profitability would also induce a dividend smoothing bank
to cut dividend payments gradually, starting from the period in which
risks are identified. We control for credit risk by including the ratio of
loss allowances to loans and leases for the US sample. For the European
sample, we use the ratio of loss provisions to loans and leases, as we
have data on this item for a larger number of banks.39 We use again
first lags.40
• Other time constant factors: The dividend policy of banks can
in addition be influenced by non-observable or non-measurable bank-
specific factors, such as corporate culture, managerial behavior, or
clientele effects as in Allen et al. (2000). In particular, if a larger part
of the shares of a bank are held by investors with a preference for div-
idends as opposed to price gains, dividend payout ratios are expected
to be higher. Further, life-cycle theories hypothesize that companies,
which at the beginning retain profits, start paying dividends once they
mature (see e.g. DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2006 and Bulan and Subra-
manian 2008). We use bank fixed effects to account for bank-specific
factors which can be assumed to remain relatively constant over the
short sample period of six years.
39In terms of accounting, loss provisions are a flow variable, whereas loss allowances
are the respective stock variable.
40We further winsorize the ratios at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
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• Other time specific factors: The dividend payout decision further
depends on the expected lending opportunities. Banks which expect to
face many profitable projects will tend to start retaining a higher frac-
tion of profits to build up a sufficient capital base. Thus, such banks
pay out a lower fraction of income to shareholders. The expected busi-
ness opportunities by individual banks are not observable by outsiders,
thus we cannot directly control for them. The most significant factor,
however, is the business cycle, for which we include time dummies.
The main aim of our research is to identify whether a shift in the dividend
policies of banks has occurred during the crisis. We indeed observe a big
increase of dividends paid out relative to net income during the financial
crisis. It remains to be investigated how the high dividend payout ratios
during the crisis relate to capital, profitability and risk. A shift in banks’
payout policy could arise for several reasons.
First, it is possible that institutions on the brink of bankruptcy paid as
high as possible dividends at the expense of debtors and deposit insurance
companies. If true, we would expect banks with low capital levels, incurring
high losses and holding very risky assets, to be the “excessive” dividend
payers.
Furthermore, the crisis might have changed the trade-off between the
agency costs of free cash flow and the no-flotation-costs benefit of retained
earnings.41 For instance, the perception that past balance sheet data do not
fully reflect the risk profiles of individual banks and the observed significant
drop in share prices may have made new capital issuance extremely costly.
Everything else equal, this should lead to a higher fraction of profits being
retained. This effect should be the largest for banks with low capital buffers
and high credit risk on their books, as for such institutions the need for
additional capital is the highest. Thus, one might expect the positive relation
between capital ratios and dividend payout ratios to become more prominent
during the crisis period.
41The argument is borrowed from the life-cycle theories of corporate dividend policy.
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The crisis and the subsequent recession have, however, also led to a de-
crease in the demand for bank loans.42 Thus, banks may need less equity to
back additional lending, affecting the dividend payout decision of all banks
with the same magnitude.
An additional factor is the interplay of competition and financial system
stress. The reluctance of bank managers to cancel dividends in times of mar-
ket turbulence might be an attempt to avoid any doubts about the solvency
of the bank. Given the aversion to cut dividends in normal times, it is natu-
ral for market participants to associate such an action with severe financial
stress.43Although empirical evidence suggests that firms use more effective
tools to reveal news to the markets, the financial crisis might have damaged
the credibility of these channels for the banking industry, rendering dividend
policy a more effective supplementary tool.
To identify shifts in dividend payout policy of banks we use:
• Interaction terms: We generate interaction terms between the ex-
planatory variables capturing capital, risk and profitability of banks,
and a dummy variable equaling one during the crisis and zero other-
wise. The coefficients for interaction terms capture the change in the
relation between the respective regressor and the adjusted payout ratio
during the crisis. We use two different crisis specifications for both the
European and the US samples as sensitivity analysis.
• Control for state recapitalization: Banks in the United States and
in the European Union have had access to government support schemes
in the crisis period. To identify shifts in dividend policy related to capi-
tal, profitability and risk which are not biased by restrictions related to
state recapitalization, we control for participation in it. In the United
States, eligible banks could receive funds from the TARP. We include
a TARP Dummy which equals one if the Treasury Department holds
outstanding preferred shares issued by the bank during the quarter.
42For evidence, see e.g. European Central Bank, Euro Area Bank Lending Survey,
quarterly available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu.
43see DeAngelo et al. (2008), p.156.
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EU Member States also introduced support schemes for their banking
industry or recapitalized individual banks on an ad-hoc basis. To con-
trol for such state support we use a State aid Dummy, equaling zero
prior to 2008 and one afterwards in case we have found evidence for a
state recapitalization and zero otherwise.
Equation 4.2 summarizes our full baseline regression model:
r divit = α0+ci+ct+
4∑
j=1
βjx
j
it+
4∑
j=1
γjd crisistx
j
it+
4∑
j=1
τjd stateitx
j
it+d stateit+it
(4.2)
where r divit is the adjusted dividend payout ratio, x
1
it - a measure for
the capital base, x2it captures profitability, x
3
it credit risk, and x
4
it is the loss
dummy. d crisis denotes the crisis dummy variable and d state is the dummy
for state aid. Further, ci and ct are time- and bank-specific fixed effects and
it is a standard error term.
In this type of specification, for example the marginal effect of profitability
during the pre-crisis period is captured by the coefficient β2. For the crisis
period, the marginal effect is allowed to vary, conditional on whether banks
have received state capital or not. For banks which did not receive state
capital, the marginal effect of an increase of profitability during the crisis
period is measured by the sum of the coefficients β2 and γ2. Respectively,
for state-recapitalized banks, the marginal effect during the crisis is the sum
of β2, γ2, and τ2.
The same logic applies to the other explanatory variables:
∂ r divit/∂ x
j|d crisis=0 and d state=0 = βj
∂ r divit/∂ x
j|d crisis=1 and d state=0 = βj + γj
∂ r divit/∂ x
j|d crisis=1 and d state=1 = βj + γj + τj
(4.3)
The coefficient γj reflects how the marginal effect of an increase of the
respective xj has changed in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis
period for non-state-recapitalized banks. The τj coefficients measure any
differences in the marginal effects during the crisis period between banks
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that have been recapitalized with state aid and their competitors that have
not.
Throughout all specifications and samples used, the inference is based on
cluster-standard errors that account for conditional heteroskedasticity be-
tween bank clusters and serial correlation of the residuals it within bank
clusters. We report the respective p-values in parentheses.
4.7 Dividends in the United States
We start by analyzing the US data. Before we present the regression results,
we provide an overview of how the adjusted ratio of dividends to net income
evolved over time between 2003-2009 in Figure 4.6. The Figure distinguishes
between the group of banks which used TARP for at least one quarter and
those which did not use TARP at all. In Figure 4.7 we divide the sample
along profitability. Especially striking is the observation that the banks which
were supported by the US Department of the Treasury in the aftermath of
Lehman Brother’s default had paid on average higher fractions of profits to
shareholders prior to receiving state support than their peers . The difference
is the biggest for the two quarters around the default of Lehman Brothers.
As some of the institutions exited TARP in the third quarter of 2009, the
average dividend payout ratio for this group of banks became higher again.
We start the econometric analysis by splitting the sample into a pre-crisis
period that ends in the second quarter of 2007 and into a crisis period which
starts right after, in the third quarter of 2007.
We run regressions of the adjusted dividend payout ratios on our mea-
sures for capital, profitability, risk and control variables for both periods
separately. For the crisis period, we additionally control for the participation
of banks in TARP and include interaction terms between the TARP dummy
and the main explanatory variables. TARP restricts the dividend payout
decisions of participating banks to both common and preferred shareholders.
Including the interaction terms with the TARP dummy allows us to differen-
tiate between the dividend payout decisions of non-participating banks and
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Figure 4.6: Mean of the adjusted dividend payout ratio in the United States
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Figure 4.7: Mean of the adjusted dividend payout ratio in the United States
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the restricted choices for banks which received state aid.
Let us very briefly summarize the most important features of the pro-
gram.44
• Form: Capital is made available in the form of senior preferred shares
which count as Tier 1 regulatory capital. They are not part of the
balance sheet equity of banks. The shares have no voting rights.
• Amount: The minimum subscription amount per institution is 1% of
its risk-weighted assets. The maximum amount is either USD 25 billion
or 3% of risk-weighted assets.
• Remuneration: The shares pay a 5% cumulative dividend rate for
the first five years, and 9% for the consecutive years.
• Restrictions: Executive compensation for participating banks is con-
siderably restricted. With regard to dividend payments to shareholders
other than the Department of the Treasury, the restrictions are rather
mild: As long as the TARP senior preferred shares are outstanding,
dividend payments on either junior preferred shares, preferred shares
pari passu to the TARP shares or common shares can be made only
after dividends to the Department of Treasury have been fully paid.
To increase dividends to common shareholders, banks need an explicit
permission by the Department of Treasury.
We perform a fixed-effects within estimation and report the results for
the pre-crisis sub-sample in Table 4.1.
In a first step we individually include the explanatory variables and con-
trol for time effects via a set of quarter dummies. The upper panel of Table
4.1 shows that only capital, profitability and the loss dummy are significant
when included individually.
As expected, higher capital, as measured either with the lagged ratio of
capital to risk-weighted assets or with the lagged ratio of equity to total
44See United States Department of Treasury (2008), TARP Capital Purchase Program,
Senior Preferred Stock and Warrants, Summary of Senior Preferred Terms, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/document5hp1207.pdf
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assets, tends to coincide with a higher adjusted dividend payout ratio; see
Columns (1) and (2). The relation becomes stronger when we include our
measure for credit risk. The coefficients for both capital ratios remain sig-
nificant at the 1% level; see Columns (7) and (8). The lagged level of loss
allowances to loans has the expected negative sign but is not significant.
Furthermore, the higher the return on assets, the lower the payout ratio
seams to be; see Column (3). As expected, banks which incur losses cancel
dividends; see Column (4). Including both variables at the same time in
Column (9) leads to a more strongly significant estimate for the coefficient
for return on assets. This supports the hypothesis that banks smooth their
dividend payments over time whenever possible and cut them to significantly
lower levels only in the case of a marked drop in profitability. Additionally
including the log of total assets does not change the coefficients.45
Our baseline results for the pre-crisis period are reported in Column (11)
using the lagged ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, and in Column (12)
using the lag of equity to total assets. The coefficients reflecting the relation
between the dividend payout ratio and the measures for capital, profitabil-
ity and losses are all significant at the 1% level. Banks with higher capital
buffers tend to pay out a higher fraction of net income to shareholders and
banks which incur losses tend to cancel dividends altogether. The negative
coefficient of the return on assets implies that banks smooth dividends over
time and adjust their levels only if shocks to profitability are considered per-
manent. Credit risk seems not to influence the payouts significantly during
this period.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results for the period during the crisis, using
the lagged ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets.46 We again first include
the explanatory variables individually using only the TARP Dummy and a
45Larger banks are often more leveraged than small banks, see for instance Gropp and
Heider (2009). Whenever we do not control for the amount of capital, the log of total
assets acts as a proxy and captures that bigger banks hold less capital relative to the size
of their balance sheet, which tends to lead to a lower adjusted dividend payout ratio as
already reported.
46Results using the alternative measure Equity to Total Assets can be found in Table
4.15 in Appendix C. The results are similar both qualitatively and quantitatively.
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Table 4.1: Fixed-effects estimation results for the pre-crisis period, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.360***
(0.00)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.062***
(0.00)
Return on Assets -2.853*
(0.07)
Loss Dummy -30.85***
(0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -0.693
(0.35)
Log of Total Assets -2.086
(0.26)
Observations 7433 7433 7435 7435 7366 7435
Number of bank clusters 505 505 505 505 502 505
R-squared 0.020 0.022 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.019
F test p-value 0 0 7.50e-11 0 2.84e-10 1.01e-10
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.604*** 0.666***
(0.01) (0.00)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.253*** 1.323***
(0.00) (0.00)
Return on Assets -6.742*** -6.795*** -6.467*** -6.579***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -44.57*** -46.00*** -48.05*** -47.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -0.789 -0.883 -0.319 -0.408
(0.33) (0.33) (0.66) (0.61)
Log of Total Assets -4.233** -0.643 -0.0852
(0.04) (0.83) (0.98)
Observations 7366 7366 7435 7435 7364 7364
Number of bank clusters 502 502 505 505 502 502
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.030
F test p-value 1.01e-10 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a 
constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
 Pre-Crisis Period
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
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set of quarter dummies as control variables. The estimates are presented in
the upper panel of Table 4.2. The most notable difference to the pre-crisis
sample is that risk now seems to influence the payout decision in the crisis
period; see Column (4).
The lower panel of Table 4.2 reports the baseline regression for the crisis
period.47 We augment it step by step by including the TARP Dummy and
the TARP interaction terms. Throughout all specifications, the coefficients
reflecting the relation between the dividend payout ratio and the measures
for profitability, risk and the Loss Dummy are significant at the 1% level,
and the coefficient for capital at the 5% level.
Let us first focus on how the dividend payout policy of banks which
received state aid differ from those of banks which did not in the crisis period.
The difference is captured by the TARP Dummy and TARP interaction
effects.
In Column (6) we fist include a single TARP interaction term with the
lagged capital ratio. Results suggest that banks with outstanding TARP
shares ceteris paribus paid a lower fraction of profits to share holders, as
suggested by the significantly negative coefficient for the TARP Dummy.
Furthermore, whereas an increase of the capital ratio of 1 percentage point
leads to an around 2 percentage points higher fraction of profits paid out for
non-TARP-supported banks, the relation is stronger for TARP-supported
banks: the total effect of a 1 percentage point increase is 2 + 4,4 percentage
points. The result could be driven by the fact that a higher capital ratio for
TARP-supported banks could mean a higher state stake in the institution.
According to the conditions of TARP, the state-owned preferred shares have
to be remunerated with a dividend rate of 5%, a number not significantly
different from to the coefficient for the interaction term.48
In Column (7) we include a TARP interaction term with the profitabil-
ity measure. The TARP Dummy is no longer significant, although its sign
47The regression is similar to the one presented in Column (11) in Table 4.1 for the
pre-crisis period.
48An F-test performed after the regression could not reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient for the interaction term between TARP and the capital ratio is equal to five.
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Table 4.2: Fixed-effects estimation results for the crisis period, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 2.700***
(0.01)
Return on Assets 2.968***
(0.00)
Loss Dummy -60.95***
(0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -11.04***
(0.00)
Log of Total Assets 13.17
(0.26)
TARP Dummy -12.04** -8.084 -3.108 -7.037 -9.315*
(0.02) (0.11) (0.51) (0.17) (0.07)
Observations 4413 4417 4418 4396 4417
Number of bank clusters 506 506 506 503 506
R-squared 0.037 0.042 0.105 0.040 0.032
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 2.061** 2.367** 2.371** 2.358** 2.024**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Return on Assets -1.236*** -2.006*** -1.303*** -1.239*** -1.841***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -62.80*** -63.27*** -61.45*** -62.44*** -64.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -7.648*** -7.622*** -7.156*** -5.399*** -5.740***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Log of Total Assets 4.215 5.295 5.709 5.890 3.774
(0.69) (0.62) (0.59) (0.58) (0.72)
TARP Dummy -59.91*** -2.617 -2.260 5.462 -50.07***
(0.00) (0.58) (0.72) (0.45) (0.01)
TARP*L1.(Capital/RWA) 4.360*** 4.572***
(0.00) (0.00)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.907*** 1.802***
(0.00) (0.01)
TARP*Loss Dummy -5.643 6.055
(0.43) (0.44)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -5.052** -6.590***
(0.04) (0.00)
Observations 4387 4387 4387 4387 4387
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.118 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.121
F test 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter 
dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Crisis Period
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remains negative. With regard to the effect of profitability on the payout
ratio, our estimation suggests that non-TARP-funded banks have continued
smoothing dividends, reflected in a significantly negative coefficient for the
return on assets. Banks supported by government aid, in contrast, did not
seem to smooth dividends. The effect of profitability on the adjusted dividend
payout ratio, captured by the sum of the coefficients for profitability and its
interaction term with the TARP Dummy, was minimal and not significantly
different from zero; see the Column (7).49
We then continue the analysis by including a TARP interaction term
with the loss dummy and with the lagged ratio of loss allowances to loans
and leases in the next two columns. We do not find any significantly different
effect of the loss dummy on the payout ratio for both groups of banks. Credit
risk, however, seems to have affected the payout decision of TARP banks
twice as strongly, with an elasticity of -10,5 as opposed to -5.4.
We include all TARP interaction terms in our baseline regression for the
crisis period in Column (10). The results remain the same as in the individual
inclusion described above.
To summarize the results of the sample-split exercise, let us highlight the
most significant differences in our results for the two periods by comparing
the baseline models , i.e. Column (11) in Table 4.1 and Column (10) in Table
4.2. Whereas credit risk seems not to have affected the dividend decisions
of banks significantly in the pre-crisis period, banks with higher credit risk
seem to have paid out a lower fraction of profits to shareholders during the
crisis. The results furthermore indicate that dividend smoothing has been
stronger in the pre-crisis period, reflected in a more than three times higher
coefficient for the return on assets. Banks supported by TARP seem to have
stopped smoothing altogether. Finally, the positive relation between capital
and dividend payout ratio appears to be stronger during the crisis. All these
observations do not suggest imprudent behavior of banks during the crisis.
Interesting is the observed difference in the payout decision of state-
supported banks and banks which did not obtain capital from TARP: The
49An F-test performed after the regression could not reject the hypothesis that the sum
of the coefficients is equal to zero.
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former seem to have behaved in a more prudent or cautious way. One may at-
tribute this observation to effective restrictions on dividend payments. Part
of the observed difference, though, could have arisen for other reasons. For
instance, it is possible that dividend payouts as a means to maintain an im-
age of stability and to prevent adverse market reactions lost relevance with
the acceptance of state support. Seeking state support has already revealed
the fragility of the bank in question. Banks which did not participate in
TARP could in contrast have used their dividend policy to signal stability
to markets. Thereby they might have adjusted their dividends more slowly
and gradually to the significantly lower profitability in the crisis period.
Next, we use the full sample and include interaction terms to identify
significant shifts in corporate payout policy. We proceed in two steps. First,
we include “Crisis” interaction terms that capture possible systematic shifts
in the relation between the dividend payout ratios and bank characteristics.
Similarly to the above sample-split exercise we define as crisis the period
starting after the second quarter of 2007. To make sure results are not sensi-
tive to the minor changes in the definition, we also use alternative “Crisis2”
interaction terms, for which the crisis period is assumed to start and to end
a period earlier, i.e. the second quarter of 2007 now belongs to the crisis
period, and the third quarter of 2009 is not labeled as a crisis period any
more. Second, we include “Lehman” interaction terms to capture possible
reactions of the institutions in the sample to the unexpected shock of the
Lehman Brothers default in the last quarter of 2008.50 This is the period in
which the state recapitalization program TARP was introduced.
Table 4.3 shows the estimates for the baseline crisis interaction terms
and Table 4.4 for the alternative, crisis2, terms.51 Similarly to our approach
before, we include TARP and crisis interaction terms step by step.
Overall, the results are very similar to what the sample split revealed. We
are not able to find evidence of a significant shift in the relation between bank
50The actual bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers took place on 15 September 2008 at
the end of the third quarter of 2008. We took the subsequent quarter because the full
magnitude of the systemic crisis had not yet been materialized for the third quarter.
51The results using the lagged ratio of equity to total assets are presented in Tables
4.18 and 4.22 in Appendix C.
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characteristics and the dividend payout ratios for banks not participating in
TARP. The interaction term of the crisis dummy with the lagged capital
to risk-weighted assets is significant at the 10% level only when all other
interaction terms are included; see Column (11). The significance disappears
in the alternative specifications that use the crisis2 dummy or the ratio of
equity to total assets; see Table 4.4, and Tables 4.18 and 4.22 in Appendix
C. The coefficient for the loss dummy turns out to be the only robustly
significant coefficient for a crisis interaction term. The result suggests that
banks which incurred losses have reduced dividends more aggressively during
the crisis than during the pre-crisis period. We believe, however, that some
caution is appropriate in this regard. Losses were common during the crisis,
but hardly ever observed in the pre-crisis period, and this might drive the
results.
In contrast, banks which were supported by the US Department of Trea-
sury pursued a significantly different payout policy. The TARP interaction
terms with the return on assets and the ratio of loss allowance to loans and
leases are significant and point to a shift away from dividend smoothing
and towards taking the amount of credit risk in the bank’s loan book more
strongly into account when dividend decisions were made.
The evidence for a significant change in the relation between the strength
of the capital base and the adjusted dividend payout ratio for TARP sup-
ported banks is rather unconvincing. As already remarked in the sample-split
exercise, the positive coefficient of the interaction term between the TARP
dummy and capital to risk-weighted assets might reflect the fact that partic-
ipating banks are required to pay dividends to the Department of Treasury
that amount to 5% of the injected capital. Thus, if capital to risk-weighted
assets increases for those banks due to a higher stake of the government, pay-
outs reflect a higher contractual obligation to pay preferred dividends to the
US Department of the Treasury. Because the injected preferred capital is not
part of equity in accounting terms, variations in the ratio of equity to total
assets are not driven by the stake of the US government. Using the ratio of
equity to total assets to measure the strength of the bank’s capital base, the
interaction term with the TARP dummy becomes insignificant both for the
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Table 4.3: Fixed-effects estimation results including crisis interaction terms,
US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.682*** 0.668*** 0.628** 0.656*** 0.622***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Return on Assets -1.403*** -2.966** -1.555*** -1.498*** -2.134
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13)
Loss Dummy -53.55*** -54.28*** -39.04*** -53.68*** -40.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.771* -1.917* -1.867** -1.205* -0.991
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13)
Log of Total Assets 2.661 2.726 3.211 2.811 2.701
(0.33) (0.33) (0.24) (0.31) (0.33)
TARP Dummy -47.93** -3.312 -2.648 6.998 -39.08**
(0.01) (0.42) (0.64) (0.28) (0.02)
TARP*L1.(Capital/RWA) 3.379** 3.713**
(0.03) (0.01)
Crisis*L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.519 0.589*
(0.11) (0.08)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.449*** 1.620***
(0.01) (0.00)
Crisis*Return on Assets 1.224 0.0274
(0.32) (0.98)
TARP*Loss Dummy -4.903 7.222
(0.42) (0.28)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -16.97*** -17.51***
(0.00) (0.00)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -5.811*** -6.990***
(0.00) (0.00)
Crisis*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -0.439 -0.950
(0.56) (0.27)
Observations 11756 11756 11756 11756 11756
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.065 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.067
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Full Sample
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. 
Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using alter-
native crisis interaction terms, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.669*** 0.673*** 0.646*** 0.661*** 0.628***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Return on Assets -1.397*** -2.507*** -1.518*** -1.459*** -1.847**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Loss Dummy -53.77*** -54.40*** -42.66*** -53.68*** -42.75***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.843* -1.961* -1.947** -1.311* -1.350*
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10)
Log of Total Assets 2.572 2.824 3.218 2.806 2.633
(0.35) (0.31) (0.24) (0.31) (0.34)
TARP Dummy -50.97*** -3.244 -1.792 7.830 -41.28**
(0.01) (0.43) (0.75) (0.23) (0.02)
TARP*L1.(Capital/RWA) 3.620** 4.066***
(0.02) (0.01)
Crisis2*L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.278 0.291
(0.48) (0.48)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.619*** 1.505***
(0.00) (0.01)
Crisis2*Return on Assets 0.765 -0.162
(0.32) (0.84)
TARP*Loss Dummy -7.656 4.548
(0.20) (0.49)
Crisis2*Loss Dummy -13.89*** -16.24***
(0.00) (0.00)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -6.217*** -7.777***
(0.00) (0.00)
Crisis2*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) 0.187 0.108
(0.80) (0.90)
Observations 11756 11756 11756 11756 11756
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.067
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. 
Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Full Sample
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baseline Crisis Dummy and for Crisis2; see Tables 4.18 and 4.22 in Appendix
C.
The outcomes using the Lehman interaction terms are very similar; see
Table 4.5 and Table 4.19 in Appendix C. The results differ form the previous
ones only with regard to the interaction term between the Lehman dummy
and return on assets. The estimate suggest that during the fourth quarter of
2008 dividends were smoothed to a lesser extent by all banks, with TARP-
funded banks not smoothing at all. The marginal effect of a 1% increase
in profitability for non-TARP banks is still negative for the fourth quarter
of 2008, equaling −1.81, but less strong compared to the average effect of
−2.548 for other quarters. For banks supported by TARP, the marginal effect
is not significantly different from zero. 52
Overall, our results suggest that no significant policy shift has taken place
during the crisis period for US banks which were not supported by TARP.
Dividend levels seem to have been adjusted rather slowly and gradually to the
sharp profitability shock, and we found no evidence that the relation between
the strength of the capital base of banks and dividend payout ratios was
more prominent during the crisis period compared to historical standards.
Bank which needed state aid, though, significantly decreased smoothing of
dividends and and increased the sensitivity of payouts to credit risk in their
loan book.
Two remarks of the results can be made. On the one hand, one can
argue that the findings support the view that weaker banks, i.e. those which
needed state aid, have taken measures to preserve their capital base. Banks
that were healthy enough to survive without government support did not
significantly adjust their behavior which could be considered unproblematic,
given their relative strength.
On the other hand, government support to a group of ailing banks en-
tails significant positive externalities to the perceived stability the banking
system. To put it in a nutshell, even banks which did not receive state funds
52We performed an F-test with the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients in
front of return on assets, Lehman*return on assets and TARP*return on assets is zero.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected.
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Table 4.5: Fixed-effects estimation results including Lehman interaction
terms, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 0.651*** 0.675*** 0.665*** 0.659*** 0.633***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Return on Assets -1.397*** -2.784*** -1.714*** -1.492*** -2.548***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -53.90*** -55.70*** -49.99*** -53.70*** -52.99***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.918* -2.063* -1.963* -1.267* -1.437*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Log of Total Assets 2.434 2.788 3.026 2.826 2.191
(0.38) (0.32) (0.27) (0.31) (0.44)
TARP Dummy -51.96*** -3.207 -2.392 7.267 -42.37**
(0.01) (0.44) (0.68) (0.26) (0.02)
TARP*L1.(Capital/RWA) 3.697** 4.164***
(0.02) (0.01)
Lehman*L1.(Capital/RWA) -0.150 -0.344
(0.72) (0.42)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.384** 1.261**
(0.01) (0.03)
Lehman*Return on Assets 2.653*** 1.467***
(0.00) (0.01)
TARP*Loss Dummy -5.611 6.071
(0.36) (0.36)
Lehman*Loss Dummy -28.42*** -23.17***
(0.00) (0.00)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -5.954*** -8.116***
(0.00) (0.00)
Lehman*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.538 0.408
(0.45) (0.84)
Observations 11756 11756 11756 11756 11756
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.068
F test 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. 
Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
157
Bank dividends in times of crisis
indirectly benefited from state recapitalization, as the banking system as
a whole became more stable. Thus, the strength of non-TARP-supported
banks hinges on the participation decision of their competitors.
4.8 Dividends in the European Union
We now turn our attention to the European sample. The data quality and fre-
quency considerably restricts our analysis: Out of the 287 banks for which we
have information on dividends, we have data on the measures for profitabil-
ity, risk, and capital for 221 banks for on average 2.8 years. Furthermore,
out of those 221, we have data on all variables for 2008 for only 131 banks.
Given that we are interested in identifying shifts in the dividend policy
during the crisis and contrasting it to the payout in the pre-crisis period,
information on bank characteristics and payouts during the crisis is essen-
tial. Thus, for our baseline analysis we use the sample of the 131 banks.
For these banks, data is available for on average 3.1 years. We repeat all
estimations in a second step using the broader sample of 221 banks and call
it the “full sample”. This allows us to check whether the results are sensitive
to sampling.53
Because of the limited availability of data we abstract from a split in a
pre-crisis and crisis period and instead include crisis interaction terms from
the beginning on. Similarly to our proceeding for the US data, we use two
definitions of the crisis period: we first use a crisis dummy equaling 1 in the
year 2008, and second, a crisis2 dummy which takes the value of 1 in 2007
and 2008. The results using crisis2 are reported in Tables 4.26 and 4.27 in
Appendix C.
We start our analysis using the baseline sample. We first perform a fixed
effects regression of the adjusted dividend payout ratio on the lagged ratio of
equity to total assets, the return on assets, the lagged ratio of loss provisions
to loans, the log of total assets, the state aid dummy and a set of year
53Even in this broader sample we can use at most the data on the 131 banks to identify
the dividend decisions of banks during the crisis period. This is different is for the estimates
for the dividend payout during the pre-crisis period.
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dummies.54 We then include state aid and crisis interaction terms step by
step. The results are reported in Table 4.6.
Column (1) shows the estimates prior to the inclusion of interaction ef-
fects. The coefficient for the capital ratio has a counterintuitive negative
sign, is insignificant and stays negative and insignificant throughout all spec-
ifications.55 The coefficient for return on assets is negative and significant,
indicating, similarly to the results for the United States, that banks tend
to smooth dividend payments. Banks experiencing losses tend to cut divi-
dends altogether, as implied by the negative and significant sign for the loss
dummy. None of the coefficients for the lagged loss provisions to loans, the
log of total assets or the state aid dummy are significant.
In Columns (2) to (5) we sequentially include the state aid and crisis
interaction terms. We start by adding interactions with the lagged ratio of
equity to total assets. The interaction with the state aid dummy is signifi-
cantly negative, counter to what common sense suggests. The result implies
that, for banks supported with government capital, lower equity ratios tend
to coincide with high dividend ratios. The counter-intuitive result possi-
bly arises as a consequence of a timing mismatch in the data. We have no
information on the exact dates of dividend payments and government recap-
italizations. Most of the direct government recapitalizations took place at
the beginning of 2009. Similarly, many banks paid dividends for 2008 at the
beginning of 2009.56 Thus, we cannot rule out that the sequence of events is
rather that banks which had low capital buffers and had paid high dividends
relative to their earnings were particularly fragile, and thus had to approach
the national authorities for state aid schemes.
Next, we include interaction terms with profitability and report results
in Column (3). The coefficient for the crisis interaction term is negative and
significant at the 5% level. Banks have seemingly smoothed dividends even
54Results from univariate regressions similar to those performed for the US sample are
shown in Table 4.23 in Appendix C
55Using the full sample instead of the baseline, the coefficient for the lagged capital
ratio has a positive sign but is again not significant throughout all specifications.
56For instance, Deutsche Bank pays it dividends regarding a fiscal year in the middle
of May of the following year.
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Table 4.6: Fixed-effects estimation results including crisis interaction terms,
EU baseline sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.363 -1.318 -1.134 -0.366 -0.314 -2.349
(0.88) (0.55) (0.63) (0.88) (0.89) (0.32)
Return on Assets -12.89** -11.60** -15.75*** -13.03** -12.71*** -14.19***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
Loss Dummy -95.64*** -106.9*** -116.3*** -51.71*** -101.0*** -53.49***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 1.501 1.472 1.842 1.627 6.266** 5.685*
(0.57) (0.56) (0.51) (0.53) (0.03) (0.06)
Log of Total Assets -9.746 -11.51 -13.25 -11.07 -11.37 -18.27
(0.57) (0.51) (0.42) (0.53) (0.48) (0.25)
State Aid Dummy 9.087 60.24 5.646 8.445 -10.17 51.23
(0.60) (0.11) (0.76) (0.68) (0.71) (0.36)
State Aid*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -6.586** -8.035**
(0.04) (0.04)
Crisis*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.659 1.118
(0.54) (0.23)
State Aid*Return on Assets -2.875 -2.534
(0.73) (0.84)
Crisis*Return on Assets -8.682** -7.881**
(0.03) (0.04)
State Aid*Loss Dummy 8.499 -24.94
(0.77) (0.63)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -52.60** -72.23***
(0.05) (0.01)
State Aid*L1.(Provisions/Loans) 44.89 63.48
(0.53) (0.28)
Crisis*L1.(Provisions/Loans) -48.94*** -41.69**
(0.00) (0.02)
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407
Number of bank clusters 131 131 131 131 131 131
R-squared 0.158 0.181 0.180 0.161 0.201 0.248
F test p-value 1.24e-06 1.17e-05 8.53e-07 . 1.84e-08 .
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant 
are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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stronger during 2008. The magnitude of the marginal effect of profitability
on the payout ratio is at fist sight implausible. According to the estimated
marginal effect, a drop in profitability of one percentage point leads to an
increase in the payout ratio by 23 percentage points in 2008.57 Such an
outcome would imply that whenever profitability drops, the level of dividends
paid is actually strongly increased by the bank management. At a second
look, the outcome seems to need further qualifying. A drop of the return
on assets of one percentage point implies for the average bank in sample
that it has incurred a loss during the quarter. Thus, we cannot consider the
loss dummy to stay constant and equal to zero. Such a profitability drop is
generally not considered transitory and is no longer smoothed. The overall
effect on the payout ratio of this type of profitability shock is negative and
leads on average to a reduction of dividend payments.
Subsequently, we include interaction terms with the loss dummy. Simi-
larly to the results for the US sample, the significantly negative coefficient
for the interaction term implies that banks which incurred losses during 2008
tended to cancel dividend payments even more often than during the pre-
crisis period.58
Finally, we include interaction terms with our measure for credit risk
- loss provisions to loans. Once a crisis interaction term is included, the
coefficient for the lagged value of provisions to loans increases and becomes
significantly positive. The coefficient for its crisis interaction is negative and
significant at the 1% level. The result indicates a shift in the relation between
credit risk and dividend payout. During 2008, banks which had to increase
their allowances for losses in the face of higher delinquencies tended to also
retain a higher fraction of profits to build up their capital base, as implied
by the negative sum of the coefficients for provisions to loans and its crisis
interaction term. Prior to 2008, the relation was rather the opposite.
None of the described results change when all the interaction terms are
57Calculated as the sum of the coefficient for return on assets and its interaction term
with the crisis dummy.
58We do not over-emphasize this particular result, as losses are hardly observed prior
to 2008 and this may influence results.
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included simultaneously; see Column (6). With the exception of the inter-
action term with equity to total assets, the state aid dummy and state aid
interaction terms remain insignificant throughout all specifications in Table
4.6. Table 4.7 shows that the results do not change when all regressions are
performed using the baseline sample without state aid interaction terms. In
a similar vein, the majority of estimates remain unchanged in estimations
using the full sample; see Tables 4.24 and 4.25 in Appendix C. Two minor
differences appear, however. First the coefficient for the lagged ratio of eq-
uity to total assets becomes positive, which is the expected sign, but remains
insignificant. Second, the significance of the coefficient for provisions to loans
improves. We interpret this as evidence that our results are not sensitive to
minor changes in the composition of the EU sample.
As a last step, we use interaction terms with the crisis2 dummy for both
the baseline and the full sample, in order to check whether our results are
sensitive to changes in the definition of the crisis period.59 And indeed they
are. Using the baseline sample, the crisis2 interaction terms with profitabil-
ity and the credit risk measure are no longer significant. The outcome is
not particularly surprising, as the big drop in profitability and the surge in
provisioning expenses occurred in 2008. Furthermore, because the state aid
dummy takes values of one only in 2008, it is possible that it acts as a proxy
for the replaced crisis dummy.60
To summarize our findings for the European sample, we first found some
evidence for stronger dividend smoothing during 2008. Second, banks which
experienced material deteriorations of profitability tended to cancel dividend
payments altogether more often than in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore,
banks with higher credit risk in their loan books seem to have paid a higher
fraction of net income to shareholders up to 2008. In 2008, however, the div-
idend payout policy of these banks has significantly shifted towards retaining
a higher fraction of profits whenever credit risk increases.
59The results are reported in Tables 4.26 and 4.27 in Appendix C.
60Note that our dataset provides us with observations for three periods per bank on
average. The variation in the definition of crisis from 2008 only to both 2007 and 2008 is
substantial. Therefore, the sensitivity of our results to the variation is by far not excessive.
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Table 4.7: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis excluding
state aid interaction terms, EU baseline sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.363 -0.283 -1.169 -0.358 -0.161 -0.861
(0.88) (0.90) (0.61) (0.88) (0.94) (0.72)
Return on Assets -12.89** -13.16** -16.27*** -13.09** -12.41*** -15.38***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -95.64*** -96.86*** -115.1*** -51.77*** -103.2*** -54.21***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 1.501 1.536 1.913 1.622 6.363** 6.217*
(0.57) (0.55) (0.49) (0.53) (0.03) (0.05)
Log of Total Assets -9.746 -9.397 -13.23 -11.05 -12.55 -17.00
(0.57) (0.58) (0.42) (0.53) (0.45) (0.30)
State Aid Dummy 9.087 9.206 4.765 9.992 2.345 1.010
(0.60) (0.60) (0.78) (0.57) (0.89) (0.95)
Crisis*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.262 0.103
(0.86) (0.94)
Crisis*Return on Assets -9.088** -7.308**
(0.01) (0.02)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -48.48** -69.78***
(0.03) (0.00)
Crisis*L1.(Provisions/Loans) -44.79*** -38.91**
(0.01) (0.03)
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407
Number of bank clusters 131 131 131 131 131 131
R-squared 0.158 0.158 0.180 0.160 0.197 0.214
F test p-value 1.24e-06 2.06e-06 3.10e-07 . 7.94e-08 .
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant are 
suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
163
Bank dividends in times of crisis
Compared to the results for the United States, three major differences
emerge. First and most prominently, the participation in TARP seems to
relate to a more prudent dividend payout policy in the United States. Banks
participating in TARP have tended to stop dividend smoothing and to pay
out lower fractions of profits as credit risk have increased. We do not observe
such a relation in the European sample. State support schemes do not seem
to have played a role for dividend payouts. Second, we are not able to find
a systematic shift in the relation between bank characteristics and dividend
ratios for non-TARP participating banks in the United States. As stated
above, we find some evidence for stronger smoothing and a stronger effect
of increased credit risk on dividend payout in the European Union. Finally,
capital ratios seem to not to have influenced the fraction of profits retained
in the European Union. Not in a single specification in our analysis is the
coefficient for equity to total assets significantly positive, and in some it is
even negative.
4.9 Conclusion
The surge in dividend payments relative to net profits in the United States
during the period of 2007 - 2008 and in the European Union in 2008 seems
ominous at first sight. Taking into account how dividend payout ratios relate
to profitability, credit risk and the capital base of banks, the picture does not
look as alarming any more. For US banks participating in TARP, we observe
a significant shift of dividend policies towards higher sensitivity to credit risk
and lesser smoothing over time. US banks that have not received support
have, in contrast, not significantly adjusted their dividend policies: for these
banks, dividends seem to have declined only gradually in the aftermath of the
profitability shock. Similarly to the results on the US banks receiving state
support, European banks seem to have increased the influence of credit risk
considerations on dividend decisions. However, we also find some evidence
for stronger dividend smoothing during the crisis period compared to the
period up to 2008.
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In sum, most of the observed surge in payout-profit ratios can be explained
by the attempt of banks to smooth the absolute levels of dividends as net
profits have declined. Importantly, we do not find any evidence of excessive
dividend payments by credit institutions with very low capital buffers or
subject to high credit risk. Nevertheless, the slow adjustment of dividends
to the drop in profitability has led to a loss of bank equity in the course of
the crisis, exacerbating the procyclical features of the financial system. The
ongoing policy initiative to tie distribution policies to the level of capital
buffers above the regulatory minima is therefore an important opening to
address the concerns of policymakers and other stakeholders and to improve
systemic stability.
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C Appendix to chapter 4
C.1 Data description
Table 4.8: Number of observations
year
banks in 
sample
of which 
report 
dividends quarter
banks in 
sample
of which 
report 
dividends
2002 134 48 4q2003 486 484
2003 144 52 1q2004 486 486
2004 355 114 2q2004 489 486
2005 441 184 3q2004 493 489
2006 480 194 4q2004 494 493
2007 475 182 1q2005 494 494
2008 422 167 2q2005 496 494
2009 0 0 3q2005 500 496
4q2005 502 500
1q2006 502 502
2q2006 502 502
3q2006 502 502
4q2006 503 502
1q2007 505 505
1998 456 456 2q2007 506 505
1999 468 468 3q2007 506 506
2000 477 477 4q2007 506 506
2001 482 482 1q2008 506 506
2002 483 483 2q2008 506 506
2003 486 486 3q2008 498 498
2004 494 494 4q2008 489 489
2005 502 502 1q2009 485 485
2006 503 503 2q2009 479 480
2007 506 506 3q2009 464 464
2008 489 489
2009* 464 464
EU sample 
Number of observations per year
USA sample 
Number of observations per quarter
* for 2009 data on the third quarter available
USA sample 
Number of observations per year
year
banks in 
sample
of which 
report 
dividends
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Table 4.9: US sample coverage
year
2003 5102.5 7808.9 65.34%
2004 6309 8488 74.33%
2005 7202.1 9843.7 73.16%
2006 8454 10821 78.13%
2007 9826.4 11809.5 83.21%
2008 10800 14001.4 77.14%
USA sample
Billions of Dollar
Assets of 
commercial banks 
in sample
Assets of 
commercial banks 
in the USA Sample coverage
Notes: Author’s calculations using data from the Flow of Funds Statistics,
Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Table 4.10: Summary statistics, US sample
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 11868 45.31 71.68 0.00 422.61
Equity/Total Assets 12383 11.13 7.52 0.00 72.86
Capital/Risk Weighted Assets 12378 14.13 11.01 0.00 171.63
Return on Assets 11879 0.91 2.22 -23.36 13.22
Loss dummy 11880 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Loss Allowances/Loans 12291 1.67 1.58 0.00 62.52
Log of Total Assets 12383 14.75 1.47 8.35 21.29
Table 4.11: Pairwise correlations, US sample
Adjusted 
Dividend 
Payout 
Ratio
Equity/Total 
Assets
Capital/Risk 
Weighted 
Assets
Return on 
Assets Loss dummy
Loss 
Allowances/
Loans
Log of Total 
Assets
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 1
Equity/Total Assets -0.04 1.00
Capital/Risk Weighted Assets -0.06 0.78 1.00
Return on Assets 0.12 0.25 0.20 1.00
Loss dummy -0.22 0.02 -0.01 -0.60 1.00
Loss Allowances/Loans -0.08 0.28 0.22 -0.10 0.24 1.00
Log of Total Assets 0.09 -0.18 -0.20 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 1.00
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Table 4.12: Summary statistics, EU sample
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 407 41.48 47.62 0.00 312.26
Equity/Total Assets 407 7.56 6.01 1.34 55.67
Return on Assets 407 0.98 1.20 -0.80 9.27
Loss dummy 407 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Provisions/Loans 407 0.54 0.68 -1.14 4.26
Log of Total Assets 407 16.52 2.20 9.87 21.51
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 611 40.49 45.82 0.00 312.26
Equity/Total Assets 611 8.46 7.78 1.34 62.02
Return on Assets 611 1.03 1.11 -0.80 9.27
Loss dummy 611 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Provisions/Loans 611 0.49 0.65 -1.14 4.26
Log of Total Assets 611 16.14 2.31 8.83 21.51
Baseline sample
Full sample
Table 4.13: Pairwise correlations, EU sample
Adjusted 
Dividend 
Payout Ratio
Equity/Total 
Assets
Return on 
Assets Loss dummy
Provisions/L
oans
Log of Total 
Assets
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 1
Equity/Total Assets 0.0002 1
Return on Assets -0.01 0.65 1.00
Loss dummy -0.17 -0.12 -0.24 1.00
Provisions/Loans -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.31 1.00
Log of Total Assets 0.09 -0.61 -0.45 0.11 -0.06 1.00
Adjusted 
Dividend 
Payout Ratio
Equity/Total 
Assets
Return on 
Assets Loss dummy
Provisions/L
oans
Log of Total 
Assets
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 1
Equity/Total Assets 0.06 1
Return on Assets 0.01 0.58 1.00
Loss dummy -0.15 -0.08 -0.25 1.00
Provisions/Loans -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.28 1.00
Log of Total Assets 0.03 -0.62 -0.42 0.08 -0.08 1.00
Full sample
Baseline sample
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Table 4.14: Dividend payout ratios of banks with negative profits, US sample
quarter mean obs.
of which 
canceled 
dividend min max
4q2003 0 11 100% 0 0
1q2004 0 6 100% 0 0
2q2004 0 8 100% 0 0
3q2004 0.00 9 100% 0.00 0
4q2004 -7.70 15 67% -23.09 0
1q2005 0.00 5 100% 0.00 0
2q2005 0.00 10 100% 0.00 0
3q2005 0.00 12 100% 0.00 0
4q2005 0.00 19 100% 0.00 0
1q2006 0.00 6 100% 0.00 0
2q2006 0.00 11 100% 0.00 0
3q2006 0.00 5 100% 0.00 0
4q2006 -13.59 15 53% -29.36 0
1q2007 0.00 9 100% 0.00 0
2q2007 0.00 12 100% 0.00 0
3q2007 -20.39 27 67% -71.74 0
4q2007 -48.92 68 61% -241.54 0
1q2008 -8.80 53 79% -63.41 0
2q2008 -35.46 91 63% -314.15 0
3q2008 -32.09 135 66% -469.35 0
4q2008 -25.56 219 65% -439.75 0
1q2009 -15.27 165 80% -294.67 0
2q2009 -7.09 199 80% -129.05 0
3q2009 -8.93 184 82% -160.72 0
Dividend to net income of banks with negative net income
US sample
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Figure 4.8: Mean of bank dividends and net income in the USA
C.2 Sensitivity analysis
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Table 4.15: Fixed-effects estimation results for the crisis period: Sensitivity
analysis using Equity/Total Assets, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 2.881***
(0.00)
Return on Assets 2.968***
(0.00)
Loss Dummy -60.95***
(0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -11.04***
(0.00)
Log of Total Assets 13.17
(0.26)
TARP Dummy -11.29** -8.084 -3.108 -7.037 -9.315*
(0.03) (0.11) (0.51) (0.17) (0.07)
Observations 4418 4417 4418 4396 4417
Number of bank clusters 506 506 506 503 506
R-squared 0.038 0.042 0.105 0.040 0.032
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.766** 1.817** 1.784** 1.859** 1.855**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Return on Assets -1.252*** -2.031*** -1.287*** -1.217*** -1.856***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -62.60*** -63.04*** -61.11*** -62.10*** -63.86***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -6.894*** -7.263*** -6.789*** -4.755** -5.007**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Log of Total Assets 5.445 4.934 5.285 5.688 4.053
(0.59) (0.63) (0.61) (0.58) (0.69)
TARP Dummy -5.041 -1.492 -1.053 7.709 -51.80***
(0.65) (0.76) (0.87) (0.30) (0.01)
TARP*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.136 4.861***
(0.88) (0.00)
TARP*Return on Assets 2.020*** 1.900***
(0.00) (0.01)
TARP*Loss Dummy -6.032 6.687
(0.40) (0.40)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -5.701** -7.370***
(0.02) (0.00)
Observations 4395 4395 4395 4395 4395
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.112 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.120
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Crisis Period
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies 
and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
176
Bank dividends in times of crisis
Table 4.16: Fixed-effects estimation results for the crisis period: Sensitivity
analysis excluding TARP participating banks, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2)
L1.(Capital/RWA) 1.262
(0.23)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.679*
(0.08)
Return on Assets -1.748*** -1.768***
(0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -57.50*** -57.17***
(0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -7.263*** -6.391***
(0.00) (0.01)
Log of Total Assets 9.424 11.04
(0.53) (0.43)
Observations 2477 2477
Number of bank clusters 282 282
R-squared 0.097 0.098
F test p-value 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes
Crisis Period, banks participating in TARP excluded
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The 
table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a 
constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.17: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis univariate
regressions, US sample
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Table 4.18: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using Eq-
uity/Total Assets, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.170*** 1.263*** 1.172*** 1.209*** 1.097***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on Assets -1.529*** -3.520*** -1.657*** -1.581*** -2.757*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)
Loss Dummy -53.62*** -53.94*** -38.68*** -53.37*** -41.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.694* -1.900* -1.848* -1.231* -1.101
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.14)
Log of Total Assets 3.304 3.451 3.888 3.464 3.250
(0.20) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21)
TARP Dummy -0.364 -3.933 -3.119 6.953 2.999
(0.97) (0.34) (0.58) (0.28) (0.77)
TARP*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.500 0.346
(0.57) (0.71)
Crisis*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.395 0.443
(0.25) (0.24)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.594*** 2.025***
(0.00) (0.00)
Crisis*Return on Assets 1.673 0.544
(0.17) (0.71)
TARP*Loss Dummy -5.494 6.702
(0.36) (0.31)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -16.91*** -16.46***
(0.00) (0.00)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -6.145*** -6.371***
(0.00) (0.00)
Crisis*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -0.126 -0.672
(0.86) (0.41)
Observations 11761 11761 11761 11761 11761
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Full Sample
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. 
Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.19: Fixed-effects estimation results: including Lehman interaction
terms, Sensitivity analysis using Equity/Total Assets, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.226*** 1.277*** 1.230*** 1.210*** 1.239***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on Assets -1.536*** -3.015*** -1.826*** -1.593*** -2.835***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -53.80*** -55.51*** -49.53*** -53.39*** -53.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.797* -2.065* -1.944* -1.238* -1.476*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Log of Total Assets 3.596 3.551 3.718 3.477 3.431
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19)
TARP Dummy -2.235 -3.788 -2.895 6.809 1.903
(0.82) (0.36) (0.61) (0.28) (0.85)
TARP*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.320 0.639
(0.70) (0.49)
Lehman*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.204 0.139
(0.72) (0.82)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.584*** 1.829***
(0.00) (0.00)
Lehman*Return on Assets 2.821*** 1.581***
(0.00) (0.01)
TARP*Loss Dummy -6.178 5.596
(0.30) (0.39)
Lehman*Loss Dummy -28.88*** -22.17***
(0.00) (0.01)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -6.084*** -7.200***
(0.00) (0.00)
Lehman*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.357 0.490
(0.50) (0.81)
Observations 11761 11761 11761 11761 11761
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.064 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.067
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Full Sample
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies 
and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 4.20: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis with regard
to the capital ratios, US sample
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Table 4.21: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis with regard
to profitability, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return on Assets 2.822*** -1.258*** -1.233*** -1.889 -2.128***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00)
Crisis*Return on Assets 0.0762
(0.95)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.465*** 1.184**
(0.01) (0.03)
Loss Dummy -54.60*** -54.25*** -36.97*** -52.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -21.44***
(0.00)
TARP*Loss Dummy 0.326 -2.641
(0.96) (0.69)
TARP Dummy -3.345 -1.839 -0.828
(0.39) (0.75) (0.89)
Lehman*Return on Assets 0.948
(0.11)
Lehman*Loss Dummy -22.41***
(0.00)
Observations 11867 11867 11852 11852 11852
Number of bank clusters 506 506 506 506 506
R-squared 0.028 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.062
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter 
dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.22: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using crisis2
interaction effects and Equity/Total Assets, US sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.180*** 1.263*** 1.197*** 1.219*** 1.136***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Return on Assets -1.524*** -2.883*** -1.624*** -1.551*** -2.054**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Loss Dummy -53.65*** -54.10*** -42.03*** -53.36*** -42.89***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -1.683* -1.958* -1.928* -1.312* -1.344
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13)
Log of Total Assets 3.337 3.556 3.904 3.472 3.394
(0.20) (0.17) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19)
TARP Dummy -0.992 -3.829 -2.281 7.562 3.222
(0.92) (0.35) (0.69) (0.24) (0.76)
TARP*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.445 0.480
(0.62) (0.62)
Crisis2*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.438 0.470
(0.27) (0.26)
TARP*Return on Assets 1.826*** 2.051***
(0.00) (0.00)
Crisis2*Return on Assets 1.035 -0.192
(0.18) (0.82)
TARP*Loss Dummy -8.244 4.041
(0.17) (0.54)
Crisis2*Loss Dummy -14.17*** -15.97***
(0.00) (0.00)
TARP*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) -6.445*** -6.824***
(0.00) (0.00)
Crisis2*L1.(Loss Allowances/Loans) 0.428 0.108
(0.56) (0.90)
Observations 11761 11761 11761 11761 11761
Number of bank clusters 503 503 503 503 503
R-squared 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. 
Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.23: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis univariate
regressions, EU samples
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.099 1.214 1.263
(0.62) (0.58) (0.56)
Return on Assets -8.731*** -18.84***
(0.01) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -74.06*** -91.55***
(0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 0.674 1.291 1.193
(0.85) (0.72) (0.74)
Log of Total Assets 6.328 6.759
(0.71) (0.69)
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 407
Number of bank clusters 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
R-squared 0.029 0.039 0.122 0.029 0.029 0.167 0.030 0.030
F test p-value 0.434 0.0841 3.84e-07 0.520 0.521 8.72e-07 0.504 0.582
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.294 1.344 1.392
(0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
Return on Assets -6.143** -14.40***
(0.02) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -67.55*** -80.97***
(0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 2.515 2.718 2.733
(0.38) (0.36) (0.35)
Log of Total Assets 5.074 6.199
(0.74) (0.68)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of bank clusters 221 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.025 0.028 0.103 0.023 0.023 0.134 0.026 0.027
F test p-value 0.487 0.253 1.65e-07 0.562 0.657 2.81e-07 0.493 0.586
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. 
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Fixed Effects
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Baseline Sample
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant are suppressed. 
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 4.24: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using the
EU full sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.098 0.617 0.880 1.070 0.942 0.118
(0.58) (0.76) (0.66) (0.59) (0.63) (0.96)
Return on Assets -10.34*** -9.066** -11.93*** -10.52*** -10.28*** -10.16***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Loss Dummy -83.51*** -91.40*** -96.57*** -46.85*** -87.97*** -46.89***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 3.425 3.641* 3.796* 3.346 6.734*** 6.673***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of Total Assets -4.803 -6.329 -6.611 -6.104 -5.772 -11.04
(0.75) (0.68) (0.66) (0.69) (0.69) (0.46)
State Aid Dummy 8.243 54.47 5.432 8.832 -11.52 50.47
(0.62) (0.14) (0.76) (0.66) (0.66) (0.36)
State Aid*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -5.978* -7.393*
(0.06) (0.05)
Crisis*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.703 0.910
(0.51) (0.34)
State Aid*Return on Assets -2.727 -7.720
(0.70) (0.47)
Crisis*Return on Assets -6.652* -5.640*
(0.05) (0.08)
State Aid*Loss Dummy 9.871 -30.02
(0.73) (0.55)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -53.38** -70.05***
(0.03) (0.00)
State Aid*L1.(Provisions/Loans) 45.70 61.67
(0.53) (0.29)
Crisis*L1.(Provisions/Loans) -48.33*** -44.33***
(0.00) (0.01)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of bank clusters 221 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.131 0.149 0.144 0.139 0.169 0.212
F test p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant 
are suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 4.25: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using the
EU full sample and excluding state aid interaction terms
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.098 1.121 0.879 1.079 0.998 0.787
(0.58) (0.57) (0.66) (0.58) (0.61) (0.70)
Return on Assets -10.34*** -10.45*** -12.34*** -10.58*** -10.08*** -12.11***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loss Dummy -83.51*** -83.99*** -95.56*** -46.93*** -89.91*** -49.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 3.425 3.430 3.848* 3.342 6.750*** 6.745***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of Total Assets -4.803 -4.654 -6.541 -6.064 -6.794 -9.905
(0.75) (0.76) (0.66) (0.69) (0.65) (0.51)
State Aid Dummy 8.243 8.277 4.669 10.63 1.109 1.884
(0.62) (0.62) (0.78) (0.54) (0.95) (0.91)
Crisis*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.123 0.0320
(0.93) (0.98)
Crisis*Return on Assets -7.038** -5.989**
(0.02) (0.03)
Crisis*Loss Dummy -48.56** -67.06***
(0.02) (0.00)
Crisis*L1.(Provisions/Loans) -43.98*** -40.69**
(0.01) (0.02)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of bank clusters 221 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.131 0.131 0.144 0.138 0.166 0.183
F test p-value 1.23e-07 2.55e-07 3.78e-09 2.37e-09 1.84e-07 1.17e-09
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant are 
suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 4.26: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using crisis2
interaction terms, EU baseline sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -0.363 -1.416 -0.372 -0.366 -0.650 -1.945
(0.88) (0.53) (0.87) (0.88) (0.78) (0.40)
Return on Assets -12.89** -12.79** -11.31** -13.03** -12.14** -10.36*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Loss Dummy -95.64*** -108.1*** -104.4*** -51.71*** -95.27*** -50.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 1.501 1.488 1.294 1.627 4.848 4.793
(0.57) (0.57) (0.62) (0.53) (0.15) (0.15)
Log of Total Assets -9.746 -11.87 -10.47 -11.07 -10.49 -14.74
(0.57) (0.49) (0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.39)
State Aid Dummy 9.087 58.33 11.96 8.445 4.504 66.59
(0.60) (0.12) (0.50) (0.68) (0.87) (0.22)
State Aid*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -6.238** -6.945*
(0.04) (0.06)
Crisis2*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.893* 0.978*
(0.07) (0.09)
State Aid*Return on Assets -12.06* -14.09
(0.08) (0.20)
Crisis2*Return on Assets -0.0372 -1.255
(0.98) (0.48)
State Aid*Loss Dummy 8.499 -47.92
(0.77) (0.34)
Crisis2*Loss Dummy -52.60** -53.01**
(0.05) (0.03)
State Aid*L1.(Provisions/Loans) 12.39 35.07
(0.86) (0.54)
Crisis2*L1.(Provisions/Loans) -15.47 -15.08
(0.20) (0.25)
Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407
Number of bank clusters 131 131 131 131 131 131
R-squared 0.158 0.185 0.163 0.161 0.164 0.203
F test p-value 1.24e-06 3.23e-06 9.53e-06 . 8.41e-07 .
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Baseline Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant are 
suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 4.27: Fixed-effects estimation results: Sensitivity analysis using crisis2
interaction terms, EU full sample
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 1.098 0.759 1.065 1.084 0.903 0.363
(0.58) (0.70) (0.60) (0.58) (0.65) (0.86)
Return on Assets -10.34*** -9.660*** -9.325** -10.39*** -9.723*** -7.389**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Loss Dummy -83.51*** -91.71*** -89.40*** -48.54** -83.08*** -43.07**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.04)
L1.(Provisions/Loans) 3.425 3.478 3.295 3.373 5.851** 5.973**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Log of Total Assets -4.803 -4.283 -5.401 -5.866 -5.639 -7.346
(0.75) (0.78) (0.72) (0.70) (0.71) (0.63)
State Aid Dummy 8.243 50.78 10.29 9.486 4.700 66.50
(0.62) (0.16) (0.54) (0.64) (0.85) (0.21)
State Aid*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) -5.439* -6.436*
(0.07) (0.08)
Crisis2*L1.(Equity/Total Assets) 0.510 0.551
(0.19) (0.18)
State Aid*Return on Assets -9.733 -16.27*
(0.11) (0.10)
Crisis2*Return on Assets 0.0999 -0.757
(0.94) (0.61)
State Aid*Loss Dummy 1.551 -57.71
(0.96) (0.24)
Crisis2*Loss Dummy -43.15 -46.67*
(0.12) (0.09)
State Aid*L1.(Provisions/Loans) 9.597 29.23
(0.89) (0.61)
Crisis2*L1.(Provisions/Loans) -11.69 -13.08
(0.19) (0.15)
Observations 611 611 611 611 611 611
Number of bank clusters 221 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.131 0.150 0.134 0.135 0.136 0.171
F test p-value 1.23e-07 5.55e-06 2.16e-06 8.96e-08 4.19e-07 4.85e-07
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster standard errors yes yes yes yes yes yes
Full Sample
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio
Fixed Effects
Notes: P-values adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows fixed effects within estimation. Quarter dummies and a constant are 
suppressed. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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